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Sunday, July 8, 2012

Reconstruction Update


  1. “Smuggling of Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Materials from Pakistan to Afghanistan.”  U.S. Government Accountability Office, May 2012.
Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been a significant cause of fatalities among U.S. troops in Afghanistan. About 80 percent of the IEDs contain homemade explosives, primarily calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) fertilizer smuggled from Pakistan. U.S. officials recognize the threat posed by the smuggling of CAN and other IED precursors from Pakistan into Afghanistan, and the Department of State (State) and other agencies are assisting Pakistan’s government to counter this threat. In addition, with the adoption in 2011 of its National Counter-IED Strategy, Pakistan recognized the importance of addressing the IED threat, both for its own security and stability goals, as well as for counterterrorism efforts in the region. Various insurgent groups in Pakistan regularly use IEDs, which have killed thousands of Pakistani civilians and security force members.

  1. “Middle East Leads World in Negative Emotions.”  Gallup World, June 2012.
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- People living in Iraq, the Palestinian Territories, Bahrain, and a few other Middle Eastern countries are among the most likely worldwide to experience a lot of negative emotions on a daily basis, according to Gallup's Negative Experience Index. Iraq's score of 59 on the index in 2011 -- which is based on respondents' reports of experiencing anger, stress, worry, sadness, and physical pain -- is the highest in the world. The Palestinian Territories placed a distant second with a score of 43.

  1. “Parting Gift for Afghans: A Military McMansion.” Wall Street Journal.
ZARGHUN SHAHR, Afghanistan—In a dusty valley here, construction workers are racing to finish a fiber-optic-equipped military base for a wood-burning army.
The $89 million U.S.-funded forward operating base, called Super FOB, is being built to house the Afghan army brigade that patrols Paktika province, along the contentious Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
But Super FOB is being completed, and due to be expanded, after the U.S. and its allies have decided the Afghan security forces should be about a third smaller than envisioned when the base was conceived by U.S. and Afghan strategists. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303610504577420232465796466.html?mod=googlenews_wsj  

  1. “Power and patronage in Pakistan.” Stephen M. Lyon, University of Kent.
Asymmetrical power relationships are found throughout Pakistan’s Punjabi and Pukhtun communities. This thesis argues that these relationships must be examined as manifestations of cultural continuity rather than as separate structures. The various cultures of Pakistan display certain common cultural features which suggest a reexamination of past analytical divisions of tribe and peasant societies. This thesis looks at the ways power is expressed, accumulated and maintained in three social contexts: kinship, caste and political relationships. These three social contexts are embedded within a collection of “hybridizing” cultures (i.e. cultures which exhibit strong mechanisms for cultural accommodation without loss of “identity”). Socialisation within kin groups provides the building blocks for Pakistani asymmetrical relationships, which may usefully be understood as a form of patronage. As these social building blocks are transferred to non-kin contexts the patron/client aspects are more easily identified and studied; however, this thesis argues that the core relationship roles exist even in close kinship contexts. The emphasis on asymmetry in personal relationships leads to rivalries between individuals who do not agree with each other’s claims to equality or superiority. There are mechanisms for defusing the tension and conflict when such disagreements arise. State politics and religion are examined for the ways in which these patron/client roles are enacted on much larger scales but remain embedded within, and must respect, the cultural values underpinning those roles.

  1. “Kurdish history: Leaders’ greed trumps nationalism.” Michael Rubin.
            June 1 marked the 37th anniversary of the founding of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan          (PUK). While Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masud Barzani graciously          congratulated PUK leader Talabani, bad blood between the two families and their parties       is long, deep, and persistent. 
            The schism predates the PUK’s birth; historian David McDowall, whose “A Modern         History of the Kurds,” remains the desktop reference for Kurdish history, details the        development of factionalism in the KDP in the wake of the Mahabad Republic’s collapse.

  1. “For Exiles, Iraq Beckons and Repels.” New York Times.
BAGHDAD — Ali al-Subiahi returned from his family’s self-imposed exile in the United States to reclaim a sense of himself in a new Iraq.
At 26, he runs a string of private schools in Baghdad, bankrolled by his earnings as an interpreter for the United States military. He has adapted, showing what he considers an American entrepreneurial flair, advertising for his schools on blast walls left from the bloodiest days of the war.
As an American citizen, and a former military employee, he remains fearful for his life. But as an Iraqi, and a Muslim, he finds living here easier than in his family’s new home in Lincoln, Neb., where strip clubs, liquor stores and churches are part of the nearby suburban landscape.

  1. Books on Pakistan:
    1. “The Unraveling: Pakistan in the Age of Jihad,” John R. Schmidt.  The author was formerly Political Counselor at the American Embassy, Islamabad, Pakistan. http://www.amazon.com/The-Unraveling-Pakistan-Age-Jihad/dp/0374280436
    2. “Pakistan: A Hard Country,” Anatol Lieven. http://www.amazon.com/Pakistan-Hard-Country-Anatol-Lieven/dp/1610391454/ref=sr_1_1?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1339561845&sr=1-1&keywords=pakistan+hard+country
      Both books are good.  If you are pressed for time, read “The Unraveling.”  

  1. 2012 Failed States Index Released, The Fund for Peace.
WASHINGTON, D.C. - The Fund for Peace today released the eighth edition of its annual Failed States Index (FSI), highlighting global political, economic and social pressures experienced by states. 
The 2012 FSI ranks Somalia as number one for the fifth consecutive year, citing widespread lawlessness, ineffective government, terrorism, insurgency, crime, and well-publicized pirate attacks against foreign vessels. 
Meanwhile, Finland has remained in the best position, with its Scandinavian neighbors Sweden and Denmark rounding out the best three rankings. All three nations benefit from strong social and economic indicators, paired with excellent provision of public services and respect for human rights and the rule of law.

  1. “Failed Index.” ForeignPolicy.com.
We at Africa is a Country think Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace should either radically rethink the Failed States Index, which they publish in collaboration each year, or abandon it altogether. We just can't take it seriously: It's a failed index.
This year, pro forma, almost the entire African continent shows up on the Failed States map in the guiltiest shade of red. The accusation is that with a handful of exceptions, African states are failing in 2012. But what does this tell us? What does it actually mean? Frankly, we have no idea. The index is so flawed in its conception, so incoherent in its structuring criteria, and so misleading in its presentation that from the perspective of those who live or work in those places condemned as failures, it's difficult to receive the ranking as anything more than a predictable annual canard issued from Washington, D.C. against non-Western -- and particularly African -- nations.

  1. “My real ‘crime’:Standing up for U.S.-Pakistan relations.” Husain Haqqani.
I am saddened but not surprised that a Pakistani judicial inquiry commission has accused me of being disloyal while serving as my country’s ambassador to the United States. The tide of anti-Americanism has been rising in Pakistan for almost a decade. An overwhelming majority of Pakistanis consider the United States an enemy, notwithstanding the nominal alliance that has existed between our countries for six decades. Americans, frustrated by what they see as Pakistani intransigence in fighting terrorism in Afghanistan, are becoming less willing to accept Pakistani demands even though Pakistan has suffered heavily at the hands of terrorists.
This is a difficult time to openly advocate friendly relations between the United States and Pakistan. I am proud that I did so as ambassador. During my tenure, the United States agreed to initiate a strategic dialogue with Pakistani civil and military leaders. The idea was to overcome the episodic nature of bilateral relations: Our countries had a pattern of working together for a few years and then falling out amid complaints about each other. The strategic dialogue sought to reconcile Pakistan’s regional concerns about Afghanistan and India with U.S. global concerns about nuclear proliferation and terrorism. But the dialogue stalled last year, and a series of unfortunate incidents, culminating in Osama bin Laden being found in Pakistan last year, has brought our countries to the brink of an adversarial relationship.

  1. “Life After Karzai.” Michael O’Hanlon, ForeignPolicy.com
Where I went: For all the worries about Afghanistan today, there was something uplifting about many of the conversations I was privileged to be part of on my most recent trip there, in May, with former U.S. Ambassador Ronald Neumann as my travel partner and with the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as the official sponsor of the trip.
A spirit of hopefulness, more than fear, characterized most people I spoke with in Kabul. The recent signing of the U.S.-Afghanistan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) to guide cooperation after 2014, when the NATO combat mission is set to end, reassures many Afghans that they will not be left to their own darker angels -- or the mercy of their neighbors -- when ISAF's transition is complete. Although implementing protocols and a status of forces agreement for the SPA may prove difficult to negotiate, the accord has definitely given a boost to the strides of many Afghan reformers who continue to work hard for their country's future.

  1. “No Country For Armed Men.”  Ahmed Rashid, ForeignPolicy.com.
LAHORE– It was a sign of the misguided times in Pakistan that on June 5 -- a day when the country faced massive rolling electricity blackouts, a crashing economy, civil war in two out of four provinces, violence from the Himalayas to the Arabian Gulf, and a cratering relationship with the United States -- the Pakistani army decided it was the best moment to test fire a cruise missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads. It was the fifth such test since April, supposedly a morale booster for a wildly depressed public, a signal to India that Pakistan would not put its guard down despite its problems, and a message to U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, who had arrived in Delhi that morning, that Pakistan could not be bullied.

  1. “Sakena Yacoobi’s Courage and the Future of Afghan Women.” Isobel Coleman.
It’s good to have heroes. One of mine is Sakena Yacoobi, the founder of a terrific organization called the Afghan Institute of Learning (AIL) that provides education and health services to women across Afghanistan. I first met Sakena nearly a decade ago, and have followed her work closely since then. I’ve visited several of AIL’s programs in Afghanistan and wrote about her and her work in my book Paradise Beneath Her Feet: How Women are Transforming the Middle East.
Taught to read as a child by her local mullah in western Afghanistan, Sakena remarkably (read my book for all the details) went on to earn a master’s degree in public health in the United States. In the 1990s, she started the Afghan Institute of Learning, mostly serving Afghan refugees in Pakistan, but also secretly operating girls’ schools in Kabul during the Taliban years. After the Taliban were toppled in 2001, AIL quickly expanded its programs, establishing multiple women’s centers across the country. Its reach today is impressive: since 1996, AIL-trained teachers have taught 4.6 million people, and more than a million Afghan women and their children have received its health services. In 2011 alone, the organization treated over 185,000 people (70 percent of them women). Over nine million Afghans – a third of the population – have been touched by AIL programs. Sakena manages all of this on a shoe-string budget of less than $2 million a year, using local resources and local salaries.

  1. “The Big Picture – Afghanistan: May 2012.” Boston.com
U.S. and NATO forces continue to train the Afghan troops in advance of the handover of the country's security in 2014. The US-led war in Afghanistan has cost the lives of around 3,000 US and allied troops, seen thousands of Afghans killed and cost hundreds of billions of dollars. We check in on our soldiers for May (and a little bit of June 2012.) -- Paula Nelson (45 photos total) http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2012/06/afghanistan_may_2012_1.html  

  1. “Afghanistan from 2012-2014: Is A Successful Transition Possible?”  Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2012.
The key issue in evaluating the prospects for a successful Transition in Afghanistan is not whether a successful transition in Afghanistan is possible, it is rather whether some form of meaningful transition is probable – a very different thing. The answer is a modest form of strategic success is still possible, but that it is too soon to know whether it is probable and there are many areas where the current level of planning, analysis, and action combined to sharply reduce the chances for success.
The Afghan government, the US and its allies, and aid donors have not made enough collective progress to assign a clear level of probability. Equally important, it is too soon to know what level of forces they will maintain in Afghanistan through the end of 2014 and beyond, what levels of military and civil aid they will provide, and what level of success Afghanistan can achieve moving forward.

  1. “Afghanistan Market Price Bulletin, June 2012 (Reporting May 2012).” World Food Programme, June 2012.
Average wheat grain retail prices were on decreasing since July-2011 and continued until the reporting month (May 2012). It is mainly due to decrease of wheat price on the regional markets (Pakistan and Kazakhstan). On the international market continues decreasing trend of wheat price started from October 2011 till April 2012. Recent decrease in wheat price is also due to normal trend of export from main export countries and good precipitation which will hopefully result in good harvest this year.

  1. “Mind the Gap? Local Practices and Institutional Reforms for Water Allocation in Afghanistan’s Panj-Amu River Basin.” Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, June 2012.
Since 2004, policymakers and international donor agencies have been trying to introduce “good” water governance concepts in the reform of Afghanistan’s water sector. The 2009 Water Law is based around the “holy trinity” of integrated water resource management (IWRM), river basin management (RBM) and participation in decentralised decision-making via Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs). Since 2005, the Panj-Amu River Basin Program (PARBP) has been piloting the introduction of these imported concepts in north-eastern Afghanistan.
International experience shows that institutional change rarely follows models as they are originally designed, as implementation often faces resistance on the ground. Piloting the implementation of complex water governance reforms at sub-basin level requires using the lessons learned from actual practices and outcomes of implemented strategies to anticipate the opportunities and challenges in the adaptation of policies and strategies, including for MSPs, in a given river basin.
With this context in mind, this research attempts to provide a better understanding of how local institutions deal with water allocation at the sub-basin level during dry years, and discuss further policy challenges and opportunities. It begins by describing the existing institutional arrangements shaping water allocation, going on to assess their performance, before identifying and analysing the gaps between existing policies and ground realities. The overall focus is on how decision-making processes and power relations shape water allocation at sub-basin level.

  1. “Rebuilding Pharmaceutical Systems in Afghanistan: Assuring Sustainability by Developing Human Resources.” International Pharmacy Journal, June 2012. http://www.fip.nl/files/fip/IPJ/IPJ_Vol27_No1_web_def.pdf#page=25  

  1.  “Counternarcotics Policy in Afghanistan: A Good Strategy Poorly Implemented.”  Brookings Institution, May 2012. 
Narcotics production and counternarcotics policies in Afghanistan are of critical importance not only for drug control there and worldwide, but also for the counterinsurgency, stabilization, economic, and rule-of-law efforts in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, many of the counternarcotics policies adopted during the 2000s decade had serious counterproductive effects on these objectives.  

In a courageous break with thirty years of counter-narcotics policies that focused on ineffective forced eradication of illicit crops as a way to reduce the supply of drugs and bankrupt belligerents, the Obama administration wisely decided in 2009 to scale back eradication in Afghanistan. Instead, its counternarcotics strategy emphasized selective interdiction of high-level and particularly Taliban-linked traffickers and comprehensive rural development.  

But the effectiveness of the administration’s well-thought-out counternarcotics strategy has been challenged by major implementation difficulties. Effective implementation is ultimately dependent on achieving robust progress in improving security and governance in Afghanistan -- the former very tenuous at best, the latter overwhelmingly characterized by corruption, abuse, and incompetence. Critical problems have also arisen as a result of misguided policies in the field. Interdiction has lost its selective focus on high-level Taliban-linked traffickers and become indiscriminate in targeting small-level farmers. In most of Afghanistan, including some of the most strategic areas, alternative livelihoods efforts have not amounted to comprehensive long-term development. And eradication and bans on poppy are still going on, once again emiserating farmers and driving instability and conflict.



  1. “Polio Global Emergency Action Plan 2012-2013.” World Health Organisation, June 2012.
An unprecedented intensity of polio eradication activities in 2010-11 resulted in several landmark successes. India became polio-free and global cases decreased by 52%; of the four countries with re-established poliovirus transmission, South Sudan and Angola have not recorded a case since June 2009 and July 2011, respectively, while cases fell substantially in the second half of 2011 in Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. All importation-associated outbreaks in eight previously polio-free countries in 2011 were stopped, all but one (in Mali) within six months.
In the three remaining polio-endemic countries, however, polio cases soared from 2010 to 2011 (in Afghanistan by 220%, in Nigeria by 185% and in Pakistan by 37%), with the most dramatic rise in the second half of 2011. Polio also spread internationally from Nigeria and Pakistan, underscoring the risk that endemic poliovirus transmission continues to pose globally. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/PDF2.pdf  

  1. “Quarterly Data Report. Q1 2012.” Afghan NGO Safety Office, June 2012.

  1. “Afghanistan: Time to Move to Sustainable Jobs. Study on the State of Employment in Afghanistan.”  International Labour Organisation, May 2012.
The situation of Afghanistan is today undermined by the convergence of demographic, social, economic, and of course, political challenges. Recent figures released by the World Bank and the Afghan Ministry of Finance indicate that the total amount of aid for 2010/2011 amounted to approximately US$15.7 billion, which is close to the overall GDP. As such, both the income of the Afghan government and the precarious economic equilibrium of the country are directly dependent on donors’ contributions and the country could thus suffer an economic downturn and severe uncertainties as a consequence of a reduction in development assistance funds.
In this context, this study calls for a longer term approach to socio-economic development in Afghanistan, in which employment and decent work take a central role. While this is indeed a major challenge given the economic and political uncertainties facing the country, a balance needs to be found between the urgency of stabilization and creating more sustainable jobs that lift people and their families out of poverty.






 














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