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Tuesday, April 9, 2013

Reconstruction Update


  1.  “Pakistani Disapproval of U.S. Leadership Soars In 2012”, Gallup, February 2013.
WASHINGTON, D.C. -- With President Barack Obama's first term characterized by strained relations between Pakistan and the U.S., more than nine in 10 Pakistanis (92%) disapprove of U.S. leadership and 4% approve, the lowest approval rating Pakistanis have ever given.
Pakistanis' approval of the leadership of their ostensible ally, the United States, has historically been quite low. However, perceptions began to change, albeit modestly, through much of Obama's first term. As recently as May 2011, 27% of Pakistanis approved of U.S. leadership, the apex of support. Noticeably, approval declined after the May 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden, carried out by the U.S. military without the assistance of the Pakistani military -- an event that many Pakistanis viewed as a blatant disregard for Pakistani sovereignty.
These findings are based on a survey conducted from Sept. 30-Oct. 16, 2012, in Pakistan. The survey directly followed massive demonstrations against the release of an anti-Muslim film made in the U.S.
  1. “Over $8B of the Money You Spent Rebuilding Iraq Was Wasted Outright,” Wired, March 2013. 
The legacy of all the money the U.S. wasted in Iraq might be summed up with a single quote. “$55 billion could have brought great change in Iraq,” Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently told the U.S.’s Iraq auditor. In fact, the U.S. spent $60 billion in its botched and often fraudulent efforts to rebuild the country it invaded, occupied and recast in its image.
With the 10-year anniversary of the Iraq invasion looming, Stuart Bowen, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, considers $8 billion of that money wasted outright. And that’s a “conservative” estimate, Bowen tells Danger Room.
  1. “Learning From Iraq A Final Report From the Special Inspector General for Iraq   Reconstruction,” SIGIR, March 2013.
A final report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction culminates SIGIR's nine-year mission overseeing Iraq's reconstruction. It serves as a follow-up to our previous comprehensive review of the rebuilding effort, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. 
This study provides much more than a recapitulation of what the reconstruction program accomplished and what my office found in the interstices. While examining both of these issues and many more, Learning From Iraq importantly captures the effects of the rebuilding program as derived from 44 interviews with the recipients (the Iraqi leadership), the executors (U.S. senior leaders), and the providers (congressional members). These interviews piece together an instructive picture of what was the largest stabilization and reconstruction operation ever undertaken by the United States (until recently overtaken by Afghanistan).
The body of this report reveals countless details about the use of more than $60 billion in taxpayer dollars to support programs and projects in Iraq. It articulates numerous lessons derived from SIGIR's 220 audits and 170 inspections, and it lists the varying consequences meted out from the 82 convictions achieved through our investigations. It urges and substantiates necessary reforms that could improve stabilization and reconstruction operations, and it highlights the financial benefits accomplished by SIGIR's work: more than $1.61 billion from audits and over $191 million from investigations.

  1. “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, March 2013.
The United States and its partner countries are reducing military involvement in Afghanistan in preparation to end the current international security mission by the end of 2014. As agreed by President Obama and Afghan President Karzai, and announced January 11, 2013, Afghan forces will assume the security lead nationwide in the spring of 2013 and U.S. forces will move to a support role. The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June 2011, has been reduced to a “pre-surge” level of 66,000 as of September 20, 2012. President Obama announced that 34,000 of the contingent will leave by February 2014. The size of the U.S. force that will remain in Afghanistan after 2014 is under discussion between the United States, its allies, and the Afghan government, and reportedly center on about 8,000-12,000 U.S. forces, plus about 4,000 partner forces. U.S. troops that remain after 2014 would do so under a U.S.-Afghanistan security agreement that is under negotiation pursuant to a May 1, 2012, U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement. The forces would reportedly engage in counter-terrorism missions as well as train the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). Still, fearing instability after 2014, some key ethnic and political faction leaders are preparing to revive their militia forces should the international drawdown lead to a major Taliban push to retake power.

  1. “Breaking Up Is Not Hard to Do - Why the U.S.-Pakistani Alliance Isn't Worth the Trouble,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2013.
Instead of continuing their endless battling, the United States and Pakistan should acknowledge that their interests simply do not converge enough to make them strong partners. Giving up the fiction of an alliance would free up Washington to explore new ways of achieving its goals in South Asia. And it would allow Islamabad to finally pursue its regional ambitions -- which would either succeed once and for all or, more likely, teach Pakistani officials the limitations of their country's power.
  1. Joint Subcommittee Hearing: After the Withdrawal: The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Part I) http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/joint-subcommittee-hearing-after-withdrawal-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan-part-i   

  1. “U.S. Builds Afghan Air Base, but Where Are the Planes?,” Wall Street Journal, March 2013.
 The Afghans won't get the planes on time. The Air Force initially awarded a contract to a U.S. company to supply Brazilian-designed planes. But it canceled the contract after a Kansas-based plane maker filed suit to block it, and the Air Force decided the contract had insufficient documentation. The Kansas congressional delegation also lobbied hard against the Brazilian plane. The Air Force has started the bidding process again, and a new contract likely won't be awarded until next year.
The Afghans won't get the planes on time. The Air Force initially awarded a contract to a U.S. company to supply Brazilian-designed planes. But it canceled the contract after a Kansas-based plane maker filed suit to block it, and the Air Force decided the contract had insufficient documentation. The Kansas congressional delegation also lobbied hard against the Brazilian plane. The Air Force has started the bidding process again, and a new contract likely won't be awarded until next year.
  1. “U.S. Military Neglects Huge Data Trove of Iraq War: The Iraqis Themselves,” Wired, March 2013.
More than the U.S. military ever knew, the Sunni tribes in Iraq prevented America’s long, searing occupation from descending into an even bigger fiasco than it was. That’s just one lesson the U.S. is missing by not taking advantage of the biggest data trove of the war: the accounts of Iraqis who lived through it.
In the popular American conception of the Iraq war, the tribes didn’t play a significant role in the war until around 2006, when they abruptly defected from the Sunni insurgency to stand with U.S. forces during the surge. The brutality of al-Qaida in Iraq — who would punish the ostensible sin of cigarette smoking by chopping off the fingers of the Sunnis they claimed to protect — compelled one of the most momentous strategic shifts of the war.  
That is nowhere near the complete truth, according to Najim Abed al-Jabouri. Jabouri was a two-star general in Saddam Hussein’s army who became one of America’s most prominent and heralded partners against the extremist forces in Iraq that killed nearly 4,500 U.S. troops. Jabouri was the key Iraqi partner for U.S. Army then-Col. H.R. McMaster in Tall Afar, a city that became a proving ground for the counterinsurgency strategy that Gen. David Petraeus would later implement and make famous.
  1. “The Untold Story of Afghan Progress,” Wall Street Journal, March 2013. 
The conventional wisdom about Afghanistan runs something like this: The country is a lost cause. Almost nothing has changed. The people remain backward and thankless, and there is little benefit for the international community to stay engaged in the country's future.
This is far from the truth. Despite many years of conflict, Afghanistan has exhibited dramatic signs of economic, social and cultural revival. The country has undergone such extraordinary change since 9/11 that a return to the dark period of the Taliban is unfathomable.
One source of the misconception about my country is the Afghan government's combative relationship with the international community. But the government doesn't reflect the views of the public. Most people in Afghanistan remain strongly supportive of international engagement and widely approve of the presence of troops from other countries.
  1. The Iraq War in pictures, The Atlantic, March 2013.
  1. The invasion of Iraq in pictures, The Atlantic, March 2013.

  1. “Taliban Talks: Past, Present and Prospects for the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan”, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), March 2013.
This report takes stock of the burgeoning efforts to achieve some level of reconciliation with the Taliban after more than 11 years of war. It deals with the recent history of initiatives to engage with the Taliban, outlines the challenges to these initiatives and derives some recommendations for how to move forward with the peace processes.
The first part written by Mona Kanwal Sheikh gives a brief background to, and status overview of the different initiatives that the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan have taken in order to initiate a peace process with the Taliban. Quoting extracts from recent interviews with experts from Afghanistan and Pakistan who have followed the different initiatives on peace and reconciliation closely, the second part identifies the challenges to the present situation and initiatives. The final part, written by Afghanistan analyst Tim Foxley, puts forward some thought-provoking recommendations on how to create a communication environment that can serve as a foundation for a viable peace process.

  1. “The World Bank Group in Afghanistan: Country Update”, World Bank, March 2013.
  1. “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014”, World Bank, February 2013.
  1. “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress”, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, January 2013.
  1. Joint Subcommittee Hearing: After the Withdrawal: The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Part I), U.S. House of Representatives, March 2013.
  1. “Perceptions of Politically Engaged, Influential Afghans on the Way Forward,” United States Institute of Peace, March 2013.
Summary
• Most influential Afghans surveyed for this report are positive about the international engagement in their country since 2001.
• Most consider that security has deteriorated and are skeptical about the 2014 end date of international combat operations.
• Most are in favor of a small contingent of international forces to be deployed after 2014.
• Mistrust of neighbors seen as interfering is widespread, as is the belief that regional dynamics have a major impact on Afghan stability.
• The majority are equally critical of Afghan foreign policy but do not think that Afghanistan is a threat to others.
• Border demarcation issues, most believe, should be addressed through a consultative process, as should water rights through international mediation, to help de-escalate regional tensions and act as confidence-building measures.
• Terrorism is deemed as sourced outside the country, and the Taliban’s strength is seen as tied to external factors.
• A negotiated political end to the conflict is considered ideal, as is a U.S. role in that process.
• Most do not believe that the Taliban would agree to the current political order or constitution, but some are willing to negotiate elements of democratic values and gender rights.
• Afghans do favor free, fair, and transparent elections for 2014 but ask for more consultation and transparency. 
• The majority do not believe that the current political system was imposed and consider democratic values essential for social and political stability.
• Approximately half of the respondents demand a more decentralized regime through a constitutional review and reform process but do not believe the country is ready for political parties. 
• Corruption, weak governance, militant attacks, foreign meddling, narco-business, and criminality are agreed to be among major challenges facing the country. 
• Most of those surveyed pin their hopes on concepts of peace, tolerance, democratic rule, education, rule of law, employment, and international support. They do not see an alternative to democratic governance. 
  1. Support Process Over Personalities in Pakistan, Council on Foreign Relations, February 2013.
Pakistan’s leadership transitions over the course of 2013 will complicate, perhaps even disrupt, the already tenuous U.S.-Pakistan relationship. As in the past, Washington may be tempted to lend support to Pakistani leaders with “pro-American” leanings. U.S. officials should resist these temptations. The United States should cast its weight behind Pakistan’s constitutional, rule-based process of leadership transition.
By actively encouraging Pakistan’s leaders to stick to their own rules (while otherwise standing above the political fray), the United States would improve prospects for an orderly transfer of power that would contribute to Pakistan’s overall stability. Pakistani leaders who emerge from such a process may not be especially friendly to Washington, but they will at least be open to businesslike cooperation on matters of greatest U.S. concern. 
  1. “Hidden enemies: Afghanistan combats landmines”, Deutsche Welle, March 2013
There are landmines hidden in nearly all of Afghanistan's provinces. Playing children are especially at risk of detonating the devices, which have already cost thousands of lives in the country.  
The 13-year-old Firoz Ali Alizada was in the wrong place at the wrong time when he decided to take a short cut on the way to school with a few friends. He stepped on a landmine that instantly went off and had to be rushed to hospital. Doctors said they would have to amputate his legs if there was any chance for him to survive. But before doctors would even see him, his parents had to bribe them with a handsome sum of money. In the end, the operation was carried out and young Firoz lost his legs. 
He was one of very few who survive such blasts. "I was lucky. It is a miracle that I survived despite losing my legs and nearly all of my blood."
Each month, between 30 and 60 Afghans have an encounter with landmines. They are either killed or badly injured. "Compared to the 1990s, that number has gone down, but it is still the highest rate in the world," Alizada explains.
  1. The Iraq Invasion Ten Years Later: A Wrong War”, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2013. 
Ten years after the U.S. invasion, the war in Iraq represents "a poor choice poorly implemented," says CFR President Richard N. Haass, who was then a senior State Department official. Haass says the cost--in terms of U.S. blood and treasure and a shaky Iraq--was clearly not worth it. The Iraq campaign, along with the current war in Afghanistan and the Vietnam War, he says, "show the folly of overlooking local realities, be they political, cultural, or historic, and trying to impose our views on these societies and trying to remake these societies using large amounts of American military might." 
  1. Joint Subcommittee Hearing: “Islamist Militant Threats to Eurasia”, Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, U.S. House of Representatives, February 2013. http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/joint-subcommittee-hearing-islamist-militant-threats-eurasia
  2. “China's Central Asia Problem”, International Crisis Group, February 2013. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China and its Central Asian neighbours have developed a close relationship, initially economic but increasingly also political and security. Energy, precious metals, and other natural resources flow into China from the region. Investment flows the other way, as China builds pipelines, power lines and transport networks linking Central Asia to its north-western province, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Cheap consumer goods from the province have flooded Central Asian markets. Regional elites and governments receive generous funding from Beijing, discreet diplomatic support if Russia becomes too demanding and warm expressions of solidarity at a time when much of the international community questions the region’s long-term stability. China’s influence and visibility is growing rapidly. It is already the dominant economic force in the region and within the next few years could well become the pre-eminent external power there, overshadowing the U.S. and Russia.
  1. “Invisible Ink: Looking for the Lost Trade Between China, Russia, and Central Asia”, Institute for Security and Development Policy, March 2013.
China, Russia, and the Central Asian States have consistently engaged in economic relations. However, the bilateral trade statistics that are publicly available show a history of inconsistent and unreliable reporting to an extent that makes usage of the statistics as any benchmark problematic. This Policy Brief examines the issues of unreliable bilateral trade statistics and explores ways to improve this area in the future. 
  1. “Addressing Pakistan's Atomisation”, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, March 2013.
Recent milestones in Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal expansion coincide with a growing governance crisis in its domestic politics. New efforts from Pakistan’s elected government to robustly anchor the social base of the state could create resources for strengthening civilian governance and the underlying social fabric. This could in turn provide a strong foundation for eventual domestic decisions to restrain Pakistan’s military nuclear ambitions. Nuclear force development is at present an attractive means for Pakistan to attract international political and financial assistance, while salving the paranoias of its security establishment. Improvement in the state-society relationship could reduce the domestic appeal of endless nuclear expansion as other, more sustainable, resources become available to the state for building economic growth and security. In the wake of national elections this spring, Pakistani politicians should be considering ways to advance this objective when in office.
  1. “Pakistan and the Narratives of Extremism”, United States Institute of Peace, March 2013.
Summary
• People process events around narratives that resonate on an emotional level. Effective strategic communications efforts understand this and ground messages within existing, accepted narratives.
• Violent extremist Islamist organizations in Pakistan have effectively drawn on powerful existing narratives in presenting and promoting their particular worldview.
• Specifically, the circumstances and arguments surrounding Pakistan’s birth gave rise to narratives that violent extremist organizations, including al-Qaeda, have exploited to promote themselves and to gain sympathy.
• For example, extremist strategic communications efforts build on Pakistan’s existing narratives to portray events related to Pakistan as proof that there is an ongoing war against Islam.
• As a result, narratives promoted by extremists are making strong headway among the Pakistani people, who are increasingly seeing extremist narratives as an attractive way of explaining the world around them.
• Unlike extremist communications efforts, strategic communications efforts to counter extremism in Pakistan typically do not deploy messages built on Pakistan’s narratives.
• An effective counterextremism communications strategy needs to engage Pakistan’s narratives and work with those elements of society who are - through their cultural output - challenging extremist visualizations of the world.
• Any strategy toward counterextremism communications in Pakistan should draw on Pakistan’s existing narratives and its sense of itself. Indeed, these narratives provide significant opportunities for counterextremists to attack the vision and worldview of groups like al-Qaeda.
• Strategic communications efforts against extremism need to move away from crafting the “right” message from the practitioners’ point of view and move toward focusing on emotionally engaging the audience.
• All such efforts should be long-term and Pakistani-led, with the capacity to involve state and private entities.
  1. “The problem with Pakistan's democracy”, Foreign Policy, April 2013.
On Sunday, former military dictator Pervez Musharraf was at last given permission to run in the parliamentary elections scheduled for May 11, but only in the northern district of Chitral. Two other districts rejected his nomination papers, and his application in Islamabad is still pending. Elections officials in Pakistan, acting under directives of the country's Supreme Court, have excluded several candidates -- among them Musharraf -- from running in the elections. This pre-selection of candidates is based on controversial Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution, decreed by military ruler General Zia ul-Haq in 1985 as part of his Islamization agenda. These articles forbid anyone who does not meet the test of being a good Muslim or patriotic Pakistani from becoming members of Pakistan's parliament. Until now, the highly subjective criteria of these provisions have never been implemented in practice. http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/04/08/the_problem_with_pakistans_democracy  
  1. “Iraq: A Decade of Abuses”, Amnesty International, March 2013.
Ten years after the US-led invasion that toppled the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, Iraq remains mired in human rights abuses. Thousands of Iraqis are detained without trial or serving prison sentences imposed after unfair trials, torture remains rife and continues to be committed with impunity, and the new Iraq is one of the world's leading executioners. The government hanged 129 prisoners in 2012, while hundreds more languished on death row. Yet, when he launched the campaign of “shock and awe” in March 2003, that swept away Saddam Hussein's regime within just four weeks, then US President George W Bush justified the military intervention partly on human rights grounds, pointing to the many grave crimes committed under the Iraqi leader. The decade since, however, as this report shows, has brought only limited change although tens of thousands of Iraqis' lives have been lost, mostly during the political and sectarian violence that succeeded the armed conflict and continues to this day. As the record shows, in the years when they held sway, the US-dominated coalition of occupying forces created their own legacies of human rights abuse, for which there is yet to be full accountability, and failed to implement new standards that fundamentally challenged the mould of repression set under Saddam Hussein. Today, assuredly, many Iraqis enjoy greater rights and freedom than existed under the ousted dictator but the margin of improvement is far less than it should be, and the country remains wracked by political, religious and other divisions and serious abuses of human rights.
  1. “Afghanistan Index”, Brookings Institution, March 2013.
  1. Justifying the Means: Afghan Perceptions of Electoral Processes”, United States Institute of Peace, March 2013.
This report focuses on local perceptions of the 2014 presidential elections in Afghanistan. It situates the elections within growing concerns about the political uncertainty of the upcoming transition. The author details the findings from over fifty interviews conducted with respondents from three different regions of the country, both male and female, and representing all of the major ethnic groups. The findings suggest that Afghan voters spoke of earlier rounds of voting as having had a cumulatively negative effect. Nevertheless, the ideals associated with elections were described in a positive way.
  1. “Major U.S. Arms Sales and Grants to Pakistan Since 2001”, Congressional Research Service, March 2013.
Major U.S. arms sales and grants to Pakistan since 2001 have included items useful for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, along with a number of “big ticket” platforms more suited to conventional warfare. In dollar value terms, the bulk of purchases have been made with Pakistani national funds, although U.S. grants have eclipsed these in recent years. The Pentagon reports total Foreign Military Sales agreements with Pakistan worth about $5.2 billion for FY2002-FY2011 (in-process sales of F-16 combat aircraft and related equipment account for about half of this). The U.S. Congress has appropriated more than $3 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Pakistan since 2001, more than two-thirds of which has been disbursed. These funds are used to purchase U.S. military equipment for longer-term modernization efforts. Pakistan has also been granted U.S. defense supplies as Excess Defense Articles (EDA). Discord in the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship beginning mid-FY2011 has slowed the pace of transfers considerably.