- “Skateboarding in Kabul,” ForeignPolicy.com, Sep 2012.
A skateboarding park in Afghanistan might
seem a little out of place, but in a country where nearly 70 percent of the
population is under the age of 25, Oliver Percovich -- the founder of the NGO Skateistan -- decided there was an
unique opportunity to work for peace.
In “Skateistan:
The Story of Skateboarding in Afghanistan,”
Oliver explains, "The whole idea was that we're building something for the
kids, in Afghanistan, and it doesn't matter if they're poor, or rich, or coming
from different ethnicities." As soon as he loaned out a few boards, he
says, "I saw the gleam in their eyes and knew they were hooked."
Since 2007, Skateistan has grown into an organization that employs youth from
the street, teaches kids a new sport, and provides a please for boys and girls
to play together.
- “Kabul's fallen skateboard fanatics,” BBC, Sep 2012.
In
a video filmed in June, 14-year-old Khorshid tips her skateboard off the high
edge of a quarter-pipe, at Kabul's indoor skatepark.
She
appears fearless - and she was, say her friends, until she was killed by a
Taliban suicide bomber last weekend.
- “Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia,” Alexander Cooley.
The
struggle between Russia and Great Britain over Central Asia in the nineteenth
century was the original "great game." But in the past quarter
century, a new "great game" has emerged, pitting America against a
newly aggressive Russia and a resource-hungry China, all struggling for
influence over the same region, now one of the most volatile areas in the
world: the long border region stretching from Iran through Pakistan to Kashmir.
In
Great Games, Local Rules, Alexander Cooley, one of America's most respected
international relations scholars, explores the dynamics of the new competition
for control of the region since 9/11. All three great powers have crafted
strategies to increase their power in the area, which includes Afghanistan and
the former Soviet republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Kazakhstan. Each nation is pursuing important goals: basing rights for the US,
access to natural resources for the Chinese, and increased political influence
for the Russians.
However,
overlooked in all of the talk about this new great game is fact that the
Central Asian governments have proven themselves critical agents in their own
right, establishing local rules for external power involvement that serve to
fend off foreign interest. As a result, despite a decade of intense interest
from the United States, Russia, and China, Central Asia remains a collection of
segmented states, and the external competition has merely reinforced the
sovereign authority of the individual Central Asian governments. A careful and
surprising analysis of how small states interact with great powers in a vital
region, Great Games, Local Rules greatly advances our understanding of how
global politics actually works in the contemporary era.
- “All-out Middle East war as good as it gets,” AsiaTimes, Sep 2012.
TEL
AVIV - It is hard to remember a moment when the United States' foreign policy
establishment showed as much unanimity as in its horror at the prospect of a
unilateral Israeli strike on Iran.
In
a September 10 report for Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Anthony Cordesman warns, "A strike by Israel on
Iran will give rise to regional instability and conflict as well as terrorism.
The regional security consequences will be catastrophic."
And
a "bi-partisan" experts' group headed by former National Security
Advisor Brent Scowcroft and co-signed by most of the usual suspects states,
"Serious costs to US interests would also be felt over the longer term, we
believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability,
including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and
counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would
significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out
regional war."
If
a contrarian thought might be permitted, consider the possibility that all-out
regional war is the optimal outcome for American interests…
- “So Much for the Good War,” ForeignPolicy.com, Sep 2012
In
the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the plight of the Afghan woman was a minor, but
important part of the narrative that shaped the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan.
Girls, for the first time in years, headed to schools, and women -- at least in
Kabul -- were able to move without the blue shuttlecock burqas that symbolized
their bondage under the Taliban.
So
it is with great irony that this week, one of the worst ever for coalition
forces in Afghanistan, foreigners were killed in Kabul by a suicide bomber who
was neither male nor linked to the Taliban. The perpetrator was a young woman affiliated with the Hezb-i-Islami
(HIG) militant group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a bitter foe of the Taliban
and former U.S. proxy who on 9/11 was self-exiled in Iran.
The
ever pragmatic Hekmatyar is a weather vane, indicating the trajectory of the
conflict in Afghanistan and the ever shifting domestic and regional power game.
His role in the Sept. 18 bombing shows that the insurgents have the upper hand,
their fight against the United States and Kabul government will continue, and
Afghanistan is headed toward a messy, full-scale civil war.
- “Failed Efforts and Challenges of America’s Last Months in Iraq,” New York Times, Sep 2012.
The
request was an unusual one, and President Obama himself made the confidential
phone call to Jalal Talabani, the Iraqi president.
Marshaling
his best skills at persuasion, Mr. Obama asked Mr. Talabani, a consummate
political survivor, to give up his post. It was Nov. 4, 2010, and the plan was
for Ayad Allawi to take Mr. Talabani’s place.
With
Mr. Allawi, a secular Shiite and the leader of a bloc with broad Sunni support,
the Obama administration calculated, Iraq would have a more inclusive
government and would check the worrisome drift toward authoritarianism under
Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.
But
Mr. Obama did not make the sale.
- “Pictures of Afghanistan in the Fifties and Sixties Are Totally Depressing,” Reason.com, Oct 2012.
"Given
the images people see on TV, many conclude Afghanistan never made it out of the
Middle Ages," writes Mohammad Qayoumi at Retronaut. "But that is not
the Afghanistan I remember. I grew up in Kabul in the 1950s and ’60s. Stirred
by the fact that news portrayals of the country’s history didn’t mesh with my
own memories, I wanted to discover the truth."
Qayoumi's
gallery of what the Graveyard of Empires looked like before it was brought into
contemporary civilization by the Hippie Trail, Soviet modernization, Taliban
discipline and American nation-building is at once endearing, heartbreaking and
disturbing. Because it turns out pre-modern Afghanistan looked pretty, well,
modern.
- “Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: Quarterly Report,” World Bank, Sep 2012.
Donors
have contributed a total of US$5.7 billion since the inception of ARTF in 2002.
SY1390 was a record year with US$933 million paid in, the majority of which was
paid in during the second half of the year (US$877 million). SY1391 has started
out strong with US$526 million contributed during the first quarter from four
donors: Japan, Canada, Finland and the United States. At the same time last
year the ARTF had received only US$57 million…In addition to the funds already
received in SY1391 Q1, another US$430 million has been pledged for the
remainder of the solar year. This amounts to a total of projected contributions
of US$930 million. As a resultof the restructuring of the Afghan financial year,
SY1391 will last only 9 months (March 21 to December 20, 2012) and consist of
only three quarters. US$930 million divided over only three quarters, an
average of US$311 million per quarter, is therefore a very high level of
contributions compared to previous years.
- “The U.S. Surge and Afghan local Governance,“ United States Institute of Peace, Sep 2012.
This
report focuses on both the U.S. military’s localized governance,
reconstruction, and development projects and U.S. civilian stabilization
programming in Afghanistan from 2009 through 2012. Based on interviews with
nearly sixty Afghan and international respondents in Kabul, Kandahar,
Nangarhar, and Washington, this report finds that the surge has not met its
transformative objectives due to three U.S. assumptions that proved
unrealistic. It also examines lessons from the U.S.surge’s impacts on local
governance that can be applied toward Afghanistan’s upcoming transition.
- “Afghanistan Monthly Progress Report. July and August 2012,” Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Aug 2012.
On
8 July at the Tokyo Conference the international community, including the UK,
agreed to help the Government of Afghanistan meet its country’s development
needs for the years up to and after security transition in 2014. Specific
pledges were made to 2017, with strong commitments from the international
community to provide financial assistance to Afghanistan through the
‘Transformation Decade’ to the end of 2024. This support is vital to ensure
that the Government can provide continued stability and prospects for its
people when international military troops withdraw at the end of 2014. Our
support will depend on the Government taking forward key governance and
economic reforms, including on protecting the rights of women and girls,
outlined in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF). At the request of
the Government of Afghanistan, the UK agreed to co-chair the first Ministerial
review of the TMAF benchmarks in 2014.
- “Six Conditions for an Effective Transfer of Power in Afghanistan,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Sep 2012.
The
subject is the transition of power in Afghanistan and I’ve been given seven
minutes to summarize what needs to be done in a way that is intended to be
controversial and stimulate discussion.
Let
me begin by saying that even if you ignore Afghanistan’s neighbors, you cannot
ignore the complexity of the challenges. Unless we take far more realistic and
effective action than we have to date, there is a significant probability that
Afghanistan will go from the center ring of America’s strategic circus in 2010
to an awkward cross between its freak show and its clown car by 2016.
To
be specific, we need to learn from past experiences and cases like Afghanistan
and Iraq, that a successful transfer of power has six elements. The first is
effective leadership, not honest elections…
- “Infantry Battalion Operations in Afghanistan: Lessons from 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (1/6),” Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, August 2012.
- “A slightly different approach: Norwegian non-military collaboration with Afghanistan,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, August 2012.
Norway
has a long history of providing humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan through
non-governmental organisations and the United Nations, and has played an active
role in aiding the rebuilding and development of the country since the fall of
the Taliban in 2001. The Norwegian approach has tried to balance support for military
and civilian efforts, fully engage with the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) and
at the same time help protect the humanitarian space. Norway has been loyal to
the development strategies and priorities agreed upon among the GoA, donors and
international organisations. It has promised to continue its development collaboration
with Afghanistan beyond 2014 when the military engagement is to end. However,
the form and extent of this collaboration is likely to depend on developments
in Afghanistan over the coming years – and not least on the ability of the GoA
to handle and implement development projects in a transparent and corruption-free
manner.
- “Lessons from Afghanistan’s History for the Current Transition and Beyond,” United States Institute of Peace, Sep 2012.
Despite
interesting patterns from the past and at least superficially striking
parallels with the present, policies on Afghanistan have not been adequately
informed by an understanding of the country’s history. Nor has the extensive academic
literature on Afghan history been translated into policy; on the contrary, much
that has been attempted in Afghanistan since late 2001 has been remarkably
ahistorical. This report identifies broad historical patterns and distills relevant
lessons that may be applicable to policies during the 2011 to 2014 transition
and beyond.
- “The Haqqani Network: A Foreign Terrorist Organization,” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 2012.
The
Haqqani Network is the most lethal terrorist network operating in Afghanistan.
It has been linked to several of the most high-profile attacks on U.S. and
foreign personnel and is responsible for most spectacular attacks and high
level assassinations in Kabul and northern Afghanistan. Formerly led by aging patriarch
Jalaluddin Haqqani, the Haqqani Network is currently run by his sons,
Sirajuddin, Badruddin and Nasiruddin and their uncle, Ibrahim. In late August,
news reports surfaced that Badruddin, the day to day operational
commander of the network was killed in a drone strike in North Waziristan.
Badruddin’s death will seriously alter the day to day efficacy of the network’s
strategic and operational capabilities. However, his death will not have a
serious effect on the network’s financial empire, which will ultimately give
the network an opportunity to regenerate an operational replacement.
The
network also includes many family members living abroad, from Pakistan to the
Persian Gulf. Under the leadership of Jalaluddin’s sons, the network operates
out of
a support zone in North Waziristan, Pakistan, opposite Afghanistan’s eastern
border in the provinces of Khost, Paktia and Paktika.
- “Taliban Perspectives on Reconciliation,” Royal United Services Institute, Sep 2012.
In
July 2012, the authors of this report interviewed four senior Taliban interlocutors
about the Taliban’s approach to reconciliation. The primary objective was to
draw them out on three key issues:
1.
International terrorism and the Taliban’s links with Al-Qa’ida and other armed
non-state actors.
2.
The potential for a ceasefire.
3.
Parameters for conflict resolution and continuing presence of US military
bases.
The
interlocutors we interviewed referred mainly to the so-called Quetta Shura
Taliban led by Mullah Mohammad Omar. This is, as they all confirmed, the
primary vehicle driving the insurgency, and, in their view, continues to enjoy
the allegiance of other key groups dotting the insurgent landscape.
The
unwavering consensus amongst our interviewees was that for an agreement to
hold, it would ultimately require approval by Mullah Mohammad Omar…
- “Kabul: City Number One,” BBC, Sep 2009.
Part
One - 1971
There
are many individuals and fragmentary events that have led to the present
situation in Afghanistan. But there was a moment in 1971 when four separate
things happened in and around Kabul that in their different ways reached back
into the past and forward into the future.
That
year the BBC sent a film crew to Kabul to recreate the first great military
disaster of the British Empire - the retreat from Kabul in 1841. The BBC began
by gathering Afghan tribesmen together to be extras. They acted out being
taught cricket by the British. The Afghans then pretended to be fierce rebels
storming out of the Kabul Bazaar to attack the British camp outside the city.
- “Huge Uncertainty' in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, Sep 2012.
President
Obama has withdrawn the last of the so-called 30,000 "surge troops"
he sent to Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010, but Max Boot, a veteran military
analyst for CFR, says there are "huge uncertainties about the
outcome" in the country. He says that "we certainly do not have the
sense of victory in sight that we saw in Iraq when the surge troops were pulled
out of there." Even though President Obama campaigned in 2008 on a
platform of bolstering forces in Afghanistan, "he has done very little to
rally public support for the war effort, again because I think he's
fundamentally ambivalent about the war himself," Boot says. He also says
there are significant questions about long-term U.S. commitment "because
neither President Obama nor [Republican presidential nominee] Governor Mitt
Romney is eager to talk about Afghanistan."
- “Waiting for the Taliban,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sep 2012.
The
withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan will leave the country worse
than it was before 2001 in some respects. There is no clear plan for the
future. Washington will progressively lose its influence over Kabul, and drone
operations in Pakistan are not a credible way to fight jihadist groups on the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The situation will only worsen after 2014, when
most U.S. troops are out of the country and aid going to the Afghan government
steeply declines.
- “No Time to Go Wobbly in Afghanistan: Focus on Stability, Not Exit Deadlines,” Armed Forces Journal, Sep 2012.
In
a parody of Army Gen. David Petraeus’ famous assessment of progress in
Afghanistan — “fragile and reversible” — the transition process there is
fragile and irreversible. There is no turning back. Propelled by the logic of
war, economic necessity and war weariness, the allies — the U.S., the 50
nations of the International Security Assistance Force and Afghanistan — are
force-marching toward a new strategic paradigm.
- “Afghanistan Index,” The Brookings Institution, Sep 2012.
