- Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized? Congressional Research Service.
The United States has been party to multilateral and bilateral agreements addressing the status of U.S. armed forces while present in a foreign country. These agreements, commonly referred to as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), generally establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country. SOFAs provide for rights and privileges of covered individuals while in a foreign jurisdiction and address how the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction apply to U.S. personnel. SOFAs may include many provisions, but the most common issue addressed is which country may exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel. The United States has agreements where it maintains exclusive jurisdiction over its personnel, but more often the agreement calls for shared jurisdiction with the receiving country. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34531.pdf
- Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign. RUSI.
In spring 2011, Western military operations, backed by the Arab League, began against the regime of Muammar Qadhafi. Libyan rebels, after being penned in by the regime, began to take ground and ultimately deposed Qadhafi seven months later. But with all eyes on Syria, does Libya offer a new model for intervention? http://www.rusi.org/publications/whitehallreports/ref:O4F631FBA20DF9/#.T2mgdhPGG2k.facebook
- Pakistan: A Hard Country. Anatol Lieven.
In the past decade Pakistan has become a country of immense importance to its region, the United States, and the world. With almost 200 million people, a 500,000-man army, nuclear weapons, and a large diaspora in Britain and North America, Pakistan is central to the hopes of jihadis and the fears of their enemies. Yet the greatest short-term threat to Pakistan is not Islamist insurgency as such, but the actions of the United States, and the greatest long-term threat is ecological change. Anatol Lieven's book is a magisterial investigation of this highly complex and often poorly understood country: its regions, ethnicities, competing religious traditions, varied social landscapes, deep political tensions, and historical patterns of violence; but also its surprising underlying stability, rooted in kinship, patronage, and the power of entrenched local elites. Engagingly written, combining history and profound analysis with reportage from Lieven's extensive travels as a journalist and academic, Pakistan: A Hard Country is both utterly compelling and deeply revealing. http://www.amazon.com/Pakistan-Hard-Country-Anatol-Lieven/dp/1610390210
- Quran Copy Burning in Afghanistan and the US ‘Exit’ Strategy. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza. Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.
The latest violent protestation in Afghanistan over the burning of copies of the Holy Quran has a demonstrative effect. It has yet again brought to light the nature of the international intervention and the challenges of stabilising this war-torn country. While on the surface the incident appears to be a religiously motivated episode, a growing sense of anxiety and seething anger among a segment of the Afghan populace over other issues is being exploited by the Taliban and its allies in the wake of this incident. More importantly, this episode has raised important questions on the possibility of early international withdrawal and prospects for an effective transition of authority into Afghan hands. http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Insights_158_-_Quran_Copy_Burning_(Amended)_08032012174623.pdf
- Time for Afghan Political Settlement Talks: Reinvigorated Diplomatic Efforts with All Parties to the Conflict Is Needed. Colin Cookman and Caroline Wadhams. Center for American Progress.
Violent protests in Afghanistan over the past week in reaction to the burning of Korans at Bagram Air Base have, as of this writing, claimed the lives of more than 30 Afghans and six U.S. military personnel around the country. These protests also exposed the vulnerabilities of the current U.S. and NATO strategy and reinforced the importance of pursuing a political settlement strategy in close synchronization with military and economic efforts.
For the past three years U.S. strategy largely centered on taking the fight to the insurgency while building up the Afghan police and military. As U.S. and NATO forces transition out of the country, these Afghan forces are expected to take over responsibility for fighting the insurgency as international forces draw down through 2014. But training, mentoring, and embedding with the Afghan police and military have all become more challenging in the wake of last week’s violence. This weekend U.S. Marine Gen. John Allen and other NATO countries withdrew hundreds of advisors from Afghan ministries. The protests reveal deep anger even among Afghans who support the current government, as well as diminishing patience for a foreign military presence that still struggles to adapt to Afghan political realities. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/03/afghan_negotiations.html
- Afghanistan: Improvements Needed to Strengthen Management of U.S. Civilian Presence, Government Accountability Office.
U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority and the Department of Defense (DOD) have reported expanding their civilian presence in Afghanistan and took steps to improve their ability to track that presence. Since January 2009, U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority more than tripled their civilian presence from 320 to 1,142. However, although State could report total Chief of Mission numbers by agency, in mid-2011 GAO identified discrepancies in State’s data system used to capture more-detailed staffing information such as location and position type. State began taking steps in the fall of 2011 to improve the reliability of its data system. Also, DOD reported expanding its overall civilian presence from 394 civilians in January 2009 to 2,929 in December 2011 to help assist U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. The extent to which DOD’s data is reliable is unknown due to omissions and double counting, among other things. In a 2009 report, GAO noted similar data issues and recommended DOD improve data concerning deployed civilians. DOD concurred with the recommendation and expects the issues will be addressed by a new tracking system to be completed in fiscal year 2012. http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588869.pdf
- Afghanistan Security: Department of Defense Effort to Train Afghan Police Relies on Contractor Personnel to Fill Skill and Resource Gaps, Government Accountability Office.
The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan depends in part on building that country’s capacity to provide for its own security by training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces, which includes the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police (ANP). Since 2002, the United States has allocated over $43 billion to train, equip, and sustain the Afghan National Security Forces, which includes about $14 billion to train, equip, and sustain the ANP. The ANP training program is intended to create and sustain a professionally-led police force that is accountable to the Afghan people and is capable of enforcing laws and maintaining civil order. Currently, U.S., coalition, and Department of Defense (DOD) civilian contractor personnel assist the Afghan Ministry of Interior in training the ANP at 23 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) training sites and in mentoring ANP units in the field. http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588816.pdf
- How Will the Withdrawal of International Forces Affect Afghanistan? Transcript of a Chatham House event featuring Fawzia Koofi, Member of Parliament, Afghanistan. http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/170212koofi.pdf
- The Looming Storm in Pakistan's Kurram Agency,John Ty Grubbs. Jamestown Foundation.
Security has worsened significantly in Pakistan’s Kurram Agency this year. In the latest incident, Pakistani fighter jets responded to a series of attacks by bombing militant positions in the Kurram and Orakzai tribal agencies on March 1, killing an estimated 22 Islamist fighters (Dawn [Karachi], March 1; Central Asia Online, March 1). This rise in violence can be attributed to the area’s increasing strategic importance. Physically jutting into Afghanistan, Kurram is an attractive haven for fighters fleeing from drone strikes in North Waziristan and is the ideal entry point into Afghanistan for the Haqqani Network. Therefore, it is crucial for the Haqqani Network and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) elements that support them to marginalize any group that could disrupt this flow of fighters (see Terrorism Monitor, December 16, 2010). The most significant obstacles are the Shi’a Turi and Bangash tribes and the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under the command of Hakimullah Mahsud (see Terrorism Monitor, April 17, 2010). Although the ISI has recently been able to break up and court portions of the TTP, the bloodshed has not abated in Kurram. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39110&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=588
- Gauging Taliban Moves in Pakistan, Daniel Markey. Council on Foreign Relations.
There are reports of efforts to unify various Taliban groups under a single umbrella (NYT) and of a growing rift within the Pakistani Taliban that could open a door for peace deals between the Pakistani government and insurgents in the restive border region. "This could be the beginning of an effort to get all of the militants on the Pakistani side of the border pushing in a similar direction, which would clarify matters in terms of negotiation with the United States," says CFR Senior Fellow Daniel Markey. He adds: "I'm still skeptical that it would make it easy to reach some sort of accommodation that would ultimately serve U.S. purposes." Markey says Washington's lack of clarity on its intentions in Afghanistan and in talks with the Taliban is the "single biggest problem" in its policy toward the region. http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/gauging-taliban-moves-pakistan/p27591
- Pakistan in a Changing Regional and Global Environment. Transcript of a Chatham House event featuring Hina Rabbani Khar, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pakistan http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/220212khar.pdf
- Sino-Pakistan Strategic Entente: Implications for Regional Security, Rajshree Jetly. Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Working_Paper_143_-_Email_-_Sino_Pakistan_Strategic_Entente_14022012160926.pdf
- Pakistan’s Long and Ordinary Crisis, Atul Mishra. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.
Longevity and ordinariness mark Pakistan’s on-going crisis. Fluttering apart, nothing dramatic or decisive has happened in the recent past. This is because the institutions – the army, the judiciary and the political-executive – that could decisively impact the crisis have gone errant. They are not performing the functions they are mandated to perform. They aren’t letting other institutions perform the functions the other institutions must perform. And though these institutions are being mutually meddlesome, they show no inclination to perform the functions of the meddled institutions. This functional derangement of key state institutions has produced Pakistan’s stalemated, and thus ordinary, crisis. Tendencies of the crisis are traceable to the October 1999 coup and its aftermath. Regime actions against the political-executive and the judiciary distorted Pakistan’s already wobbly institutional architecture. Apart from stoking general scepticism against the effectiveness of army rule, regime actions created incentives in whose pursuit the three institutions have become errant. The conditions that structure this crisis also diminish the effectiveness of policy anticipation. Whatever currently exists in Pakistan does not resemble democracy in any meaningful sense. In Pakistan, India faces an assembly of vigorously malfunctioning institutions, which should not be mistaken for a set of weak institutions servicing a fledgling democracy. Nor should Pakistan be considered a failed state. A decisive army coup could clear the space for Pakistan’s domestic politics and for sustainable bilateral relations. But given the army’s disinclination for a political role, India must adopt a studied indifference as its Pakistan policy for a while. http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/PakistansLongandOrdinaryCrisis
- Factsheet: The Fight for Eastern Afghanistan, Institute for the Study of War, March 2012, Isaac Hock.
Security gains made by the addition of U.S. “surge” forces in southern Afghanistan have denied the Taliban its historical safe havens in Kandahar and Helmand. The campaign in Afghanistan must now focus on the East, which received few surge troops. The provinces surrounding Kabul are strategically important for controlling the capital and connecting the city with the rest of Afghanistan. http://www.understandingwar.org/reference/fact-sheet-fight-eastern-afghanistan
- The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat, Institute for the Study of War, March 2012, Jeffrey Dressler.
The Haqqani Network represents hh a strategic threat to the enduring stability of the Afghan state and U.S. national security interests in the region. The Haqqanis are currently Afghanistan’s most capable and potent insurgent group, and they continue to maintain close operational and strategic ties with al-Qaeda and their affiliates. These ties will likely deepen in the future. Unlike the Quetta Shura Taliban in southern Afghanistan, the counterinsurgency campaign has not weakened the Haqqanis’ military capabilities significantly. Few of the “surge” resources deployed to their strongholds in Eastern Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network has increased its operational reach and jihadist credentials over the past several years. The Haqqani Network has expanded its reach toward the Quetta Shura Taliban’s historical strongholds in southern Afghanistan, the areas surrounding Kabul, as well as the Afghan north. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf
- Factsheet: U.S.-Afghan Strategic Agreement, Institute for the Study of War, March 2012, Paraag Shukla. http://www.understandingwar.org/reference/fact-sheet-us-afghan-strategic-agreement
- Their drill may be out of step, but Afghan army is ready for the fight, The Telegraph, 11 March 2012, Sean Rayment. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9135883/Their-drill-may-be-out-of-step-but-Afghan-army-is-ready-for-the-fight.html
- Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts, The RAND Corporation, 2011 by Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel and Olga Oliker.
Security force assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. The outcome of the campaign hinges, in large measure, on the effectiveness of the assistance given to the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other security forces, assistance that the International Security Force must provide while fighting the insurgents. Yet senior U.S. military and civilian officials have posed many questions about the effectiveness of SFA in Afghanistan, and no empirically rigorous assessments exist to help answer these questions. This monograph analyzes SFA efforts in Afghanistan over time and documents U.S. and international approaches to building the Afghan National Security Forces from 2001 to 2009. Finally, it provides observations and recommendations that emerged from extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2009 and their implications for the U.S Army. http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1066.html
- SIGAR: Cost of security in Afghanistan to rise sharply.
On March 9, 2012, we provided a management alert letter to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), detailing a number of concerns regarding the transition to the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) and providing three suggested action items for the agency to consider. The rushed approach we observed to establish agreements with the APPF and the Risk Management Companies compelled us to develop this alert letter to caution both USAID and policy makers of the risks. Our work was conducted in accordance with our professional standards and quality control procedures. Specifically, it was conducted by independent staff, objectively designed and planned, and supported by sufficient and appropriate evidence. We believe that the work performed provides a reasonable basis for the letter’s observations.
On March 13, 2012, the USAID Mission Director in Kabul, Afghanistan provided a written response to this alert letter, which took exception to our findings, conclusions, and suggested action items. Unfortunately, as shown by its comments, USAID has interpreted this alert letter as an affront to its management of the transition, instead of as a constructive document that would aid it in assessing and responding to the risks we identified. Therefore, we are compelled to respond to these comments. http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/alerts/2012-03-15-appf-alert.pdf
