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Monday, June 3, 2013

Reconstruction Update


1.      “A New Plan for a New Afghanistan”, www.TheDiplomat.com, May 2013
Afghanistan's future will not be determined by the thousands of lives tragically lost, the billions spent, or the number of international troops that will remain after 2014. The number of troops on the ground — whether foreign or Afghan — will not decide our future. We can only secure Afghanistan’s success if we first secure sustainable economic development at home.
We are confronting a unique set of economic challenges at a time when the West is confronting their own. Demographic shifts and an unsustainable debt burden will fundamentally change the calculus of aid and intervention; we must come up with our own solutions. Our success as a nation will rest largely on our capacity to create economic growth, stimulate job creation, and use financial innovation to create and sustain entrepreneurs and functioning markets as well as increase our access to global capital through our natural resources.
Much has been written about the immense wealth that lies in the ground as well as the immense difficulty of extracting it. To meet its unusual challenges, Afghanistan needs a novel plan to reverse the trend that typically befalls nations struggling through extreme poverty while possessing vast mineral wealth. The solution I propose includes the establishment of transparent and accountable trusts first, then pledging a fraction of Afghanistan's mineral wealth to those trusts, and thirdly issuing bonds backed by the trust's value to fund agricultural, water, and industrial development projects first, not last. As mining tenders are accepted, a portion of those proceeds should be earmarked to pay down the trust and service the capital.
2.      USAID-Tijara Technical Reports, www.usaid.gov, January 2013.
An illustrated report on the impact and accomplishments of the USAID-Tijara Provincial Economic Growth Program from its inception in April 2008 through November 2012.  Includes investor guides to Iraq’s provinces.
3.      Postcards From Afghanistan”, www.zerohedge.com, May 2013.
ConvergEx's Nick Colas undertook a recent trip to Afghanistan.  As he notes, the country has a long way to go to reestablish a viable economy and political stability, but he saw enough to be optimistic on both counts.  Security around the capital is tight, and Afghan troops look professional and disciplined.  There is ample food on display in countless local grocery stands.  Girls go to school throughout the city, although women are a less common sight on the streets.  Scarcity makes for odd economic outcomes – the only passenger car you’ll see is a Toyota Corolla, imported from different countries.  No Afghan will be surprised that you are a tourist in their country – they are still very proud of its history and resilience.  Westerners there will assume you are “On business.” Here are seven “Postcards from Kabul” with his last observations from this trip.
4.      “What have we learned about stabilization in Afghanistan? Not much.”, Foreign Policy, May 2013.
As of this year, Afghanistan has experienced ten years of stabilization intervention, but what is there to show for it? Marked by massive expenditure with little to no accountability, and often marred by waste, stabilization in Afghanistan started out with arguably honorable aims. However, as troops prepare to leave in 2014, what legacy will be left behind? 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) began with perhaps the best of intentions: to fill the vacuum of law and order left by the fall of the Taliban and undertake reconstruction, badly needed in a country devastated by three decades of conflict. The security situation was perceived to be relatively benign, with the major threats being criminals and warlords seeking to reassert power.
PRTs did some positive work, often acting as the only authority in a security vacuum, and were appreciated, at least early on, by Afghans. They were no substitute, however, for the effective governance and security required. PRTs' predominantly military staff received little to no training, lacked the technical skills required to carry out development work and focused more on short term quick impact projects instead of the long term state-and-peace-building work that was so badly needed.  Rather than seeking to build Afghan capacity - a central component of their mandate - they often worked around the government. The PRTs also created winners and losers, supporting local strongmen or funneling money through often corrupt construction companies.

5.      “U.S. Treasury Department Removes Sanctions Against Iraqi Bank”, U.S. Department of the Treasury, May 2013.
The Department of the Treasury has lifted sanctions against the Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq following the bank’s significant and demonstrated change in behavior.
On July 31, 2012 the Treasury Department imposed sanctions under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (CISADA), against Elaf Islamic Bank, a privately-owned Iraqi financial institution, for knowingly facilitating significant transactions and providing significant financial services for the U.S. and EU-designated Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI).  Following the CISADA finding, Elaf immediately engaged the Treasury Department and began an intensive course of action to stop the conduct that led to the CISADA sanction, including freezing EDBI accounts at Elaf and reducing its overall exposure to the Iranian financial sector.  Following today’s action U.S. financial institutions are once again permitted to open or maintain correspondent accounts or payable-through accounts in the United States for Elaf Islamic Bank.
6.      “We Served Too: Some Thoughts After Benghazi Regarding Resilience of Civilians Deployed in Conflict Zones and High Threat Security Posts”, Anne Speckhard, May 2013.
Currently thousands of American civilian workers -- from military contractors, to civilian and foreign service workers (representing the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, USAID, etc.), as well as reservists and former military who return to do civilian service, bravely serve our nation -- deploying into conflict zones such as Iraq and Afghanistan and into high threat security posts such as Pakistan, Libya and elsewhere. Last year four of these civilians, U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens, information officer Sean Smith, and two embassy security personnel Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty gave the ultimate sacrifice -- these four were killed in Benghazi, Libya as they served our nation.
Soldiers are well trained and prepared psychologically to face armed conflict. Civilian contractors, government servants and diplomats -- who serve alongside and in support of our military -- are not as well trained, prepared or supported pre, during and post deployment as their military counterparts. Yet in recent years we see that they are deployed by the thousands, into uncertain and anxiety-provoking environments. And these facts have serious implications for the psycho-social resilience and physical welfare of our civilian forces deployed in high threat security environments.
7.      Guccifer Obama Campaign Iraq White Papers  (11.3 MB) http://cryptome.org/2013/05/guccifer-iraq-white-papers.pdf        
8.      Department of Defense’s Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations: Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, May 2013.
Throughout its history, the Department of Defense (DOD) has relied on contractors to support a wide range of military operations. Operations over the last thirty years have highlighted the critical role that contractors play in supporting U.S. troops—both in terms of the number of contractors and the type of work being performed. Over the last decade in Iraq and Afghanistan, and before that, in the Balkans, contractors accounted for 50% or more of the total military force.
Regardless of whether future operations are similar to−or significantly different from− those of the past decade most analysts and defense officials believe that contractors will continue to play a central role in overseas military operations. Consequently, these observers believe that DOD should be prepared to effectively award and manage contracts at a moment's notice, anywhere in the world, in unknown environments, and on a scale that may exceed the total contract obligations of any other federal agency.
9.      “Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights”, Congressional Research Service, April 2013.
Ten years after the March 19, 2003 U.S. military intervention to oust Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq, increasingly violent sectarian divisions are undermining the fragile stability left in place after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq will collapse. Sunni Arab Muslims, who resent Shiite political domination, are in increasingly open revolt against the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. The revolt represents an escalation of the Sunni demonstrations that began in December 2012. Iraq’s Kurds are increasingly aligned with the Sunnis, based on their own disputes with Maliki over territorial, political, and economic issues. The Shiite faction of Moqtada Al Sadr has been leaning to the Sunnis and Kurds, and could hold the key to Maliki’s political survival. Adding to the schisms is the physical incapacity of President Jalal Talabani, a Kurd who has served as a key mediator, who suffered a stroke in mid-December 2012 and remains outside Iraq. The rifts have impinged on provincial elections on April 20, 2013, and will likely affect national elections for a new parliament and government in 2014. Maliki is expected to seek to retain his post in that vote.
10.  “Direct Overt U.S. Aid Appropriations for and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2014”, Congressional Research Service, April 2013 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/pakaid.pdf
11.  “Status of Developing Afghan Governance and Lessons for Future Endeavors”, Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, May 2013.
Building the capacity of and reforming Afghan governance is widely viewed as the key to success in Afghanistan. Assessing progress, however, is hampered by limited data outside the Afghan security ministries – the Ministries of Defense and Interior – and by the lack of a common definition of governance. Available reporting suggests building governance capacity is far from complete. Varying definitions of governance, coupled with the use of the term by numerous organizations without defining it, results in addressing too broad a range of issues. It would be more useful to concentrate on the core of governance – providing the services the Afghan government has committed to provide to its citizens. This, in turn, requires that Afghan ministries have the functional capacity to carry out their responsibilities, including financial management, budget formulation and execution, policy and strategic planning, and service delivery. However, time is growing short. The Afghan experience provides some important lessons that could guide future endeavors for the international community. First, this paper discusses progress in building ministerial capacity. Second, it discusses recent efforts to link continued financial assistance to Afghanistan with improved governance. Third, it describes how the lack of a commonly accepted definition of governance complicates assessing progress. Finally, it offers conclusions and observations about the failure to establish an autonomous Afghan governance capacity.
For more than a decade, improving governance has been recognized as the most difficult and critical challenge involving Afghan reconstruction. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reports that U.S. policymakers have consistently identified building the capacity of and reforming Afghan governance as the key to success in Afghanistan (SIGAR 2012, 22).
12.  “The Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) – Shackled by a Twisted History,” Ambassador Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Jr., March 2013.
13.  “The Search for Common Ground: Civil–Military Relations in Afghanistan, 2002–13”, Overseas Development Institute, April 2013.
The belief that development and reconstruction are central to stability and security is not new. It is, however, also highly contentious, perhaps nowhere more so than in Afghanistan, the longest running experiment in stabilisation.
Experiences in Afghanistan have irrevocably shaped how aid agencies regard and relate to military forces during conflict and, arguably, vice-versa. Through the Afghanistan case, this Working Paper seeks to better understand the challenges of civil–military dialogue – dialogue between military forces and independent humanitarian actors – in the context of combined international and national military forces pursuing stabilisation. In particular, it looks at the challenges posed by military forces that actively seek to pursue development and reconstruction – traditionally the domain of aid agencies – as a central component of a military strategy. 
Based on extensive interviews with actors from all sides and a review of literature, this analysis aims to uncover lessons from Afghanistan about what can be achieved through structured engagement, at various levels, on civil–military issues.
14.  “Securing the Future of Afghanistan”, House of Commons Defence Committee (UK), March 2013.
Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. It has suffered many years of conflict. Prime Minister Tony Blair promised ‘The conflict will not be the end, we will not walk away as the outside world has done so many times before.’ Throughout this inquiry into securing the future of Afghanistan, we have received starkly opposing evidence and narratives of future scenarios following the withdrawal of combat forces from those which are overly optimistic to those which see only gloom and doom. The fact is that the UK will have limited influence and, indeed, it is for the Afghan people themselves to determine for their future. The best the UK can do is to withdraw in good order and engage with external partners to improve the chances of Afghanistan going forward. In so doing the UK and its international partners must show the Afghan people that they will abide by their obligations to continue to support them in their efforts including in the area of women’s rights which, at the start of the conflict, the then US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, described as ‘non- negotiable’...
Securing the future of Afghanistan requires the concerted efforts of all the Afghan people; regional neighbours, in particular Pakistan; the USA; NATO and other coalition partners. Much detailed work needs to be done before the end of combat operations at the end of 2014. We recognise that achieving a peaceful Afghanistan is a process not an event but Afghanistan has to be given the best chance when it takes over full responsibility for its own security.
15.  “Travails of mutual accountability in Afghanistan”, Foreign Policy, May 2013.
The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF), agreed to at the July 2012 Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan, started out with high hopes.  International donors pledged to provide Afghanistan with $4 billion in civilian aid per year through 2015 and to continue significant support through 2017 and beyond, while the Afghan government committed to governance improvements and a democratic political transition as per the Afghan Constitution.  Less than a year into the implementation process, however, serious obstacles are being encountered.  
As noted in a recent paper, the old adage about work in Soviet-era centrally-planned economic systems -- "we pretend to work, and they pretend to pay us" -- appears to be increasingly applicable to TMAF implementation…
16.  “Early Mistakes with Security Forces Advisory Teams in Afghanistan”, Military Review, May/June 2013.
IN MID-2011, THE commander-in-chief announced the withdrawal of combat troops in Afghanistan by 2014. Overnight, the security forces advisory team (SFAT), rather than the brigade combat team (BCT), became the focal point of the war effort. Senior level military planners had the unenviable task of converting the theoretical into reality. When the first wave of these advisory teams were set to deploy in spring of 2012, the entire leadership of several BCTs received orders to start planning for a short-notice deployment as combat advisors. Such a dramatic strategy shift from the BCT to the 12-man SFAT in Afghanistan was a necessary change in methodology, but brought with it the natural friction and challenges inherent to any rapid change of mission.
Future SFATs will be more prepared with more advance notice and a more deliberate train-up prior to deployment. However, senior leaders must address other significant shortcomings before the next wave of advisors arrives or we are doomed to fight through the same “ambush” repeatedly. Most critically, we must organize SFATs more appropriately for their assigned missions, and once assigned, it should be rare if not unheard of to alter that SFAT mission or partner. Frivolous reassignments can, at the stroke of a pen, render weeks or months of training useless and indicate an attitude that predeployment training is irrelevant.
17.  “Afghanistan Index”, Brookings Institution, April 2013.

 

 

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