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Sunday, February 10, 2013

Reconstruction Update


  1. “Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians”, Congressional Research Service, December 2012.
This report collects statistics from a variety of sources on casualties sustained during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which began on October 7, 2001, and is ongoing. OEF actions take place primarily in Afghanistan; however, OEF casualties also include American casualties in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen.
Casualty data of U.S. military forces are compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), as tallied from the agency’s press releases. Also included are statistics on those wounded but not killed. Statistics may be revised as circumstances are investigated and as records are processed through the U.S. military’s casualty system.

  1. “In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, December 2012. 
On May 1, 2012, President Obama gave a speech from Bagram Air Field in which he laid out U.S. government approaches for “winding down” the war in Afghanistan. While a number of observers have challenged the logical plausibility of a unilateral decision to “wind down” a war, the Administration’s commitment to decreasing U.S. involvement in the war in Afghanistan is clear.
Many observers point to a coalescing vision of the way forward—shared by the governments of the United States, Afghanistan, and other international partners—that includes bringing the current campaign to a close by the end of 2014, and pursuing a political settlement among the parties in conflict, while extending U.S. and other international commitments to Afghanistan beyond 2014. In evaluating this emerging vision, some observers emphasize that the overall level of ambition has been lowered, while others stress that the timeline for international engagement has been extended.

  1. “The Governor's Solution: How Alaska’s Oil Dividend Could Work in Iraq and Other Oil-Rich Countries”, Center for Global Development, November 2012.  
Reliance on natural resource revenues, particularly oil, is often associated with bad governance, corruption, and poverty. Worried about the effect of oil on Alaska, Governor Jay Hammond had a simple yet revolutionary idea: let citizens have a direct stake. 
The Governor’s Solution features his firsthand account that describes, with brutal honesty and piercing humor, the birth of the Alaska Permanent Fund dividend, which has been paid to each resident every year since 1982. 
Thirty years later, Hammond’s vision is still influencing oil policies throughout the world. This reader, part of the Center for Global Development’s Oil-to-Cash initiative, includes recent scholarly work examining Alaska’s experience and how other oil-rich societies, particularly Iraq, might apply some of the lessons. It is as a powerful reminder that the combination of new ideas and determined individuals can make a tremendous difference—even in issues as seemingly complex and intractable as fighting the oil curse.

  1. “Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan After U.S. Pullout”, U.S. Institute of Peace, January 2013.
The Islamic Republic considers the U.S. presence in Afghanistan a major security concern along its 600-mile eastern border. It was deeply suspicious of the 2010 U.S. surge to dislodge Taliban forces from southern Afghanistan. Iranian leaders are now more concerned about a residual U.S. presence—albeit in smaller numbers—after 2014. On January 11, President Hamid Karzai visited the White House and announced that coalition forces will transition to a support role this spring. Tehran is keeping a close eye on the Bilateral Security Agreement under negotiation between Kabul and Washington, and actively trying to influence that debate inside Afghanistan as well as at the regional level.
Iran’s influence since 2001—when it supported the U.N.-backed effort to topple the Taliban and establish a new political order—has gone through different phases.  It used mainly soft power to strengthen its foothold in Afghanistan through investment, trade and cultural linkages. Over the years, Iranian security and intelligence institutions have become increasingly active in prodding a Western withdrawal and shaping Afghan politics.
  1. “How to prevent the next Benghazi”, Amb. James Jeffrey, Washington Post, January 2013.
For most of America’s history, our diplomacy was based on establishing rapport with foreign leaders, negotiating military alliances, promoting trade and reporting back to Washington on key developments, all while watching out for our citizens abroad. But since World War II, and particularly under Presidents Obama and George W. Bush, our approach has expanded: Our diplomats now move beyond host government offices to work directly with populations to help mediate conflicts, press economic development and serve shoulder to shoulder with the military in the fight against terrorism.
This new type of mission, dubbed “expeditionary diplomacy,” is hands-on and often effective. But, as we saw with the Sept. 11, 2012, attack on the Benghazi outpost that killed Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans, it can also be very dangerous. In hearings this past week before Senate and House committees, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton reiterated her conviction that direct-to-the-population diplomatic work is essential for U.S. security. But to make sure the risks of expeditionary diplomacy are worth the rewards, we need a clear, formal framework for deciding when these missions should be undertaken, avoided or rolled back.

  1. “How We Fight: Fred Kaplan’s ‘Insurgents,’ on David Petraeus”, New York Times, January 2013.
The American occupation of Iraq in its early years was a swamp of incompetence and self-delusion. The tales of hubris and reality-denial have already passed into folklore. Recent college graduates were tasked with rigging up a Western-style government. Some renegade military units blasted away at what they called “anti-Iraq Forces,” spurring an inchoate insurgency. Early on, Washington hailed the mess a glorious “mission accomplished.” Meanwhile, a “forgotten war” simmered to the east in Afghanistan. By the low standards of the time, common sense passed for great wisdom. Any American military officer willing to criticize his own tactics and question the viability of the mission brought a welcome breath of fresh air.
Most alarming was the atmosphere of intellectual dishonesty that swirled through the highest levels of America’s war on terror. The Pentagon banned American officers from using the word “insurgency” to describe the nationalist Iraqis who were killing them. The White House decided that if it refused to plan for an occupation, somehow the United States would slide off the hook for running Iraq. Ideas mattered, and many of the most egregious foul-ups of the era stemmed from abstract theories mindlessly applied to the real world.
  1. “Leadership in COIN Operations,” U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, January 2009. http://cryptome.org/dodi/2013/coin-leadership.pdf
  2. “Remembering 1960s Afghanistan, the photographs of Bill Podlich,” Denver Post, January 2013.  
In 1967, Dr. William Podlich took a two-year leave of absence from teaching at Arizona State University and began a stint with UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) to teach in the Higher Teachers College in Kabul, Afghanistan, where he served as the “Expert on Principles of Education.” His wife Margaret and two daughters, Peg and Jan, came with him. Then teenagers, the Podlich sisters attended high school at the American International School of Kabul, which catered to the children of American and other foreigners living and working in the country. 
Outside of higher education, Dr. Podlich was a prolific amateur photographer and he documented his family’s experience and daily life in Kabul, rendering frame after frame of a serene, idyllic Afghanistan. Only about a decade before the 1979 Soviet invasion, Dr. Podlich and his family experienced a thriving, modernizing country. These images, taken from 1967-68, show a stark contrast to the war torn scenes associated with Afghanistan today. 
  1. “Afghanosphere” http://unamoore.com/afghanosphere/  

  1. “Alleged terrorism ties foil some Afghan interpreters’ U.S. visa hopes”, Washington Post, February 2013.
KABUL — According to the U.S. military, Tariq is an interpreter who risked his life to aid the American mission in Afghanistan and for seven years had access to sensitive information about U.S. tactical operations. 
According to the State Department, there’s a very good chance he is a terrorist who poses a threat to national security and should never be allowed on American soil. 
Tariq, one of southern Afghanistan’s longest-serving interpreters, wants to know: How is it that one man can be praised as a hero and labeled a terrorist by the same government?
  1. Battlefield journalists http://www.xl-shop.com/forum/viewtopic.php?p=140695&sid=5ccf97c9b3180153f50a6d3784d0de71  

  1. “Why Is The United States Subsidizing Iran?”, Foreign Policy, February 2013. 
U.S. President Barack Obama has often spoken of the ever-tightening ring of sanctions against Iran. The hope is that the sanctions will eventually bring the Islamic Republic to the bargaining table, if not to its knees. The effort, however, would be more effective if these sanctions did not go hand in hand with a longstanding and lucrative annual bonus to Iran from Washington. That's right: The United States is effectively funding its adversary.
  1. Capital of Corruption, BBC, February 2013.
The cost of corruption in Afghanistan rose sharply last year to $3.9 billion, and half of all Afghans bribed public officials for services, the U.N. said Thursday. The findings came despite repeated promises by President Hamid Karzai to clean up his government. 
The international community has long expressed concern about the problem of corruption in Afghanistan because it reduces confidence in the Western-backed government.

  1. “Despite progress, Afghanistan's total corruption cost increases to $3.9 billion”, UNODC,  January 2013. 
Since 2009, Afghanistan has made some tangible progress in reducing corruption in the public sector, as fewer people now report paying bribes. Nonetheless, the total corruption cost has increased by some 40 per cent over the last three years to reach $3.9 billion. Moreover, in 2012, half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe while requesting a public service, says a new joint High Office for Oversight and Anti-Corruption (HOO) and UNODC survey on trends and patterns of corruption in Afghanistan.
Nearly 30 per cent of Afghan citizens paid a bribe when requesting a service from individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan in 2012, as opposed to the 50 per cent who paid bribes to public officials. The national economic impact of non-governmental bribery is also lower, with an estimated total cost of $600 million.

  1. “A Resilient Oligopoly: A Political-Economy of Northern Afghanistan”, Afghanistan Research Evaluation Unit, December 2012. 
This paper studies the political and social dynamics of Northern Afghanistan, not just from the short-term perspective of political rivalry and personal competition, but also from the wider and longer-term perspective of the resilience and weaknesses of organisations, patronage networks, and institutions, by looking at the social and economic interests underpinning them. While much has been written about Northern Afghanistan, no overview of the Northern political landscape has been written previously and this paper is meant to fill the gap.
The Northern region, defined here as the provinces of Faryab, Jowzjan, Sar-i Pul, Balkh and Samangan, has some peculiarities compared to the rest of Afghanistan in its politics, economics and social structure. It is: the only region dominated by Uzbek speakers; the second largest hinterland of a major city (after Kabul); and the only region where a duopoly of power exists. No other region is dominated by the struggle for influence between two major strongmen like Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Mohammad Nur- a feature of Northern politics this report argues has become permanent.

  1. “Political Economy and Conflict Dimensions of Afghanistan’s Mineral Resources: A Preliminary Exploration”, United States Institute of Peace, December 2012. 
Mining, currently a localized, largely informal, and mostly small-scale sector in Afghanistan, is widely seen as a potential leading economic growth driver and source of government revenues. Afghanistan is well-endowed with underground mineral resources, but not much systematic exploitation using modern technology has occurred, and exploration remains in its infancy. Linkages to other economic activities and substantial employment generation also are envisioned, with development of “resource corridors” exploiting multi-use infrastructure and regional transport and trading opportunities. The potential positive impacts on Afghanistan’s economy, jobs, budget and on regional development have been assessed by the World Bank and others.
Set against these potential benefits is the so-called “resource curse” often associated with underground minerals in countries lacking strong institutions and effective rule of law. Adverse macroeconomic (“Dutch Disease”), developmental (loss of comparative advantage in other sectors, environmental damage), fiscal (expenditure distortions, disincentives to mobilize other revenues), governance (risk of grand corruption, diversion of revenues, lack of accountability), political (undermining of social contract with and political accountability to the population), and conflict (grievances of have-nots, fighting over spoils) effects have been noted, to varying degrees in different countries.
  1. “Afghanistan: Meeting the Real World Challenges of Transition”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, January 2013. 
The more one looks at Afghanistan today, the more likely it seems that Transition will at best produce a weak and divided state and at worst a state that either continues its civil war or comes under Taliban and extremist control. More than a decade of Western intervention has not produced a strong and viable central government, an economy that can function without massive outside aid, or effective Afghan forces. There are no signs that insurgents are being pushed towards defeat or will lose their sanctuaries in Pakistan, and outside aid efforts have generally produced limited benefits – many of which will not be sustainable once Transition occurs and aid levels are cut.  
There has also been a steady erosion of outside support for the war – first in Europe and increasingly in the US, where some 60% of Americans no longer see a prospect of victory or any reasons to stay. While governments talk about enduring efforts, each time the US and its allies have reviewed their Afghan policy since 2010, their future level of commitment has seemed to shrink and more uncertainties have arisen. 

  1. “Eagle's Summit Revisited: Decision-Making in the Kajaki Dam Refurbishment Project”, Afghanistan Analysts Network,  January 2013. 
  1. “Money Pit: The Monstrous Failure of US Aid to Afghanistan”, World Affairs, January/February 2013.
More than half of Afghanistan’s population is under twenty-five, which shouldn’t be surprising since the average life span there is forty-nine. But the United States Agency for International Development looked at this group and decided it needed help because, it said, these young people are “disenfranchised, unskilled, uneducated, neglected—and most susceptible to joining the insurgency.” So the agency chartered a three-year, $50 million program intended to train members of this generation to become productive members of Afghan society. Two years into it, the agency’s inspector general had a look at the work thus far and found “little evidence that the project has made progress toward” its goals. 
The full report offered a darker picture than this euphemistic summary, documenting a near-total failure. It also showed that USAID had handed the project over to a contractor and then paid little attention. Unfortunately, the same can be said for almost every foreign-aid project undertaken in Afghanistan since the war began eleven years ago.

  1. “How It All Began: A Short Look at the Pre-1979 Origins of Afghanistan's Conflicts”, Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 2013. 

  1. “Is Pakistan's Behavior Changing?”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2013. 
Islamabad has been trying to send signals over the last few months indicating that it is pursuing a new course of action, both internally and externally, that is more in line with international norms. Pakistan has tried to improve its relationship with India. It has also indicated a preference for a negotiated peace in Afghanistan and demonstrated a new attitude toward terrorism.  
Of course, claims that Pakistan’s policies are changing in one way or another are not new. And in the past, the status quo ante has almost always prevailed. But this could be different.
The context is different this time. The looming international troop withdrawal from Afghanistan brings considerable risks for the region in general and for Pakistan in particular. Islamabad fears that, come 2014, it will face an unstable Afghanistan and find itself isolated regionally and globally. 
  1. “Difficult Times Ahead for Iraq”, Council on Foreign Relations, January 2013. 
The Iraqi government, headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, faces difficult times ahead, says Meghan L. O'Sullivan, a former top official dealing with Iraq in the Bush administration. "The coming year will not be an easy one for Iraq," she says. "It will need not only to address a host of persistent internal issues, but also must contend with regional forces which--in themselves--would be sufficient to challenge Iraq's progress." She says Maliki is under strong pressure not only from Sunnis and Kurds, but also from fellow Shiites, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, who is now opposed to many of Maliki's policies. O'Sullivan says that even though Iraq is now rich with oil profits, the ordinary Iraqi is still not benefiting much. "[M]ost Iraqis do not see these significant revenues as translating into better lives for themselves and blame the government for incompetence and corruption," she says.

  1. “Afghanistan Index”, Brookings Institution, January 3012.
  1. “The case for an enduring mission in Afghanistan”, Foreign Policy, January 2013.   
Denying al Qaeda's re-emergence in Afghanistan requires ensuring that Afghanistan can be sufficiently stable and capable of defending itself, as President Barack Obama explained during the surge announcement at West Point on Dec. 1, 2009. Al Qaeda is not present in large numbers (perhaps less than 1,000) in Afghanistan now, but Secretary Leon Panetta stated in November 2012 that "intelligence continues to indicate that they are looking for some kind of capability to be able to go into Afghanistan as well." The U.S. and NATO cannot allow war weariness and economic conditions to obscure the realities and requirements they face. The recently announced accelerated shift to a "support role" in Afghanistan could become a guise to withdraw if "support" means just a few thousand counterterrorism forces and trainers. 
In the eyes of many officials, a sound counterterrorism strategy rests on the assumption that the U.S. and NATO can kill their way toward a better future, against the Taliban and the Haqqanis or against al Qaeda and its affiliates. A decade of war proves the falsehood of this assumption. Experts outside the military are better qualified to determine how best to assist Afghanistan in the areas of governance, economic development, and reconciliation, and how best to move forward in Pakistan. But my experience in accelerating the growth of the Iraqi security forces -- in size, capacity, and confidence -- during the Iraqi "surge" of 2007 to 2008 qualifies me to speak about what is necessary to help the Afghan army succeed in taking lead responsibility. 

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