1. Buried Treasure.  Archaeologists are racing to save Afghanistan's cultural heritage before the Chinese start digging on one of the world's most valuable new copper mines.   http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204542404577157281392227936.html#ixzz1lKc8KjrD

2. Afghan First Initiative Has Placed Work with Afghan Companies, but Is Affected by Inconsistent Contract Solicitation and Vetting, and Employment Data Is Limited, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR%20Audit-12-6.pdf  

3. Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Jan2012/Lores%20PDF/2012JanBook.pdf  

4. DOD Improved its Accountability for Vehicles Provided to the Afghan National Security Forces, but Should Follow Up on End-Use Monitoring Findings, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR%20Audit-12-4.pdf  

5. Thirty Years of Conflict: Drivers of Anti-Government Mobilisation in Afghanistan, 1978-2011,
   Antonio Giustozzi and Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.  The literature concerning the last 30 years of war in Afghanistan has over the last few years reached such a critical mass that it is now possible to identify structural factors in Afghan history that contributed to the various conflicts and have been its signal feature from 1978 onward. The state-building model borrowed from the neighbouring British and Tsarist empires in the late 19th century contained the seeds of later trouble, chiefly in the form of rural-urban friction that gained substantial force with the spread of modernity to rural Afghanistan starting in the 1950s. Following the Khalqi regime’s all-out assault on rural conservatism in 1978-79, this friction ignited into large-scale collective action by a variety of localised opposition groups, including political organisations, clerical networks, and Pakistani military intelligence, as well as the intelligence services of several other countries.  http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1203E-Drivers%20of%20Conflict%20IP%202012.pdf  

6. Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan, Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder. Feinstein International Center.  Political and security objectives have always influenced U.S. foreign assistance policies and priorities. Since 9/11, however, development aid for countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan has increasingly and explicitly been militarized and subsumed into the national security agenda. In the U.S. as well as in other western nations, the re-structuring of aid programs to reflect the prevailing foreign policy agenda of confronting global terrorism has had a major impact on development strategies, priorities, and structures. The widely held assumption in military and foreign policy circles that development assistance is an important “soft power” tool to win consent for the presence of foreign troops in potentially hostile areas, and to promote stabilization and security objectives, assumes a relationship between poverty and insecurity that is shared by many in the development and humanitarian community.  http://sites.tufts.edu/feinstein/files/2012/01/WinningHearts-Final.pdf  

7. Healing the Legacies of Conflict in Afghanistan: Community Voices on Justice, Peace and Reconciliation, Emily Winterbotham, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.  Ten years after the overthrow of the Taliban, Afghanistan is an environment of escalating conflict and prevailing impunity. In this context, the narrative of the Afghan government and its international partners has increasingly focused on ending the violence through negotiating with insurgent leaders and reintegrating their fighters into Afghan society. In their attempt to secure peace, policymakers have largely failed to include justice as a component of reconciliation and reintegration processes. This has continued the predominant approach since 2001 (and before) with the need for immediate stability outweighing the need for wartime accountability. The fact that the Afghan government and its international partners have failed to implement a comprehensive programme to provide justice or compensation for past and present wartime crimes has inhibited people’s ability to deal with the legacies of conflict. Subsequently, the majority of people participating in AREU’s research said they were struggling to cope emotionally, psychologically and practically, and the desire for some form of “closure” remains strong.  http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1201E-Healing%20the%20Legacies%20of%20Conflict%20in%20Afghanistan%20SP%202011.pdf  

8. Pakistan's Perspective on Investigation Report Conducted by BG Stephen Clark into 26th November 2011 US Led ISAF/NATO Forces Attack on Pakistani Volcano and Boulder Posts in Mohmand Agency, Inter Services Public Relations, Government of Pakistan http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/press/pakistan.pdf  

9.      The Limits of the Pakistan-China Alliance, Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors. Heritage Foundation.  After the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan in May 2011, Pakistani political leaders played up their country’s relations with China, touting Beijing as an alternative partner to Washington. But China’s concerns over Pakistan’s future stability will likely limit the extent to which it will help Pakistan out of its economic difficulties. While China has an interest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan, the eco­nomic relationship is not very extensive and the notion that Chinese ties could serve as a replacement for U.S. ties is far-fetched. Instead of wringing its hands over Chinese influence on Pakistan, the U.S. should seek cooperation from Beijing in encouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan—which will benefit all parties involved.  http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/B2641.pdf  

10.  Report of the Commission of Inquiry Concerning the Gruesome Incident of the Abduction and Murder of Syed Saleem Shahzad, Submitted to the Government of Pakistan http://www.pid.gov.pk/REPORT.pdf  

11.  Security Sector Governance in Pakistan: Progress, But Many Challenges Persist, C. Christine Fair. Centre for International Governance Innovation.  The utility of the Pakistani army’s domination over nearly all aspects of the state in Pakistan was brought into question following the US Navy SEAL raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideout on May 2, 2011. Pakistanis wondered how these events could have occurred right under the military’s nose. This issue paper examines the prospects for security sector governance in Pakistan and identifies the reforms that are necessary for Pakistan’s government to make meaningful strides in this area. It begins by explaining the hegemonic role of the armed forces in the history of the state of Pakistan and the unique challenges of its contemporary security terrain before surveying security sector governance in several key areas: the security of Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal; the all powerful intelligence agencies; disaster management; law enforcement; the criminal justice system and support to jihadist groups. While the report elucidates persistent shortcomings of security governance in all areas, it also highlights key areas of recent improvement, including disaster management and control of nuclear arms.  http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/SSR_Issue_no5.pdf  

12. Counter-IED Strategic Plan 2012-2016, Joint IED Defeat Organization https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20120106_JIEDDOC-IEDStrategicPlan_MEDprint.pdf

13.  An Afghanistan Without Institutions, A World Without Rest by Kip Whittington, Small Wars Journal.  Let’s not kid ourselves; Afghanistan will still be at war post-2014. Given that the coalition intends to end combat operations in 2014 while security problems linger on, the Afghans will certainly be left to manage the daily activities of a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign well into the “Transformation Decade” (2015-2024), discussed in-depth at the recent Bonn Conference. If the world doesn’t want to see Afghanistan plunge into chaos once again, there must be a serious focus on strengthening the institutions that will protect and run the country as a whole.  http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/an-afghanistan-without-institutions

14. Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report_-_January_2012.pdf#view=fit       

15. Few Contracts Terminated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Resulted in Wasted Funds in Iraq, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-011.pdf#view=fit      

16. The Department of State's Process to Provide Information on Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-009.pdf#view=fit       

17. Development Fund for Iraq: Department of Defense Cannot Fully Account for the Funds it Used after the Coalition Provisional Authority Dissolved, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-008.pdf#view=fit       

18. Status of Recommendations Made by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction to the Department of Defense, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-010.pdf#view=fit       

19. Iraq after America: 2012 Promises to be a Stormy Year for the Beleaguered Country, LTC Joel Rayburn, USA. Defining Ideas, Hoover Institution http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/106226      

20. Development Funds for Iraq Returned to the Central Bank of Iraq, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-012-F.pdf#view=fit

Reconstruction Update

1. The Real Outcome of the Iraq War: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq, Anthony H. Cordesman, et al. Center for Strategic and International Studies

Iraq has become a key focus of the strategic competition between the United States and Iran. The history of this competition has been shaped by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the 1991 Gulf War, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Since the 2003 war, both the US and Iran have competed to shape the structure of Post-Saddam Iraq’s politics, governance, economics, and security.

The US has gone to great lengths to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, including using its status as an occupying power and Iraq’s main source of aid, as well as through information operations and more traditional press statements highlighting Iranian meddling. However, containing Iranian influence, while important, is not America’s main goal in Iraq. It is rather to create a stable democratic Iraq that can defeat the remaining extremist and insurgent elements, defend against foreign threats, sustain an able civil society, and emerge as a stable power friendly to the US and its Gulf allies.

http://csis.org/files/publication/111220_Iran_Chapter_6-Iraq.pdf  

2. End of Mission Ceremony in Baghdad, GEN Martin Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey at the End of Mission Ceremony in Baghdad

Thank you very much Ambassador, Mr. Secretary, Ministers, General Babaker—my brother, and I see out there as well, General Abdul Kader, you’re always going to be General Abdul Kader to me, you know that. As-Salamu Alakum [peace be with you].

Thank you for welcoming me back to Baghdad to mark this new beginning for Iraq, the United States and on some level, the entire region. I’m honored to share this moment with Secretary Panetta, Ambassador Jeffrey, General Mattis, and of course General Austin and his sergeant major [Command Sgt. Maj. Joseph Allen]. They stand tall in a long line of American leaders who have been dedicated to seeing this difficult mission through. They represent a generation of my fellow who came here to keep America safe and to free Iraq from tyranny. They have shouldered their duties in partnership with our very respected Iraqi brothers. http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1668  

3. Was the Iraq War Worth It?, Andrew J. Bacevich, et al. Council on Foreign Relations

Was the nine-year U.S. war in Iraq worth it? Boston University's Andrew Bacevich says the world is a better place without Saddam Hussein, but stresses that the "disastrous legacy" of the war transcends lives lost or dollars spent. CFR's Max Boot says it may be premature to assess the benefits but there remains a chance for Iraq to serve as "a model for the Arab Spring." Michael Ignatieff, an academic, human rights advocate, and initial supporter of the war, says groups like the Kurds and the Shia in Iraq have gained. But it's "difficult to believe the war was worth it," he says, given the damage to U.S. credibility, the strengthening of Iran, and the lack of stability in Iraq. Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution expresses hope that over time the "the war will not be seen historically as a mistake or failure." http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-war-worth-/p26820  

4. Iraq: Putting US Withdrawal in Perspective,  Anthony H. Co desman. Center for Strategic and International Studies

The prospects of cuts in defense spending interacts with the US failure to reach a meaningful agreement with the Iraqi government over how to implement the Strategic Framework Agreement. At present, the US security role will continue after the end of 2011, but in an extremely limited way. Plans keep changing, but the US effort to deal with the Iraqi military will consist solely of a small Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), and an increasingly uncertain police training mission that has been transferred to the State Department and which the Congress is unlikely to fund at anything like the planned level. http://csis.org/files/publication/111214_Iraq_US_Withdrawal.pdf  

5. U.S.-Iraq Relations Enter a New Era: U.S. Forces Complete their Strategic Reset as U.S. Diplomats Set New Tone, Peter Juul. Center for American Progress

Our nation is well on its way to withdrawing the last of our troops from Iraq before the holiday season begins, just as President Barack Obama promised. Under the U.S.-Iraq security agreement our troops must be out by the end of the year, but Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s visit to Washington this week will be matched by U.S. military ceremonies in Baghdad and elsewhere highlighting the final strategic reset of our Iraq policy sometime this week.

Prime Minister Maliki’s visit will mark this key achievement of the Obama administration, but so too will his talks with President Obama and other top administration officials as the United States and Iraq enter into a more normal relationship. The U.S. military is leaving Iraq but it is clear that the United States will not be leaving Iraq any time soon. As a result, it’s worth charting out where the new U.S.-Iraq relationship will and should be going in the near future. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/12/us_iraq_relationship.html  

6. The "End" of the War in Iraq?, Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies

It is all too clear that most Americans want the war in Iraq to be over. A Gallup poll in October found that 75% approved of President Obama’s withdrawal of U.S. troops, although Americans divide sharply by party: 96% Democrats, 77% independents, and 43% Republicans. There are good reasons for such feelings. In spite of U.S. military successes in reducing the level of internal violence in Iraq, the war has been a strategic failure when its costs are compared to its benefits. http://csis.org/files/publication/111212_Cordesman_EndWarIraq_Commentary_Formatted.pdf

7. Oversight in Iraq and Afghanistan: Challenges and Solutions, Hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1529%3A12-7-2011-qoversight-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-challenges-and-solutionsq&catid=17&Itemid=25  

8. Central Asia and the Transition in Afghanistan, A Majority Staff Report by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations http://www.foreign.senate.gov/publications/download/central-asia-and-the-transition-in-afghanistan2

Reconstruction Update

1.  How Afghanization Can Work, Linda Robinson.  If past is prologue, the December 5 Bonn conference, which aims to shore up international support for Afghanistan, will conclude with promises that will almost certainly remain unfulfilled, like the Kabul and London conferences before it, and the barely noticed Istanbul conference last month.  The most important question about Afghanistan is one that must be answered in Washington, not Bonn: What is the size and nature of the military commitment that the United States is prepared to make in the coming years? That decision will in turn dramatically affect both the diplomatic prospects for negotiations and the funds available for ongoing assistance.  http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/afghanization-can-work/p26662                                                      
2. Women and the Afghan Transition, Ben Smith. House of Commons Library, United KingdomThere has been a lot of concern that Afghan women will be the main losers in the next few years as international forces withdraw and the Kabul government negotiates some sort of accommodation with the insurgency.  http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06132.pdf     

3. Transition in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond 2014, The World Bank                                          Full responsibility for security is to be handed over and most international troops are to be withdrawn by the end of 2014—as understood at the 2010 Kabul and Lisbon conferences. Experience suggests that withdrawals of international troops reduce civilian aid, with implications for economic growth, fiscal sustainability, and service delivery.                    Potential financing gaps in the budget could threaten security and recent development progress, creating a sense of urgency for both the Government and the donor community.  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/AFBeyond2014.pdf              

4. The Afghanistan-Pakistan War at the End of 2011: Strategic Failure? Talk Without Hope? Tactical Success? Spend not Build (And Then Stop Spending)?, Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies                                                                                         The US is on the thin edge of strategic failure in two wars: the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan/Pakistan. This failure may never reach the point of outright defeat in either country. Iraq may never become hostile, revert to civil war, or come under anything approaching Iranian control. Afghanistan and Pakistan may never become major sanctuaries for terrorist attacks on the US and its allies.                                                                                                                    Yet Iraq is already a grand strategic failure. The US went to war for the wrong reasons, let Iraq slide into a half decade of civil war, and failed to build an effective democracy and base for Iraq’s economic development. Its tactical victories – if they last – did little more than put an end to a conflict it help create, and the US failed to establish anything like the strategic partnership it sought. http://csis.org/files/publication/111115_Afghanistan_at_End_2011.pdf                             

5.      A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan, Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Ten years ago in Bonn, Germany, the United Nations Envoy to Afghanistan, Ambassador

Lakhdar Brahimi, and U.S. Envoy to the Afghan Opposition, Ambassador James Dobbins,

led a diverse group of international diplomats and warriors to consensus and charted

the political course for Afghanistan well into the decade. The process that led to the Bonn

Agreement (Bonn 2001, or Bonn I) reflects the best of U.S. and United Nations statesmanship

and was the result of the effective application of military and diplomatic power. Bonn 2001

was successful for five reasons… 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/Strategic%20Perspectives%208_Fields-Ahmed.pdf                      

6.      Painful Steps: Justice, Forgiveness and Compromise in Afghanistan’s Peace Process, Jay Lamey. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Peace in Afghanistan is frequently discussed but remains only a faint hope. As we move from meetings in Kabul to Bonn, and as strategies for the future are made and revised, it is vital that the voices of those who have suffered during Afghanistan’s conflicts are heard and understood. An arrangement that respects their hopes and concerns stands the best chance of delivering a just and durable peace in the country.
http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1129%20Painful%20Steps%20PN.pdf                   

7. Afghanistan's Paramilitary Policing in Context: The Risks of Expediency, Antonio Giustozzi and Mohammad Isaqzadeh. Afghanistan Analysts Network                                                 Despite representing the bulk of Afghanistan’s post‐2001 policing, the paramilitary dimension has received little attention among analysts. Still, if the current regime is to survive the transition to Afghan leadership in the security sector, which officially started in July 2011, and the subsequent Western disengagement, getting paramilitary policing into a functional state will be decisive.  There are different types of para‐militarism, however, and what suits the Afghan predicament can only be determined by looking at the functioning of the MoI.                 http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/AAAN-2011-Police_and_Paramilitarisation.pdf                     
8. Iraqi Leaders React to the U.S. Withdrawal, Ramzy Mardini. Institute for the Study of War                                                                                                                                                On October 21, 2011, President Barack Obama announced his decision to withdraw all of the remaining 39,000 U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of the year. The complete pullout of U.S. forces satisfies the final phase of the withdrawal timetable established by the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement signed in December 2008 by outgoing President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The decision comes after negotiating efforts failed to reach a new security arrangement with Iraq that would have allowed for a continued U.S. military presence beyond 2011. This document compiles and analyzes many of the reactions of Iraq’s leaders to the cessation of negotiations and the withdrawal of U.S. forces.  http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Backgrounder_IraqLeadersReacttoWithdrawal.pdf                     
9. Security Issues Relating to Iraq, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on 15 November 2011 http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=5256                                            
10. Police Corruption: What Past Scandals Teach about Current Challenges, U.S. Institute of Peace                                                                                                                                         Police corruption is a universal problem, but it is a particular challenge in countries in crisis and emerging from conflict. This report is based on the lessons gleaned from a review of public commissions of inquiry into police misconduct worldwide and their possible application in stability operations, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. The study attempts to determine whether past scandals can help us deal more effectively with the contemporary problems of nation building and police reform.  http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR%20294.pdf                          
11. Geopolitical Fault Lines – The Case of Afghanistan, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich                                                                                                                                         Long before the colonial age, Afghanistan’s history has been defined geopolitically, first as a buffer zone between chaffing empires, then as a collision point between competing and global powers. This article examines the country’s past, current and perhaps future geopolitical fate. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Special-Feature/Detail?lng=en&id=134666&contextid774=134666&contextid775=134664&tabid=134664&dynrel=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233,4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4                                       
12. China's Pakistan Conundrum, ForeignAffairs.com
China is often called an "all-weather friend" to Pakistan -- a strategic partner, a reliable source of trade and aid, and Islamabad's closest military ally. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani has described the friendship between the two countries as "higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger than steel, and sweeter than honey." In September, he told the visiting Chinese Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, "Your friends are our friends," continuing, "your enemies are our enemies, and your security is our security. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136718/evan-a-feigenbaum/chinas-pakistan-conundrum?cid=nlc-this_week_on_foreignaffairs_co-120811-chinas_pakistan_conundrum_2-120811

Reconstruction Indexes

1. Iraq Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf

2. Afghanistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx

3. Pakistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/pakistan%20index/index.pdf

Reconstruction Update

1.      Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
From the report's summary:
This report summarizes important recent developments in Pakistan and in Pakistan-U.S. relations.
Obama Administration engagement with Pakistan has been seriously disrupted by recent events.
A brief analysis of the current state of Pakistan-U.S. relations illuminates the main areas of contention
and uncertainty. Vital U.S. interests related to links between Pakistan and indigenous American
terrorism, Islamist militancy in Pakistan and Islamabad’s policies toward the Afghan insurgency,
Pakistan’s relations with historic rival India, nuclear weapons proliferation and security, and the
troubled status of Pakistan’s domestic setting are reviewed. Ongoing human rights concerns and U.S.
foreign assistance programs for Pakistan are briefly summarized, and the report closes with an
analysis of current U.S.-Pakistan relations. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41832.pdf

2.      The Status Report: Afghanistan and Pakistan Civilian Engagement
November 4, 2011 21:17
Source: U.S. Department of State
From the press statement by Secretary Clinton:
The civilian surge in Afghanistan and Pakistan that President Obama launched in 2009 to accompany the military surge in Afghanistan has helped advance our goals of defeating al-Qaeda, reversing the Taliban's momentum in key areas, and bolstering the economy and civil society of both countries. As U.S. troops begin a phased drawdown in Afghanistan as part of the larger plan for transition, our civilian initiatives in both Afghanistan and Pakistan are assuming new importance.
This report provides a thorough review of our civilian efforts, identifies significant challenges and areas of progress, and outlines the way forward.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/176809.pdf

3.      Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Summary Findings, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Overview:
The total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2011 was estimated at 131,000 hectares (ha), a 7% increase compared to 2010. 95% of total cultivation took place in nine provinces in the Southern and Western regions6, which include the most insecure provinces in the country. This confirms the link between insecurity and opium cultivation observed since 2007.
The number of poppy-free provinces decreased from 20 in 2010 to 17 in 2011 as Baghlan and Faryab provinces in the Northern region and Kapisa province in the Eastern region lost their poppy-free status.
Potential opium production in 2011 was estimated at 5,800 mt, a 61% increase compared to 2010, when opium yields were much reduced due to plant diseases.
http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Executive_Summary_2011_web.pdf

4.      Message from the Director: Setting the Record Straight on Our Afghanistan Analysis, Statement to CIA Employees by Director David H. Petraeus, October 14, 2011
An Associated Press article published today presents an inaccurate picture of my thoughts on the CIA's Afghanistan analysis. The article asserts that a change in process introduced to enhance coordination, to get our officers even earlier access to more information, and to ensure we gain the benefit of hearing from those on the ground full-time—intelligence base chiefs, civilian experts, and military officers alike—was somehow designed to impose a military viewpoint on our analysis. That is flat wrong.
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-2011/setting-the-record-straight-on-our-afghanistan-analysis.html

5.      2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, Part I, Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
Testimony:
a.       Steve Chabot, Subcommittee Chairman http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/cha110311.pdf
b.      Zalmay Khalilzad http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/kha110311.pdf
c.       LTG David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/bar110311.pdf
d.      Ashley J. Tellis http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/tel110311.pdf
e.       C. Christine Fair http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/fai110311.pdf

6.      Crackdown in Iraq: Former Ba’athists Still Pose Lingering Security Challenge

Executive Summary
Hundreds of people have been arrested all around Iraq in an operation launched by the security forces against members of the banned Ba’ath party. The crackdown came a few days after U.S. President Barack Obama announced that U. S. forces will pull out from Iraq by the end of 2011, a deadline assigned by the United States and Iraq two years previously. The operation is one of the biggest of its kind in post—war Iraq. More significantly Iraqi officials introduced it as a pre-emptive strike against an alleged plan to overthrow the government and the whole Iraqi political order. However, tension over the Iraqi government’s decision to move forward with the operation has created discord at the highest levels. It was reported that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had a verbal encounter with one of his Deputy Prime Ministers—Saleh al-Mutlaq [1]—over the issue during a cabinet session. (al-Mada October 26, Asharq al-Awsat October 27). The authorities have depended on a membership list of the old party, and claimed that it had revived its old structure. People from both Sunni and Shia areas were arrested but in general the crackdown was welcomed by the Shia parties. Critics, especially from the dominantly Sunni Iraqia party, have vocally opposed the operation claiming that the arrests were politically motivated. The issue of dealing with Iraq’s Ba’athist past has been one of the most divisive factors in Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion. With the recent developments, it is clear that it will cause even more tensions in the post-American era. The whole affair came amid a recent surge in violence across Iraq.  
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38618&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=d1b6a06f91304f3d57677251fb71841a

7.      The Haqqanis as the Pivot in the Deteriorating US-Pakistan Relations by Shahid Javed Burki, National University of Singapore

The author of this article addresses the question as to what kind of Afghanistan Washington should leave behind. To leave the country at peace, one of the more important things is to have the powerful Haqqani network in the country’s south and with a sanctuary in Pakistan to align itself with Washington’s broad objectives. Would the use of force bring this about or would negotiations among different interest parties produce the desired result?
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/133438/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/9fa28ccf-340f-4d1d-912b-b5be86183c68/en/EVELINE_ISAS_Insights_138.pdf

8.      Constitutional Interpretation and the Continuing Crisis in Afghanistan, Scott Worden and Sylvana Q. Sinha, United States Institute of Peace
Summary
The recent controversy in Afghanistan over the outcome of the 2010 parliamentary elections ultimately resolved the question of who sits in Parliament, but left a more fundamental question
unanswered: “Who has the power to interpret the Afghan Constitution?”
• Ambiguities in the language of the Constitution make it difficult to determine who has the legal authority to interpret it. The Supreme Court maintains that the Constitution gives it the power of judicial review, but the Constitution also calls for the Independent Commission on the Supervision of Implementation of the Constitution (ICSIC), which the Parliament has mandated to decide constitutional issues instead.
• Without political and legal consensus over who has final authority to decide different types of constitutional claims, Afghanistan cannot achieve a rule of law where government activities are subject to consistent and transparent rules.
• Afghanistan must establish clear and unambiguous rules for constitutional interpretation to avoid damaging crises about political leadership and the separation of powers as the security transition and Presidential election approach in 2014.
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%20113.pdf

Reconstruction Indexes

1. Iraq Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf

2. Afghanistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx

3. Pakistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/pakistan%20index/index.pdf

1.      The Cost of Kill/Capture: Impact of the Night Raid Surge on Afghan Civilians, Open Society Institute

Nighttime kill and capture operations (“night raids”) by international military have been one of the most controversial tactics in Afghanistan. They are as valued by the international military as they are reviled by Afghan communities. Night raids have been associated with the death, injury, and detention of civilians, and have sparked enormous backlash among Afghan communities. The Afghan government and the Afghan public have repeatedly called for an end to night raids. International military say they have addressed many of the past concerns with night raids, including improved intelligence and conduct. They argue that night raids are a way to reduce civilian casualties and are an essential part of their military strategy.

The Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office published an in depth study of night raids in February 2010.1 Since that time, some night raids practices have improved, but the overall number of night raids has multiplied, bringing this divisive practice into more Afghan homes.2 This policy paper will summarize the impact of these changes from both a human rights and a policy perspective.                            http://www.soros.org/initiatives/washington/articles_publications/publications/the-cost-of-kill-capture-impact-of-the-night-raid-surge-on-afghan-civilians-20110919/Night-Raids-Report-FINAL-092011.pdf

2.      Forging New Ties: Report from the First Meeting Between Afghan and Pakistani Women arliamentarians, East West Institute.   

During their two-day visit to Islamabad in June 2011, the Afghan delegates and their Pakistani peers met with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Speaker of the House Dr. Fehmida Mirza. They also agreed on a plan for a regular, ongoing dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani women parliamentarians.

“Such a dialogue will open a new channel for building trust between the two countries,” said Guenter Overfeld, EWI Vice President and Director of Regional Security. “It will also give Afghan women politicians much-needed support at a crucial time.”

http://www.ewi.info/forging-new-ties

3.      Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully Account for Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel, Government Accountability Office

The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) designated SPOT as their system in 2010 for tracking statutorily required information on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Citing limitations with SPOT’s implementation, the agencies generally relied on data sources other than SPOT to prepare their 2011 joint report. Only State used SPOT but just for its contractor personnel numbers. However, GAO found that regardless of the data source used, the agencies’ data had significant limitations, many of which were not fully disclosed. For example, while the agencies collectively reported $22.7 billion in fiscal year 2010 obligations, we found that they underreported the value of Iraq and Afghanistan contracts and assistance instruments by at least $4 billion, the majority of which was for DOD contracts. In addition, data presented in the joint report on personnel, including those performing security functions, are of limited reliability because of significant over- and undercounting. For example, DOD did not disclose that its contractor personnel numbers for Afghanistan were overreported for most of the reporting period because of double counting. Additionally, despite the reporting requirement, State did not provide information on its assistance instruments or the number of personnel working under them. As a result of such limitations, data presented in the joint report should not be used to draw conclusions or identify trends over time.

4.      A Tougher U.S. Tack on Pakistan, Council on Foreign Relations

Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen testified before Congress (PDF) on September 22 that the Haqqani network, the militant group blamed for the September 13 attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul, is a "strategic arm" of Pakistan's top spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). U.S. allegations of links between the ISI and extremist groups are hardly new (ForeignPolicy). But the latest remarks constitute a firm ultimatum that the United States will act unilaterally if Pakistan doesn't crack down on extremist groups and official ties to those groups, says CFR's South Asia expert Daniel Markey. Mullen's remarks prompted outrage from Pakistani officials (WSJ) who deny such links. Markey warns that unless the United States can make this latest threat to Pakistan credible, Pakistan will not change the status quo. He recommends Washington be clear with the Pakistanis on the steps the United States is willing to take to destroy the Haqqani network, if Pakistan fails to do so.

http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/tougher-us-tack-pakistan/p26019

5.      Who Benefits From U.S. Aid to Pakistan?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

After 9/11 and again following the killing of Osama bin Laden, questions have been raised

about the purpose of aid from the United States to Pakistan. If aid was primarily meant for

military and counterterrorism support, the results from an American perspective have been

inadequate at best. Washington has accused the Pakistani government and military of duplicity, and of protecting key militant leaders living within Pakistan. The United States continues to ask the government of Pakistan to “do more.”

There are Pakistani voices, however, who argue that this is America’s war, not a global or

Pakistani war. The fighting has cost Pakistan three times as much as the aid provided and

35,000 victims. Sympathizers of militant groups in Pakistan’s army have also been found to

protect insurgents and have been involved in terrorist activities themselves.

            http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_aid2011.pdf

6.      Pakistan Seeks Administrative Solution to Terrorism on the Northwest Frontier, The Jamestown Foundation

Although new changes to colonial-era laws known as the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) are aimed at giving more political freedom to the people living in the lawless Pakistani tribal areas, one of the unstated objectives of the government seems to be defeating the militants with political rather than military force. [1] President Asif Ali Zardari hinted at this when he said that a bigger “challenge of defeating the militant mindset awaits us… In the long run, we must defeat the militant mindset to defend our country, our democracy, our institutions and our way of life” (Dawn, August 13).

To achieve this objective in the turbulent Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari signed two executive orders, the Amendments to the FCR (2011) and the Extension of the Political Parties Order (2002), into law on August 12. Most political parties and analysts in Pakistan welcomed the reforms, which will establish a new three-member FATA tribunal and introduce political activity in the area in the form of enfranchisement and the establishment of political parties (The Nation [Islamabad], September 4). There is a consensus that these laws will lead to even more far-reaching social and political reforms in the coming years (Dawn [Karachi], August 13; The News [Islamabad], August 13).

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38402&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=515

7.      Stop Doing Harm in Pakistan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is under great stress. In a video Q&A, George Perkovich says Washington’s policy toward Pakistan has had the unintended but undeniable effect of empowering Pakistan’s military and intelligence services at the expense of the country’s political future.

To stop doing harm to Pakistan and its own interests, the United States must stop looking at Pakistan as a tool that can be used to help solve America’s other problems and instead focus on Pakistan for its own sake—it is one of the world’s most populous nations, has nuclear weapons, is in a critical region, and produces many of the terrorists looking to strike America. Instead of pressing Pakistan’s army to fight America’s war in Afghanistan, the United States would accomplish more by distancing itself from the Pakistani army, reforming trade and aid policies, and clarifying the defensive purposes of U.S.-Indian cooperation.

http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/13/stop-doing-harm-in-pakistan/549u

8.              Iraq: U.S. Diplomatic Mission and Security Personnel for 2012 (Taken Question), U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/10/175059.htm

9.      Lessons from Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, United States Institute of Peace

Embedded provincial reconstruction teams (ePRTs) were small State Department-led units

inserted into U.S. combat brigades in Iraq from 2007 to 2010 to support military counterinsurgency efforts at the local level.

During major combat operations in 2007 and into 2008, ePRTs provided important support

to military counterinsurgency efforts. As U.S. combat units wound down these efforts

and withdrew from towns and cities, ePRTs did useful—but harder to quantify—work in

mentoring local officials.

Combat brigades and ePRTs generally worked well together. However, some units were

unsure of how best to employ civilians. The military and civilians also sometimes had differing views on issues of short-term versus long-term goals.

Despite problems, ePRT veterans believe that they had a positive effect in both supporting

military counterinsurgency efforts and helping local Iraqi officials prepare for self-reliance.

Interviewees identified a variety of operational problems that detracted from ePRT mission

accomplishment. The Iraq ePRTs are now history, but as the United States continues to use civil-military teams in Afghanistan, these observed lessons need to be learned and acted upon.

Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are civilian-military teams that were first fielded in

Afghanistan in 2002. A significantly modified version was introduced in Iraq in 2005. The

theory was that a stable nation would not emerge unless reconciliation, good governance,

and economic development extended beyond the central government in the capital city  to provincial and local officials across the nation. PRTs were envisioned as a key means to achieve these goals. 

http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR290.pdf

10.  Failing Oversight: Iraq's Unchecked Government, International Crisis Group

After years of uncertainty, conflict and instability, the Iraqi state appears to be consolidating by reducing violence sufficiently to allow for a semblance of normalcy. Yet in the meantime, it has allowed corruption to become en-trenched and spread throughout its institutions. This, in turn, has contributed to a severe decay in public services. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government has exacerbated the problem by interfering in anti-corruption cases, ma-nipulating investigations for political advantage and in-timidating critics to prevent a replication of the type of popular movements that already have brought down three regimes in the region. The government’s credibility in the fight against corruption has eroded as a result, and this, together with troubling authoritarian tendencies, is giving ammunition to the prime minister’s critics. To bolster its faltering legitimacy, Maliki’s government will have to launch a vigorous anti-corruption campaign, improve service delivery and create checks and balances in the state system.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf

11.  The U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=5252

12.  US and Iranian Strategic Competition: Competition in Iraq, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Iraq has become a key focus of the strategic competition between the United States and Iran. The history of this competition has been shaped by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the 1991 Gulf War. Since the 2003 Iraq War, both the US and Iran have competed to shape the structure of Post-Saddam Iraq’s politics, governance, economics, and security.

The US has gone to great lengths to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, including using its status as an occupying power and Iraq’s main source of aid, as well as through information operations and more traditional press statements highlighting Iranian meddling.

However, containing Iranian influence, while important, is not America’s main goal in Iraq. It is rather to create a stable democratic Iraq that can defeat the remaining extremist and insurgent elements, defend against foreign threats, sustain an able civil society, and emerge as a stable power friendly to the US.

http://csis.org/files/publication/110927_Iran_Chapter_6_Iraq.pdf

13.  Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role, Government Accountability Office

DOD has robust plans and processes for determining the sequence of actions and associated resources necessary to achieve the drawdown from Iraq, which is well underway with a significant amount of equipment removed from Iraq and bases transitioned, among other things. However, several factors contribute to making this phase more challenging than the previous drawdown phase. First, DOD will have less operational flexibility in this phase of the drawdown, yet will need to move a greater amount of equipment than in prior drawdown phases. Second, DOD is closing the largest bases with fewer available resources left on site, which creates a set of challenges and risks greater than what DOD faced during the prior drawdown phase. Although DOD's plans and processes create flexibility and mitigate risk, it has limited visibility over some equipment remaining in Iraq and does not track equipment found on transitioning bases that is not listed on any property accountability record. Without addressing these issues, DOD may miss opportunities to make the drawdown more efficient. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11774.pdf 

14.  Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully Account for Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel, Government Accountability Office

The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) designated SPOT as their system in 2010 for tracking statutorily required information on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Citing limitations with SPOT’s implementation, the agencies generally relied on data sources other than SPOT to prepare their 2011 joint report. Only State used SPOT but just for its contractor personnel numbers. However, GAO found that regardless of the data source used, the agencies’ data had significant limitations, many of which were not fully disclosed. For example, while the agencies collectively reported $22.7 billion in fiscal year 2010 obligations, we found that they underreported the value of Iraq and Afghanistan contracts and assistance instruments by at least $4 billion, the majority of which was for DOD contracts. In addition, data presented in the joint report on personnel, including those performing security functions, are of limited reliability because of significant over- and undercounting. For example, DOD did not disclose that its contractor personnel numbers for Afghanistan were overreported for most of the reporting period because of double counting. Additionally, despite the reporting requirement, State did not provide information on its assistance instruments or the number of personnel working under them.

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11886.pdf