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Friday, September 16, 2011

Reconstruction Update

1.       “Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risks,” the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan
The final report of the congressionally chartered Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan says at least $31 billion has been lost to contract waste and fraud, and that major reforms are required.
Commission reform objectives include improving federal planning for use of contracts, strengthening contract management and oversight, expanding competition, improving interagency coordination, and modifying or cancelling U.S.-funded projects that host nations cannot sustain. The reforms are described in 15 strategic recommendations.  
The eight-member, bipartisan Commission filed its 240-page final report, “Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks,” with U.S. Senate and House officials this morning [31 August 2011].
2.       Pakistan’s Future Policy Towards Afghanistan.  A Look at Strategic Depth, Militant Movements and the Role of India and the U.S.  
What factors are likely to govern the course of Pakistan’s future policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan? This question has increasing relevance for regional security, especially in the light of the imminent endgame in Afghanistan and of the ongoing dialogue with the Taliban.  
This report probes the implications of the volatile US–Pakistan relationship and of Indo–Pak rivalry in the Af–Pak war theatre, in particular for Pakistan’s reliance on militant extremist groups to secure and further its strategic interests. Developments pertaining to the role and engagement of the United States in the region and Indian ties to Afghanistan and the US affect Pakistan’s perceived power status in the Indian subcontinent. The extent to which Pakistani interests are met in the process and outcome of brokering a deal with the Taliban is an additional determinant of whether Pakistan will continue with, or veer from, the status quo. 
3.       One Team's Approach to Village Stability Operations  
This paper is an effort to demonstrate my team’s approach to VSO using the principles and TTPs that numerous articles have recently highlighted in the July-September issue of Special Warfare Magazine. It illustrates the practical application of the principles of VSO in the current operational environment and details exactly how these principles appear through the prism of the Military Decision-Making Process. This is the product of the team’s assessment, planning, execution, after action review and refinement process over the last 150 days of VSO operations in an austere and isolated location.   
The Village Stability Operations Methodology is a bottom up approach that employs USSOF teams and partnered units embedded with villagers in order to establish security and to support and promote socioeconomic development and good governance. Each Village Stability Team is a distinct entity with its own culture, appearances and way of operating, which reflects the Afghan dynamic of that particular site. It is true that Village Stability Platforms (VSP) throughout Afghanistan vary greatly within the context of conducting Village Stability Operations (VSO), yet every VSP applies the same principles of the methodology and shepherds the village through the phases of Shape, Hold, Build, and Expand / Transition; culminating with connecting the village to GIRoA through the district and province. 

4.       Afghan Concerns over U.S. Staying Power
As the timeline for the drawdown of U.S. and international troops from Afghanistan approaches, the United States and Afghanistan are working to finalize a long-term security arrangement that would secure a limited U.S. troop presence in the country beyond 2014. But the United States and Afghanistan disagree on several points, starting with how binding the agreement should be. Taj Ayubi, a minister-counselor to Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai, says as U.S. public opinion for the war in Afghanistan wanes amid an economic downturn and rising unemployment, Afghans grow increasingly concerned about Washington's long-term commitment to the country. Ayubi, who accused some in the Afghan government of sabotaging the strategic pact under discussion with Washington in a speech he delivered at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, says the majority of Afghans support a U.S. military base in the country post-2014.
5.       How Afghanistan is Rebuilding Itself
Serious concerns persist in the international community about Afghanistan's governance abilities as the 2014 timeline for the security transition to Afghan forces draws near. The director of the office of Afghanistan and Pakistan affairs at the U.S. Agency for International Development, J. Alexander Thier, says economic effects of the drawdown "will be real" but points to sweeping improvements in Afghanistan's capacity to govern itself, singling out progress in health, education, energy, and road building. "We are changing the way we do business by doing more of our work directly through the Afghan government," to increase spending that goes directly into the Afghan economy, he says. Going forward, he says, investment in infrastructure and energy will be critical to increasing Afghans' capacity and making economic growth sustainable. He says the international community will be supporting development work in Afghanistan for years beyond 2014.
6.       The Missing Endgame for Afghanistan: A Sustainable Post-Bin Laden Strategy 
Within hours of President Obama’s announcement of Osama bin Laden’s May 2 death, pundits and politicians from both the right and left were calling for a speedier withdrawal from Afghanistan. The discovery and targeted killing of bin Laden in a compound on the outskirts of Abbottabad, Pakistan,
located less than a mile from the Pakistan Military Academy, dramatically amplified concerns about elements of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence service (ISI) maintaining links with al-Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations. Many argued that the death of al-Qaeda’s leader meant that our post-9/11 mission had been accomplished, and our expensive presence in Afghanistan was no longer needed amidst an era of mounting debt and budget fights. 
7.        Pakistan’s Deteriorating Economic Situation: How Much of it is Caused by Politics?  
Pakistan’s economy is in a state of deep crisis, the worst in its troubled history. While some natural disasters – an earthquake in 2005 and floods in 2010 – contributed to the poor performance of the economy, much of it was the result of weak management by the civilian government that took office in the spring of 2008. The cumulative loss to the economy during the five-year tenure of the current administration may be as high as 16 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP). On a number of previous occasions the military intervened when the government in place was deemed to be performing poorly in the economic field. Such an outcome seems unlikely this time around as the military has become conscious of the latent power of the street. This has been demonstrated by the Arab Spring. The country’s youth and the civil society do not want to see the army intervene in politics once again. That said, the current government, as it prepares for the general elections that must be held before the spring of 2013, has adopted a populist approach towards economic management. This includes the recent decision by the central bank to ease the supply of money. This may win votes but may further aggravate the already weak economic situation.
8.       The Politics of Water Discourse in Pakistan 
The policy brief explores the evolving discourse on water issues in Pakistan where the process of political articulation, securitization and mobilization which often links water to Kashmir is studied. The rationale for undertaking such an approach is to provide useful insights to understand Pakistan‟s thinking on strategizing water. The primary research question therefore put to test is- whether Pakistan has a strategic design as far as the Indus waters is concerned? While this study has no intentions to under-estimate the water scarcity being experienced by Pakistan in any way, it aims to delink the issue of water politics from water security. The thrust of the study is to assess and analyze beliefs, interests, motivations and patterns of behaviour inside Pakistan regarding water issues.
The death of Osama bin Laden presents an important opportunity to reassess U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Current U.S. thinking centers on two interests. The first is preventing al Qaeda and its Taliban allies from reestablishing a safe haven. The second is preventing the violence in Afghanistan from destabilizing Pakistan, thus putting its nuclear forces at risk and increasing the likelihood of nuclear terrorism. Coalition strategy is based on the assumptions that the only way to deny al Qaeda safe haven is by building a strong central Afghan state and that Pakistan’s nuclear complex will become increasingly vulnerable to militant attacks if the Taliban succeeds in Afghanistan.
Both assumptions are wrong. The United States does not need to build a state in Afghanistan because the conditions that allowed al Qaeda safe haven in the 1990s have permanently changed. Moreover, the steps needed to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal have nothing to do with the war in Afghanistan. Policymakers should scale back their ambitions in Afghanistan.  If they do so, they could cut troop levels by 80–90 percent while defending core U.S. interests and dramatically reducing the costs to America in both blood and treasure.  
10.   Microsoft Afkar.  Afkar is an Arabic word that means “ideas”. Microsoft Afkar gives Arabic users from all over the  world the chance to play with cool new tools and ideas coming out of Cairo Microsoft Innovation Lab. 

Reconstruction Indexes

  1. Iraq Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf
  2. Afghanistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx
  3. Pakistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/pakistan%20index/index.pdf