Reconstruction Update

1.      Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
From the report's summary:
This report summarizes important recent developments in Pakistan and in Pakistan-U.S. relations.
Obama Administration engagement with Pakistan has been seriously disrupted by recent events.
A brief analysis of the current state of Pakistan-U.S. relations illuminates the main areas of contention
and uncertainty. Vital U.S. interests related to links between Pakistan and indigenous American
terrorism, Islamist militancy in Pakistan and Islamabad’s policies toward the Afghan insurgency,
Pakistan’s relations with historic rival India, nuclear weapons proliferation and security, and the
troubled status of Pakistan’s domestic setting are reviewed. Ongoing human rights concerns and U.S.
foreign assistance programs for Pakistan are briefly summarized, and the report closes with an
analysis of current U.S.-Pakistan relations. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41832.pdf

2.      The Status Report: Afghanistan and Pakistan Civilian Engagement
November 4, 2011 21:17
Source: U.S. Department of State
From the press statement by Secretary Clinton:
The civilian surge in Afghanistan and Pakistan that President Obama launched in 2009 to accompany the military surge in Afghanistan has helped advance our goals of defeating al-Qaeda, reversing the Taliban's momentum in key areas, and bolstering the economy and civil society of both countries. As U.S. troops begin a phased drawdown in Afghanistan as part of the larger plan for transition, our civilian initiatives in both Afghanistan and Pakistan are assuming new importance.
This report provides a thorough review of our civilian efforts, identifies significant challenges and areas of progress, and outlines the way forward.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/176809.pdf

3.      Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Summary Findings, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Overview:
The total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2011 was estimated at 131,000 hectares (ha), a 7% increase compared to 2010. 95% of total cultivation took place in nine provinces in the Southern and Western regions6, which include the most insecure provinces in the country. This confirms the link between insecurity and opium cultivation observed since 2007.
The number of poppy-free provinces decreased from 20 in 2010 to 17 in 2011 as Baghlan and Faryab provinces in the Northern region and Kapisa province in the Eastern region lost their poppy-free status.
Potential opium production in 2011 was estimated at 5,800 mt, a 61% increase compared to 2010, when opium yields were much reduced due to plant diseases.
http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Executive_Summary_2011_web.pdf

4.      Message from the Director: Setting the Record Straight on Our Afghanistan Analysis, Statement to CIA Employees by Director David H. Petraeus, October 14, 2011
An Associated Press article published today presents an inaccurate picture of my thoughts on the CIA's Afghanistan analysis. The article asserts that a change in process introduced to enhance coordination, to get our officers even earlier access to more information, and to ensure we gain the benefit of hearing from those on the ground full-time—intelligence base chiefs, civilian experts, and military officers alike—was somehow designed to impose a military viewpoint on our analysis. That is flat wrong.
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-2011/setting-the-record-straight-on-our-afghanistan-analysis.html

5.      2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, Part I, Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
Testimony:
a.       Steve Chabot, Subcommittee Chairman http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/cha110311.pdf
b.      Zalmay Khalilzad http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/kha110311.pdf
c.       LTG David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/bar110311.pdf
d.      Ashley J. Tellis http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/tel110311.pdf
e.       C. Christine Fair http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/fai110311.pdf

6.      Crackdown in Iraq: Former Ba’athists Still Pose Lingering Security Challenge

Executive Summary
Hundreds of people have been arrested all around Iraq in an operation launched by the security forces against members of the banned Ba’ath party. The crackdown came a few days after U.S. President Barack Obama announced that U. S. forces will pull out from Iraq by the end of 2011, a deadline assigned by the United States and Iraq two years previously. The operation is one of the biggest of its kind in post—war Iraq. More significantly Iraqi officials introduced it as a pre-emptive strike against an alleged plan to overthrow the government and the whole Iraqi political order. However, tension over the Iraqi government’s decision to move forward with the operation has created discord at the highest levels. It was reported that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had a verbal encounter with one of his Deputy Prime Ministers—Saleh al-Mutlaq [1]—over the issue during a cabinet session. (al-Mada October 26, Asharq al-Awsat October 27). The authorities have depended on a membership list of the old party, and claimed that it had revived its old structure. People from both Sunni and Shia areas were arrested but in general the crackdown was welcomed by the Shia parties. Critics, especially from the dominantly Sunni Iraqia party, have vocally opposed the operation claiming that the arrests were politically motivated. The issue of dealing with Iraq’s Ba’athist past has been one of the most divisive factors in Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion. With the recent developments, it is clear that it will cause even more tensions in the post-American era. The whole affair came amid a recent surge in violence across Iraq.  
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38618&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=d1b6a06f91304f3d57677251fb71841a

7.      The Haqqanis as the Pivot in the Deteriorating US-Pakistan Relations by Shahid Javed Burki, National University of Singapore

The author of this article addresses the question as to what kind of Afghanistan Washington should leave behind. To leave the country at peace, one of the more important things is to have the powerful Haqqani network in the country’s south and with a sanctuary in Pakistan to align itself with Washington’s broad objectives. Would the use of force bring this about or would negotiations among different interest parties produce the desired result?
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/133438/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/9fa28ccf-340f-4d1d-912b-b5be86183c68/en/EVELINE_ISAS_Insights_138.pdf

8.      Constitutional Interpretation and the Continuing Crisis in Afghanistan, Scott Worden and Sylvana Q. Sinha, United States Institute of Peace
Summary
The recent controversy in Afghanistan over the outcome of the 2010 parliamentary elections ultimately resolved the question of who sits in Parliament, but left a more fundamental question
unanswered: “Who has the power to interpret the Afghan Constitution?”
• Ambiguities in the language of the Constitution make it difficult to determine who has the legal authority to interpret it. The Supreme Court maintains that the Constitution gives it the power of judicial review, but the Constitution also calls for the Independent Commission on the Supervision of Implementation of the Constitution (ICSIC), which the Parliament has mandated to decide constitutional issues instead.
• Without political and legal consensus over who has final authority to decide different types of constitutional claims, Afghanistan cannot achieve a rule of law where government activities are subject to consistent and transparent rules.
• Afghanistan must establish clear and unambiguous rules for constitutional interpretation to avoid damaging crises about political leadership and the separation of powers as the security transition and Presidential election approach in 2014.
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%20113.pdf

Reconstruction Indexes

1. Iraq Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf

2. Afghanistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx

3. Pakistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/pakistan%20index/index.pdf

1.      The Cost of Kill/Capture: Impact of the Night Raid Surge on Afghan Civilians, Open Society Institute

Nighttime kill and capture operations (“night raids”) by international military have been one of the most controversial tactics in Afghanistan. They are as valued by the international military as they are reviled by Afghan communities. Night raids have been associated with the death, injury, and detention of civilians, and have sparked enormous backlash among Afghan communities. The Afghan government and the Afghan public have repeatedly called for an end to night raids. International military say they have addressed many of the past concerns with night raids, including improved intelligence and conduct. They argue that night raids are a way to reduce civilian casualties and are an essential part of their military strategy.

The Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office published an in depth study of night raids in February 2010.1 Since that time, some night raids practices have improved, but the overall number of night raids has multiplied, bringing this divisive practice into more Afghan homes.2 This policy paper will summarize the impact of these changes from both a human rights and a policy perspective.                            http://www.soros.org/initiatives/washington/articles_publications/publications/the-cost-of-kill-capture-impact-of-the-night-raid-surge-on-afghan-civilians-20110919/Night-Raids-Report-FINAL-092011.pdf

2.      Forging New Ties: Report from the First Meeting Between Afghan and Pakistani Women arliamentarians, East West Institute.   

During their two-day visit to Islamabad in June 2011, the Afghan delegates and their Pakistani peers met with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Speaker of the House Dr. Fehmida Mirza. They also agreed on a plan for a regular, ongoing dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani women parliamentarians.

“Such a dialogue will open a new channel for building trust between the two countries,” said Guenter Overfeld, EWI Vice President and Director of Regional Security. “It will also give Afghan women politicians much-needed support at a crucial time.”

http://www.ewi.info/forging-new-ties

3.      Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully Account for Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel, Government Accountability Office

The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) designated SPOT as their system in 2010 for tracking statutorily required information on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Citing limitations with SPOT’s implementation, the agencies generally relied on data sources other than SPOT to prepare their 2011 joint report. Only State used SPOT but just for its contractor personnel numbers. However, GAO found that regardless of the data source used, the agencies’ data had significant limitations, many of which were not fully disclosed. For example, while the agencies collectively reported $22.7 billion in fiscal year 2010 obligations, we found that they underreported the value of Iraq and Afghanistan contracts and assistance instruments by at least $4 billion, the majority of which was for DOD contracts. In addition, data presented in the joint report on personnel, including those performing security functions, are of limited reliability because of significant over- and undercounting. For example, DOD did not disclose that its contractor personnel numbers for Afghanistan were overreported for most of the reporting period because of double counting. Additionally, despite the reporting requirement, State did not provide information on its assistance instruments or the number of personnel working under them. As a result of such limitations, data presented in the joint report should not be used to draw conclusions or identify trends over time.

4.      A Tougher U.S. Tack on Pakistan, Council on Foreign Relations

Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen testified before Congress (PDF) on September 22 that the Haqqani network, the militant group blamed for the September 13 attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul, is a "strategic arm" of Pakistan's top spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). U.S. allegations of links between the ISI and extremist groups are hardly new (ForeignPolicy). But the latest remarks constitute a firm ultimatum that the United States will act unilaterally if Pakistan doesn't crack down on extremist groups and official ties to those groups, says CFR's South Asia expert Daniel Markey. Mullen's remarks prompted outrage from Pakistani officials (WSJ) who deny such links. Markey warns that unless the United States can make this latest threat to Pakistan credible, Pakistan will not change the status quo. He recommends Washington be clear with the Pakistanis on the steps the United States is willing to take to destroy the Haqqani network, if Pakistan fails to do so.

http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/tougher-us-tack-pakistan/p26019

5.      Who Benefits From U.S. Aid to Pakistan?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

After 9/11 and again following the killing of Osama bin Laden, questions have been raised

about the purpose of aid from the United States to Pakistan. If aid was primarily meant for

military and counterterrorism support, the results from an American perspective have been

inadequate at best. Washington has accused the Pakistani government and military of duplicity, and of protecting key militant leaders living within Pakistan. The United States continues to ask the government of Pakistan to “do more.”

There are Pakistani voices, however, who argue that this is America’s war, not a global or

Pakistani war. The fighting has cost Pakistan three times as much as the aid provided and

35,000 victims. Sympathizers of militant groups in Pakistan’s army have also been found to

protect insurgents and have been involved in terrorist activities themselves.

            http://carnegieendowment.org/files/pakistan_aid2011.pdf

6.      Pakistan Seeks Administrative Solution to Terrorism on the Northwest Frontier, The Jamestown Foundation

Although new changes to colonial-era laws known as the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) are aimed at giving more political freedom to the people living in the lawless Pakistani tribal areas, one of the unstated objectives of the government seems to be defeating the militants with political rather than military force. [1] President Asif Ali Zardari hinted at this when he said that a bigger “challenge of defeating the militant mindset awaits us… In the long run, we must defeat the militant mindset to defend our country, our democracy, our institutions and our way of life” (Dawn, August 13).

To achieve this objective in the turbulent Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari signed two executive orders, the Amendments to the FCR (2011) and the Extension of the Political Parties Order (2002), into law on August 12. Most political parties and analysts in Pakistan welcomed the reforms, which will establish a new three-member FATA tribunal and introduce political activity in the area in the form of enfranchisement and the establishment of political parties (The Nation [Islamabad], September 4). There is a consensus that these laws will lead to even more far-reaching social and political reforms in the coming years (Dawn [Karachi], August 13; The News [Islamabad], August 13).

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38402&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=515

7.      Stop Doing Harm in Pakistan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is under great stress. In a video Q&A, George Perkovich says Washington’s policy toward Pakistan has had the unintended but undeniable effect of empowering Pakistan’s military and intelligence services at the expense of the country’s political future.

To stop doing harm to Pakistan and its own interests, the United States must stop looking at Pakistan as a tool that can be used to help solve America’s other problems and instead focus on Pakistan for its own sake—it is one of the world’s most populous nations, has nuclear weapons, is in a critical region, and produces many of the terrorists looking to strike America. Instead of pressing Pakistan’s army to fight America’s war in Afghanistan, the United States would accomplish more by distancing itself from the Pakistani army, reforming trade and aid policies, and clarifying the defensive purposes of U.S.-Indian cooperation.

http://carnegieendowment.org/2011/09/13/stop-doing-harm-in-pakistan/549u

8.              Iraq: U.S. Diplomatic Mission and Security Personnel for 2012 (Taken Question), U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/10/175059.htm

9.      Lessons from Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, United States Institute of Peace

Embedded provincial reconstruction teams (ePRTs) were small State Department-led units

inserted into U.S. combat brigades in Iraq from 2007 to 2010 to support military counterinsurgency efforts at the local level.

During major combat operations in 2007 and into 2008, ePRTs provided important support

to military counterinsurgency efforts. As U.S. combat units wound down these efforts

and withdrew from towns and cities, ePRTs did useful—but harder to quantify—work in

mentoring local officials.

Combat brigades and ePRTs generally worked well together. However, some units were

unsure of how best to employ civilians. The military and civilians also sometimes had differing views on issues of short-term versus long-term goals.

Despite problems, ePRT veterans believe that they had a positive effect in both supporting

military counterinsurgency efforts and helping local Iraqi officials prepare for self-reliance.

Interviewees identified a variety of operational problems that detracted from ePRT mission

accomplishment. The Iraq ePRTs are now history, but as the United States continues to use civil-military teams in Afghanistan, these observed lessons need to be learned and acted upon.

Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are civilian-military teams that were first fielded in

Afghanistan in 2002. A significantly modified version was introduced in Iraq in 2005. The

theory was that a stable nation would not emerge unless reconciliation, good governance,

and economic development extended beyond the central government in the capital city  to provincial and local officials across the nation. PRTs were envisioned as a key means to achieve these goals. 

http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR290.pdf

10.  Failing Oversight: Iraq's Unchecked Government, International Crisis Group

After years of uncertainty, conflict and instability, the Iraqi state appears to be consolidating by reducing violence sufficiently to allow for a semblance of normalcy. Yet in the meantime, it has allowed corruption to become en-trenched and spread throughout its institutions. This, in turn, has contributed to a severe decay in public services. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government has exacerbated the problem by interfering in anti-corruption cases, ma-nipulating investigations for political advantage and in-timidating critics to prevent a replication of the type of popular movements that already have brought down three regimes in the region. The government’s credibility in the fight against corruption has eroded as a result, and this, together with troubling authoritarian tendencies, is giving ammunition to the prime minister’s critics. To bolster its faltering legitimacy, Maliki’s government will have to launch a vigorous anti-corruption campaign, improve service delivery and create checks and balances in the state system.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria%20Lebanon/Iraq/113%20-%20Failing%20Oversight%20-%20Iraqs%20Unchecked%20Government.pdf

11.  The U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=5252

12.  US and Iranian Strategic Competition: Competition in Iraq, Center for Strategic and International Studies

Iraq has become a key focus of the strategic competition between the United States and Iran. The history of this competition has been shaped by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the 1991 Gulf War. Since the 2003 Iraq War, both the US and Iran have competed to shape the structure of Post-Saddam Iraq’s politics, governance, economics, and security.

The US has gone to great lengths to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, including using its status as an occupying power and Iraq’s main source of aid, as well as through information operations and more traditional press statements highlighting Iranian meddling.

However, containing Iranian influence, while important, is not America’s main goal in Iraq. It is rather to create a stable democratic Iraq that can defeat the remaining extremist and insurgent elements, defend against foreign threats, sustain an able civil society, and emerge as a stable power friendly to the US.

http://csis.org/files/publication/110927_Iran_Chapter_6_Iraq.pdf

13.  Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role, Government Accountability Office

DOD has robust plans and processes for determining the sequence of actions and associated resources necessary to achieve the drawdown from Iraq, which is well underway with a significant amount of equipment removed from Iraq and bases transitioned, among other things. However, several factors contribute to making this phase more challenging than the previous drawdown phase. First, DOD will have less operational flexibility in this phase of the drawdown, yet will need to move a greater amount of equipment than in prior drawdown phases. Second, DOD is closing the largest bases with fewer available resources left on site, which creates a set of challenges and risks greater than what DOD faced during the prior drawdown phase. Although DOD's plans and processes create flexibility and mitigate risk, it has limited visibility over some equipment remaining in Iraq and does not track equipment found on transitioning bases that is not listed on any property accountability record. Without addressing these issues, DOD may miss opportunities to make the drawdown more efficient. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11774.pdf 

14.  Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully Account for Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel, Government Accountability Office

The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) designated SPOT as their system in 2010 for tracking statutorily required information on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Citing limitations with SPOT’s implementation, the agencies generally relied on data sources other than SPOT to prepare their 2011 joint report. Only State used SPOT but just for its contractor personnel numbers. However, GAO found that regardless of the data source used, the agencies’ data had significant limitations, many of which were not fully disclosed. For example, while the agencies collectively reported $22.7 billion in fiscal year 2010 obligations, we found that they underreported the value of Iraq and Afghanistan contracts and assistance instruments by at least $4 billion, the majority of which was for DOD contracts. In addition, data presented in the joint report on personnel, including those performing security functions, are of limited reliability because of significant over- and undercounting. For example, DOD did not disclose that its contractor personnel numbers for Afghanistan were overreported for most of the reporting period because of double counting. Additionally, despite the reporting requirement, State did not provide information on its assistance instruments or the number of personnel working under them.

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11886.pdf

Reconstruction Indexes

 

1. Iraq Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf
2. Afghanistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx
3. Pakistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/pakistan%20index/index.pdf

Reconstruction Update

1.       “Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, reducing risks,” the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan

The final report of the congressionally chartered Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan says at least $31 billion has been lost to contract waste and fraud, and that major reforms are required.

Commission reform objectives include improving federal planning for use of contracts, strengthening contract management and oversight, expanding competition, improving interagency coordination, and modifying or cancelling U.S.-funded projects that host nations cannot sustain. The reforms are described in 15 strategic recommendations.  

The eight-member, bipartisan Commission filed its 240-page final report, “Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks,” with U.S. Senate and House officials this morning [31 August 2011].

http://www.wartimecontracting.gov

2.       Pakistan’s Future Policy Towards Afghanistan.  A Look at Strategic Depth, Militant Movements and the Role of India and the U.S.  

What factors are likely to govern the course of Pakistan’s future policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan? This question has increasing relevance for regional security, especially in the light of the imminent endgame in Afghanistan and of the ongoing dialogue with the Taliban.  

This report probes the implications of the volatile US–Pakistan relationship and of Indo–Pak rivalry in the Af–Pak war theatre, in particular for Pakistan’s reliance on militant extremist groups to secure and further its strategic interests. Developments pertaining to the role and engagement of the United States in the region and Indian ties to Afghanistan and the US affect Pakistan’s perceived power status in the Indian subcontinent. The extent to which Pakistani interests are met in the process and outcome of brokering a deal with the Taliban is an additional determinant of whether Pakistan will continue with, or veer from, the status quo. 

http://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2011/RP2011-08-Pakistans-future-policy_web.pdf

3.       One Team's Approach to Village Stability Operations  

This paper is an effort to demonstrate my team’s approach to VSO using the principles and TTPs that numerous articles have recently highlighted in the July-September issue of Special Warfare Magazine. It illustrates the practical application of the principles of VSO in the current operational environment and details exactly how these principles appear through the prism of the Military Decision-Making Process. This is the product of the team’s assessment, planning, execution, after action review and refinement process over the last 150 days of VSO operations in an austere and isolated location.   

The Village Stability Operations Methodology is a bottom up approach that employs USSOF teams and partnered units embedded with villagers in order to establish security and to support and promote socioeconomic development and good governance. Each Village Stability Team is a distinct entity with its own culture, appearances and way of operating, which reflects the Afghan dynamic of that particular site. It is true that Village Stability Platforms (VSP) throughout Afghanistan vary greatly within the context of conducting Village Stability Operations (VSO), yet every VSP applies the same principles of the methodology and shepherds the village through the phases of Shape, Hold, Build, and Expand / Transition; culminating with connecting the village to GIRoA through the district and province. 

http://smallwarsjournal.com/printpdf/11412  

4.       Afghan Concerns over U.S. Staying Power

As the timeline for the drawdown of U.S. and international troops from Afghanistan approaches, the United States and Afghanistan are working to finalize a long-term security arrangement that would secure a limited U.S. troop presence in the country beyond 2014. But the United States and Afghanistan disagree on several points, starting with how binding the agreement should be. Taj Ayubi, a minister-counselor to Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai, says as U.S. public opinion for the war in Afghanistan wanes amid an economic downturn and rising unemployment, Afghans grow increasingly concerned about Washington's long-term commitment to the country. Ayubi, who accused some in the Afghan government of sabotaging the strategic pact under discussion with Washington in a speech he delivered at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, says the majority of Afghans support a U.S. military base in the country post-2014.

http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/afghan-concerns-over-us-staying-power/p25778 

5.       How Afghanistan is Rebuilding Itself

Serious concerns persist in the international community about Afghanistan's governance abilities as the 2014 timeline for the security transition to Afghan forces draws near. The director of the office of Afghanistan and Pakistan affairs at the U.S. Agency for International Development, J. Alexander Thier, says economic effects of the drawdown "will be real" but points to sweeping improvements in Afghanistan's capacity to govern itself, singling out progress in health, education, energy, and road building. "We are changing the way we do business by doing more of our work directly through the Afghan government," to increase spending that goes directly into the Afghan economy, he says. Going forward, he says, investment in infrastructure and energy will be critical to increasing Afghans' capacity and making economic growth sustainable. He says the international community will be supporting development work in Afghanistan for years beyond 2014.

http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/afghanistan-rebuilding-itself/p25824 

6.       The Missing Endgame for Afghanistan: A Sustainable Post-Bin Laden Strategy 

Within hours of President Obama’s announcement of Osama bin Laden’s May 2 death, pundits and politicians from both the right and left were calling for a speedier withdrawal from Afghanistan. The discovery and targeted killing of bin Laden in a compound on the outskirts of Abbottabad, Pakistan,

located less than a mile from the Pakistan Military Academy, dramatically amplified concerns about elements of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence service (ISI) maintaining links with al-Qaeda and other violent extremist organizations. Many argued that the death of al-Qaeda’s leader meant that our post-9/11 mission had been accomplished, and our expensive presence in Afghanistan was no longer needed amidst an era of mounting debt and budget fights. 

http://www.twq.com/11autumn/docs/11autumn_Abshire_Browne.pdf

7.        Pakistan’s Deteriorating Economic Situation: How Much of it is Caused by Politics?  

Pakistan’s economy is in a state of deep crisis, the worst in its troubled history. While some natural disasters – an earthquake in 2005 and floods in 2010 – contributed to the poor performance of the economy, much of it was the result of weak management by the civilian government that took office in the spring of 2008. The cumulative loss to the economy during the five-year tenure of the current administration may be as high as 16 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP). On a number of previous occasions the military intervened when the government in place was deemed to be performing poorly in the economic field. Such an outcome seems unlikely this time around as the military has become conscious of the latent power of the street. This has been demonstrated by the Arab Spring. The country’s youth and the civil society do not want to see the army intervene in politics once again. That said, the current government, as it prepares for the general elections that must be held before the spring of 2013, has adopted a populist approach towards economic management. This includes the recent decision by the central bank to ease the supply of money. This may win votes but may further aggravate the already weak economic situation.

http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Insight_128_-_Email_-_Pakistan's_Deteriorating_Economic_Situation_15082011181555.pdf

8.       The Politics of Water Discourse in Pakistan 

The policy brief explores the evolving discourse on water issues in Pakistan where the process of political articulation, securitization and mobilization which often links water to Kashmir is studied. The rationale for undertaking such an approach is to provide useful insights to understand Pakistan‟s thinking on strategizing water. The primary research question therefore put to test is- whether Pakistan has a strategic design as far as the Indus waters is concerned? While this study has no intentions to under-estimate the water scarcity being experienced by Pakistan in any way, it aims to delink the issue of water politics from water security. The thrust of the study is to assess and analyze beliefs, interests, motivations and patterns of behaviour inside Pakistan regarding water issues.

http://www.icrier.org/pdf/Policy_Series_No_4.pdf  

9.       Dominoes on the Durand Line?  Overcoming Strategic Myths in Afghanistan and Pakistan

The death of Osama bin Laden presents an important opportunity to reassess U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Current U.S. thinking centers on two interests. The first is preventing al Qaeda and its Taliban allies from reestablishing a safe haven. The second is preventing the violence in Afghanistan from destabilizing Pakistan, thus putting its nuclear forces at risk and increasing the likelihood of nuclear terrorism. Coalition strategy is based on the assumptions that the only way to deny al Qaeda safe haven is by building a strong central Afghan state and that Pakistan’s nuclear complex will become increasingly vulnerable to militant attacks if the Taliban succeeds in Afghanistan.

Both assumptions are wrong. The United States does not need to build a state in Afghanistan because the conditions that allowed al Qaeda safe haven in the 1990s have permanently changed. Moreover, the steps needed to help Pakistan secure its nuclear arsenal have nothing to do with the war in Afghanistan. Policymakers should scale back their ambitions in Afghanistan.  If they do so, they could cut troop levels by 80–90 percent while defending core U.S. interests and dramatically reducing the costs to America in both blood and treasure.  

http://www.cato.org/pubs/fpbriefs/fpb92.pdf

10.   Microsoft Afkar.  Afkar is an Arabic word that means “ideas”. Microsoft Afkar gives Arabic users from all over the  world the chance to play with cool new tools and ideas coming out of Cairo Microsoft Innovation Lab. 

http://afkar.microsoft.com/

Reconstruction Indexes

1. Iraq Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf
2. Afghanistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx
3. Pakistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/pakistan%20index/index.pdf

Reconstruction Update

1.      Pakistan's Tribal Area Reforms Too Little, Too Late

Sheikh Janzada has reason to celebrate. Political and judicial reforms have finally come to his mountainous village in Bajauar Agency, part of Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), realizing a lifelong dream.

On August 12, the Pakistani government announced that political parties would be allowed to freely campaign in FATA, located along the country's western border with Afghanistan. Also slated for revision are draconian Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which will undergo modest improvements to allow for more accountability and some conformity with modern human rights standards.

http://www.rferl.org/content/pakistan_fata_tribal_reforms/24302628.html

2.      Afghan Villagers Stone a Taliban Commander to Death

KABUL, Afghanistan — Angry villagers stoned to death a local Taliban commander and his bodyguard in southern Afghanistan Sunday after the militants killed a 60-year-old man accused of aiding the government, Afghan officials said.

It was a rare reversal of brutality aimed at the Taliban and, some Afghan officials believe, suggests a growing sense of security in an area where the insurgency has lost ground to NATO forces in the last two years. The stoning happened in the Nawa District of Helmand Province, a verdant agricultural area along the Helmand River Valley, now considered one of the safest places in the volatile south as a result of a heavy influx of American troops and aid dollars.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/world/asia/23afghanistan.html?_r=1

3.      The Great Hindukush Gold Rush (1): Another Silver Bullet

When last year the not-so-new news hit the headlines that Afghanistan possesses enormous mineral resources, a lot of eyes started to shine with joy. Some Afghan and foreign officials believe that they finally have found the Holy Grail for post-2014 Afghanistan: a resource from which the country can pay its own security and development costs, currently incurred by Western donors mainly. But resources can also be a curse, as examples from other Third World countries – and current practice in Afghan mining - show. The hazards are manifold: social, ecological and in the political economy. The Kabul government is busy auctioning the deposits off already, making the right noises about ‘prudent’ and ‘responsible’ use of the resources, but before proper legislation exists to guarantee this. Thomas Ruttig, a Senior Analyst at AAN, starts looking at a few questions related to this Great Hindukush Gold Rush.

http://aan-afghanistan.com/index.asp?id=2022

4.      Afghans brace for economic fallout of U.S. exit

Reporting from Kabul, Afghanistan— Sorosh Tokhi's wallet is a lot fatter since foreign troops moved into Afghanistan in 2001. As an interpreter for the U.S. military earning $700 a month, he has bought a flat-screen TV and a sport utility vehicle, helped his parents out and paid for relatives' tuition.

So President Obama's recent announcement that U.S. troops will step up the pace toward a 2014 departure makes him nervous.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-afghan-economy-20110819,0,4578448.story

5.      The Foundation for Relief and Reconciliation in the Middle East http://www.frrme.org/

6.      How Pakistan Drifted Away from Itself

With the partition of the Indian subcontinent, the Dominion of Pakistan came into existence on Aug. 14, 1947. The valiant and astute Muhammad Ali Jinnah led the minority Muslim community of United India to the fulfillment of its dream for a separate homeland. The basis for the very demand of independence was the upholding of the freedom of religion, profession and speech.

Jinnah was an outstanding lawyer who had studied law in London. He had a modern outlook on the world and was strongly secular. "No subject ... in Pakistan shall, on grounds only of religion, place of birth, descent, color or any of them be ineligible for office," read part of the oath under which he took office. He was absolutely clear that the new state he was founding would accommodate people of all faiths and descents without any prejudice. To assert this point, he appointed a non-Muslim as his first law minister. The Muslims in his cabinet consisted of Sunni, Shia and Ahmadis alike. He believed that Islam endorsed a secular democracy and the two were perfectly compatible.

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/kashif-n-chaudhry/how-pakistan-drifted-from_b_931394.html

7.      Of 'Instructors' and Interests in Iraq

The Obama administration repeatedly says that US forces are "on track"  to vacate Iraq by the end of 2011, in keeping with candidate Barack Obama's pledge to "end the war in Iraq." Yet over the summer the US and the Iraqi government have rather quietly converged on the contours of a deal to keep thousands of US soldiers, to be described as "instructors," in Iraq past December.

Reidar Visser unravels the tangled Iraqi politics behind the negotiations in "Of 'Instructors' and Interests in Iraq," now available in Middle East Report Online:

http://www.merip.org/mero/mero082211

8.      Cutting Through Pentagon Spin About Businesses in Iraq

I've been trying to understand the purpose of the Pentagon's Task Force for Business and Stability Operations for about a year now. It is an intriguing effort to apply business development as a tool for economic growth and as an instrument of counterinsurgency -- a frankly rare example of really outside-the-box thinking from the military. At the same time, evaluating its effectiveness has proved to be incredibly difficult. Along the way, almost a dozen puff-pieces about the TFBSO, as its known, have been published, which repeat many talking points about the task force but don't actually discuss what it does.

http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/08/cutting-through-pentagon-spin-about-businesses-in-iraq/243773/

9.      Iraq dreams big with infrastructure projects

(Reuters) - In Iraq where renovating a single street can take years, government plans for a multi-billion dollar high-speed train to rival Japan's bullet train have been greeted with skepticism by many Iraqis struggling to get even basic electricity services.

The $10 billion project to build a railway connecting Baghdad to the southern provinces is the latest in a series of large-scale infrastructure proposals by Iraq's government to try to rebuild the OPEC oil-producing country after years of war.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/21/us-iraq-economy-infrastructure-idUSTRE77K1H120110821

10.  Washington Rivalry

With federal budget cuts looming, both the State Department and the Defense Department are scrambling to justify their budgets and to explain why they are each better qualified than the other to manage spending when their tasks overlap. And there is quite an overlap these days, especially in Iraq and Afghanistan. Congressional partisans are already taking sides in the debate.

Stephen Glain's "State vs. Defense" enters the battle as a battering ram at the Pentagon's gates. Mr. Glain assails the expansion of the Defense Department from strictly military matters to nation-building and economic development—turf that rightly belongs, the author says, to the State Department and to the Agency for International Development. Civilians can govern and foster development better than soldiers, he argues; and unlike soldiers, the presence of civilians does not alienate foreigners fearful of American imperialism. He also argues that the Defense Department's huge budget—and the Pentagon's growing authority to give military assistance outside the State Department's channels—have allowed Defense to exercise an undue influence over U.S. foreign policy

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903480904576510502556813690.html

11.  Realistic Policy Options in Iraq

Two new articles on the post-2011 US presence in Iraq as well as the ongoing political struggles relating to security portfolios and the national council for high policies:

“Of Instructors and Interests in Iraq”, available at http://www.merip.org/mero/mero082211

“Power Grabs and Politics Are Stalling Progress in Iraq”, available at

http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/power-grabs-and-politics-are-stalling-progress-in-iraq?pageCount=0

Recent blog posts include:
Iraqiyya and the Kurds Challenge Maliki on Oil and Gas
The Last Straw? Maliki Appoints Dulaymi as Acting Minister of Defence
Parliament Finishes the First Reading of the Strategic Policy Council Bill
Another Change to the Second Maliki Government as the Electricity Minister Is Sacked
Ramadan Agreement Provides Some Answers but Many Uncertainties Linger
All available at http://gulfanalysis.wordpress.com/

 12.  Billions Spent On Afghan Police But Brutality, Corruption Prevail

(Reuters) - An Afghan policeman shot dead taxi driver Mohammad Jawid Amiri six month ago, for no apparent reason. According to a Kabul police official, the shooting was an accident, and the offending policeman is now behind bars.

That's news to the family of 27-year-old Amiri.

They say the only contact with the policeman they had since the shooting was when his family offered a sheep and three bags each of rice and flour as compensation, but only if the Amiris signed papers saying their son died a traffic accident, and not from gunshot wounds.