Reconstruction Indexes

1. Iraq Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf

2. Afghanistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx

3. Pakistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/pakistan%20index/index.pdf

1. Buried Treasure.  Archaeologists are racing to save Afghanistan's cultural heritage before the Chinese start digging on one of the world's most valuable new copper mines.   http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204542404577157281392227936.html#ixzz1lKc8KjrD

2. Afghan First Initiative Has Placed Work with Afghan Companies, but Is Affected by Inconsistent Contract Solicitation and Vetting, and Employment Data Is Limited, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR%20Audit-12-6.pdf  

3. Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Jan2012/Lores%20PDF/2012JanBook.pdf  

4. DOD Improved its Accountability for Vehicles Provided to the Afghan National Security Forces, but Should Follow Up on End-Use Monitoring Findings, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR%20Audit-12-4.pdf  

5. Thirty Years of Conflict: Drivers of Anti-Government Mobilisation in Afghanistan, 1978-2011,
   Antonio Giustozzi and Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.  The literature concerning the last 30 years of war in Afghanistan has over the last few years reached such a critical mass that it is now possible to identify structural factors in Afghan history that contributed to the various conflicts and have been its signal feature from 1978 onward. The state-building model borrowed from the neighbouring British and Tsarist empires in the late 19th century contained the seeds of later trouble, chiefly in the form of rural-urban friction that gained substantial force with the spread of modernity to rural Afghanistan starting in the 1950s. Following the Khalqi regime’s all-out assault on rural conservatism in 1978-79, this friction ignited into large-scale collective action by a variety of localised opposition groups, including political organisations, clerical networks, and Pakistani military intelligence, as well as the intelligence services of several other countries.  http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1203E-Drivers%20of%20Conflict%20IP%202012.pdf  

6. Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan, Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder. Feinstein International Center.  Political and security objectives have always influenced U.S. foreign assistance policies and priorities. Since 9/11, however, development aid for countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan has increasingly and explicitly been militarized and subsumed into the national security agenda. In the U.S. as well as in other western nations, the re-structuring of aid programs to reflect the prevailing foreign policy agenda of confronting global terrorism has had a major impact on development strategies, priorities, and structures. The widely held assumption in military and foreign policy circles that development assistance is an important “soft power” tool to win consent for the presence of foreign troops in potentially hostile areas, and to promote stabilization and security objectives, assumes a relationship between poverty and insecurity that is shared by many in the development and humanitarian community.  http://sites.tufts.edu/feinstein/files/2012/01/WinningHearts-Final.pdf  

7. Healing the Legacies of Conflict in Afghanistan: Community Voices on Justice, Peace and Reconciliation, Emily Winterbotham, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.  Ten years after the overthrow of the Taliban, Afghanistan is an environment of escalating conflict and prevailing impunity. In this context, the narrative of the Afghan government and its international partners has increasingly focused on ending the violence through negotiating with insurgent leaders and reintegrating their fighters into Afghan society. In their attempt to secure peace, policymakers have largely failed to include justice as a component of reconciliation and reintegration processes. This has continued the predominant approach since 2001 (and before) with the need for immediate stability outweighing the need for wartime accountability. The fact that the Afghan government and its international partners have failed to implement a comprehensive programme to provide justice or compensation for past and present wartime crimes has inhibited people’s ability to deal with the legacies of conflict. Subsequently, the majority of people participating in AREU’s research said they were struggling to cope emotionally, psychologically and practically, and the desire for some form of “closure” remains strong.  http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1201E-Healing%20the%20Legacies%20of%20Conflict%20in%20Afghanistan%20SP%202011.pdf  

8. Pakistan's Perspective on Investigation Report Conducted by BG Stephen Clark into 26th November 2011 US Led ISAF/NATO Forces Attack on Pakistani Volcano and Boulder Posts in Mohmand Agency, Inter Services Public Relations, Government of Pakistan http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/press/pakistan.pdf  

9.      The Limits of the Pakistan-China Alliance, Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors. Heritage Foundation.  After the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan in May 2011, Pakistani political leaders played up their country’s relations with China, touting Beijing as an alternative partner to Washington. But China’s concerns over Pakistan’s future stability will likely limit the extent to which it will help Pakistan out of its economic difficulties. While China has an interest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan, the eco­nomic relationship is not very extensive and the notion that Chinese ties could serve as a replacement for U.S. ties is far-fetched. Instead of wringing its hands over Chinese influence on Pakistan, the U.S. should seek cooperation from Beijing in encouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan—which will benefit all parties involved.  http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/B2641.pdf  

10.  Report of the Commission of Inquiry Concerning the Gruesome Incident of the Abduction and Murder of Syed Saleem Shahzad, Submitted to the Government of Pakistan http://www.pid.gov.pk/REPORT.pdf  

11.  Security Sector Governance in Pakistan: Progress, But Many Challenges Persist, C. Christine Fair. Centre for International Governance Innovation.  The utility of the Pakistani army’s domination over nearly all aspects of the state in Pakistan was brought into question following the US Navy SEAL raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideout on May 2, 2011. Pakistanis wondered how these events could have occurred right under the military’s nose. This issue paper examines the prospects for security sector governance in Pakistan and identifies the reforms that are necessary for Pakistan’s government to make meaningful strides in this area. It begins by explaining the hegemonic role of the armed forces in the history of the state of Pakistan and the unique challenges of its contemporary security terrain before surveying security sector governance in several key areas: the security of Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal; the all powerful intelligence agencies; disaster management; law enforcement; the criminal justice system and support to jihadist groups. While the report elucidates persistent shortcomings of security governance in all areas, it also highlights key areas of recent improvement, including disaster management and control of nuclear arms.  http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/SSR_Issue_no5.pdf  

12. Counter-IED Strategic Plan 2012-2016, Joint IED Defeat Organization https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20120106_JIEDDOC-IEDStrategicPlan_MEDprint.pdf

13.  An Afghanistan Without Institutions, A World Without Rest by Kip Whittington, Small Wars Journal.  Let’s not kid ourselves; Afghanistan will still be at war post-2014. Given that the coalition intends to end combat operations in 2014 while security problems linger on, the Afghans will certainly be left to manage the daily activities of a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign well into the “Transformation Decade” (2015-2024), discussed in-depth at the recent Bonn Conference. If the world doesn’t want to see Afghanistan plunge into chaos once again, there must be a serious focus on strengthening the institutions that will protect and run the country as a whole.  http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/an-afghanistan-without-institutions

14. Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report_-_January_2012.pdf#view=fit       

15. Few Contracts Terminated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Resulted in Wasted Funds in Iraq, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-011.pdf#view=fit      

16. The Department of State's Process to Provide Information on Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-009.pdf#view=fit       

17. Development Fund for Iraq: Department of Defense Cannot Fully Account for the Funds it Used after the Coalition Provisional Authority Dissolved, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-008.pdf#view=fit       

18. Status of Recommendations Made by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction to the Department of Defense, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-010.pdf#view=fit       

19. Iraq after America: 2012 Promises to be a Stormy Year for the Beleaguered Country, LTC Joel Rayburn, USA. Defining Ideas, Hoover Institution http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/106226      

20. Development Funds for Iraq Returned to the Central Bank of Iraq, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-012-F.pdf#view=fit

Reconstruction Update

1. The Real Outcome of the Iraq War: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq, Anthony H. Cordesman, et al. Center for Strategic and International Studies

Iraq has become a key focus of the strategic competition between the United States and Iran. The history of this competition has been shaped by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the 1991 Gulf War, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Since the 2003 war, both the US and Iran have competed to shape the structure of Post-Saddam Iraq’s politics, governance, economics, and security.

The US has gone to great lengths to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, including using its status as an occupying power and Iraq’s main source of aid, as well as through information operations and more traditional press statements highlighting Iranian meddling. However, containing Iranian influence, while important, is not America’s main goal in Iraq. It is rather to create a stable democratic Iraq that can defeat the remaining extremist and insurgent elements, defend against foreign threats, sustain an able civil society, and emerge as a stable power friendly to the US and its Gulf allies.

http://csis.org/files/publication/111220_Iran_Chapter_6-Iraq.pdf  

2. End of Mission Ceremony in Baghdad, GEN Martin Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey at the End of Mission Ceremony in Baghdad

Thank you very much Ambassador, Mr. Secretary, Ministers, General Babaker—my brother, and I see out there as well, General Abdul Kader, you’re always going to be General Abdul Kader to me, you know that. As-Salamu Alakum [peace be with you].

Thank you for welcoming me back to Baghdad to mark this new beginning for Iraq, the United States and on some level, the entire region. I’m honored to share this moment with Secretary Panetta, Ambassador Jeffrey, General Mattis, and of course General Austin and his sergeant major [Command Sgt. Maj. Joseph Allen]. They stand tall in a long line of American leaders who have been dedicated to seeing this difficult mission through. They represent a generation of my fellow who came here to keep America safe and to free Iraq from tyranny. They have shouldered their duties in partnership with our very respected Iraqi brothers. http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1668  

3. Was the Iraq War Worth It?, Andrew J. Bacevich, et al. Council on Foreign Relations

Was the nine-year U.S. war in Iraq worth it? Boston University's Andrew Bacevich says the world is a better place without Saddam Hussein, but stresses that the "disastrous legacy" of the war transcends lives lost or dollars spent. CFR's Max Boot says it may be premature to assess the benefits but there remains a chance for Iraq to serve as "a model for the Arab Spring." Michael Ignatieff, an academic, human rights advocate, and initial supporter of the war, says groups like the Kurds and the Shia in Iraq have gained. But it's "difficult to believe the war was worth it," he says, given the damage to U.S. credibility, the strengthening of Iran, and the lack of stability in Iraq. Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution expresses hope that over time the "the war will not be seen historically as a mistake or failure." http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-war-worth-/p26820  

4. Iraq: Putting US Withdrawal in Perspective,  Anthony H. Co desman. Center for Strategic and International Studies

The prospects of cuts in defense spending interacts with the US failure to reach a meaningful agreement with the Iraqi government over how to implement the Strategic Framework Agreement. At present, the US security role will continue after the end of 2011, but in an extremely limited way. Plans keep changing, but the US effort to deal with the Iraqi military will consist solely of a small Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), and an increasingly uncertain police training mission that has been transferred to the State Department and which the Congress is unlikely to fund at anything like the planned level. http://csis.org/files/publication/111214_Iraq_US_Withdrawal.pdf  

5. U.S.-Iraq Relations Enter a New Era: U.S. Forces Complete their Strategic Reset as U.S. Diplomats Set New Tone, Peter Juul. Center for American Progress

Our nation is well on its way to withdrawing the last of our troops from Iraq before the holiday season begins, just as President Barack Obama promised. Under the U.S.-Iraq security agreement our troops must be out by the end of the year, but Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s visit to Washington this week will be matched by U.S. military ceremonies in Baghdad and elsewhere highlighting the final strategic reset of our Iraq policy sometime this week.

Prime Minister Maliki’s visit will mark this key achievement of the Obama administration, but so too will his talks with President Obama and other top administration officials as the United States and Iraq enter into a more normal relationship. The U.S. military is leaving Iraq but it is clear that the United States will not be leaving Iraq any time soon. As a result, it’s worth charting out where the new U.S.-Iraq relationship will and should be going in the near future. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/12/us_iraq_relationship.html  

6. The "End" of the War in Iraq?, Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies

It is all too clear that most Americans want the war in Iraq to be over. A Gallup poll in October found that 75% approved of President Obama’s withdrawal of U.S. troops, although Americans divide sharply by party: 96% Democrats, 77% independents, and 43% Republicans. There are good reasons for such feelings. In spite of U.S. military successes in reducing the level of internal violence in Iraq, the war has been a strategic failure when its costs are compared to its benefits. http://csis.org/files/publication/111212_Cordesman_EndWarIraq_Commentary_Formatted.pdf

7. Oversight in Iraq and Afghanistan: Challenges and Solutions, Hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1529%3A12-7-2011-qoversight-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-challenges-and-solutionsq&catid=17&Itemid=25  

8. Central Asia and the Transition in Afghanistan, A Majority Staff Report by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations http://www.foreign.senate.gov/publications/download/central-asia-and-the-transition-in-afghanistan2

Reconstruction Update

1.  How Afghanization Can Work, Linda Robinson.  If past is prologue, the December 5 Bonn conference, which aims to shore up international support for Afghanistan, will conclude with promises that will almost certainly remain unfulfilled, like the Kabul and London conferences before it, and the barely noticed Istanbul conference last month.  The most important question about Afghanistan is one that must be answered in Washington, not Bonn: What is the size and nature of the military commitment that the United States is prepared to make in the coming years? That decision will in turn dramatically affect both the diplomatic prospects for negotiations and the funds available for ongoing assistance.  http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/afghanization-can-work/p26662                                                      
2. Women and the Afghan Transition, Ben Smith. House of Commons Library, United KingdomThere has been a lot of concern that Afghan women will be the main losers in the next few years as international forces withdraw and the Kabul government negotiates some sort of accommodation with the insurgency.  http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06132.pdf     

3. Transition in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond 2014, The World Bank                                          Full responsibility for security is to be handed over and most international troops are to be withdrawn by the end of 2014—as understood at the 2010 Kabul and Lisbon conferences. Experience suggests that withdrawals of international troops reduce civilian aid, with implications for economic growth, fiscal sustainability, and service delivery.                    Potential financing gaps in the budget could threaten security and recent development progress, creating a sense of urgency for both the Government and the donor community.  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/AFBeyond2014.pdf              

4. The Afghanistan-Pakistan War at the End of 2011: Strategic Failure? Talk Without Hope? Tactical Success? Spend not Build (And Then Stop Spending)?, Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies                                                                                         The US is on the thin edge of strategic failure in two wars: the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan/Pakistan. This failure may never reach the point of outright defeat in either country. Iraq may never become hostile, revert to civil war, or come under anything approaching Iranian control. Afghanistan and Pakistan may never become major sanctuaries for terrorist attacks on the US and its allies.                                                                                                                    Yet Iraq is already a grand strategic failure. The US went to war for the wrong reasons, let Iraq slide into a half decade of civil war, and failed to build an effective democracy and base for Iraq’s economic development. Its tactical victories – if they last – did little more than put an end to a conflict it help create, and the US failed to establish anything like the strategic partnership it sought. http://csis.org/files/publication/111115_Afghanistan_at_End_2011.pdf                             

5.      A Review of the 2001 Bonn Conference and Application to the Road Ahead in Afghanistan, Mark Fields and Ramsha Ahmed. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

Ten years ago in Bonn, Germany, the United Nations Envoy to Afghanistan, Ambassador

Lakhdar Brahimi, and U.S. Envoy to the Afghan Opposition, Ambassador James Dobbins,

led a diverse group of international diplomats and warriors to consensus and charted

the political course for Afghanistan well into the decade. The process that led to the Bonn

Agreement (Bonn 2001, or Bonn I) reflects the best of U.S. and United Nations statesmanship

and was the result of the effective application of military and diplomatic power. Bonn 2001

was successful for five reasons… 
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/Strategic%20Perspectives%208_Fields-Ahmed.pdf                      

6.      Painful Steps: Justice, Forgiveness and Compromise in Afghanistan’s Peace Process, Jay Lamey. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

Peace in Afghanistan is frequently discussed but remains only a faint hope. As we move from meetings in Kabul to Bonn, and as strategies for the future are made and revised, it is vital that the voices of those who have suffered during Afghanistan’s conflicts are heard and understood. An arrangement that respects their hopes and concerns stands the best chance of delivering a just and durable peace in the country.
http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1129%20Painful%20Steps%20PN.pdf                   

7. Afghanistan's Paramilitary Policing in Context: The Risks of Expediency, Antonio Giustozzi and Mohammad Isaqzadeh. Afghanistan Analysts Network                                                 Despite representing the bulk of Afghanistan’s post‐2001 policing, the paramilitary dimension has received little attention among analysts. Still, if the current regime is to survive the transition to Afghan leadership in the security sector, which officially started in July 2011, and the subsequent Western disengagement, getting paramilitary policing into a functional state will be decisive.  There are different types of para‐militarism, however, and what suits the Afghan predicament can only be determined by looking at the functioning of the MoI.                 http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/AAAN-2011-Police_and_Paramilitarisation.pdf                     
8. Iraqi Leaders React to the U.S. Withdrawal, Ramzy Mardini. Institute for the Study of War                                                                                                                                                On October 21, 2011, President Barack Obama announced his decision to withdraw all of the remaining 39,000 U.S. forces from Iraq by the end of the year. The complete pullout of U.S. forces satisfies the final phase of the withdrawal timetable established by the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement signed in December 2008 by outgoing President George W. Bush and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The decision comes after negotiating efforts failed to reach a new security arrangement with Iraq that would have allowed for a continued U.S. military presence beyond 2011. This document compiles and analyzes many of the reactions of Iraq’s leaders to the cessation of negotiations and the withdrawal of U.S. forces.  http://www.understandingwar.org/files/Backgrounder_IraqLeadersReacttoWithdrawal.pdf                     
9. Security Issues Relating to Iraq, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on 15 November 2011 http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=5256                                            
10. Police Corruption: What Past Scandals Teach about Current Challenges, U.S. Institute of Peace                                                                                                                                         Police corruption is a universal problem, but it is a particular challenge in countries in crisis and emerging from conflict. This report is based on the lessons gleaned from a review of public commissions of inquiry into police misconduct worldwide and their possible application in stability operations, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. The study attempts to determine whether past scandals can help us deal more effectively with the contemporary problems of nation building and police reform.  http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR%20294.pdf                          
11. Geopolitical Fault Lines – The Case of Afghanistan, Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, Zurich                                                                                                                                         Long before the colonial age, Afghanistan’s history has been defined geopolitically, first as a buffer zone between chaffing empires, then as a collision point between competing and global powers. This article examines the country’s past, current and perhaps future geopolitical fate. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Special-Feature/Detail?lng=en&id=134666&contextid774=134666&contextid775=134664&tabid=134664&dynrel=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233,4888caa0-b3db-1461-98b9-e20e7b9c13d4                                       
12. China's Pakistan Conundrum, ForeignAffairs.com
China is often called an "all-weather friend" to Pakistan -- a strategic partner, a reliable source of trade and aid, and Islamabad's closest military ally. Pakistani Prime Minister Yousef Raza Gilani has described the friendship between the two countries as "higher than mountains, deeper than oceans, stronger than steel, and sweeter than honey." In September, he told the visiting Chinese Public Security Minister Meng Jianzhu, "Your friends are our friends," continuing, "your enemies are our enemies, and your security is our security. http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136718/evan-a-feigenbaum/chinas-pakistan-conundrum?cid=nlc-this_week_on_foreignaffairs_co-120811-chinas_pakistan_conundrum_2-120811

Reconstruction Indexes

1. Iraq Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf

2. Afghanistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx

3. Pakistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/pakistan%20index/index.pdf

Reconstruction Update

1.      Pakistan-U.S. Relations: A Summary
Source: Congressional Research Service (via Federation of American Scientists)
From the report's summary:
This report summarizes important recent developments in Pakistan and in Pakistan-U.S. relations.
Obama Administration engagement with Pakistan has been seriously disrupted by recent events.
A brief analysis of the current state of Pakistan-U.S. relations illuminates the main areas of contention
and uncertainty. Vital U.S. interests related to links between Pakistan and indigenous American
terrorism, Islamist militancy in Pakistan and Islamabad’s policies toward the Afghan insurgency,
Pakistan’s relations with historic rival India, nuclear weapons proliferation and security, and the
troubled status of Pakistan’s domestic setting are reviewed. Ongoing human rights concerns and U.S.
foreign assistance programs for Pakistan are briefly summarized, and the report closes with an
analysis of current U.S.-Pakistan relations. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41832.pdf

2.      The Status Report: Afghanistan and Pakistan Civilian Engagement
November 4, 2011 21:17
Source: U.S. Department of State
From the press statement by Secretary Clinton:
The civilian surge in Afghanistan and Pakistan that President Obama launched in 2009 to accompany the military surge in Afghanistan has helped advance our goals of defeating al-Qaeda, reversing the Taliban's momentum in key areas, and bolstering the economy and civil society of both countries. As U.S. troops begin a phased drawdown in Afghanistan as part of the larger plan for transition, our civilian initiatives in both Afghanistan and Pakistan are assuming new importance.
This report provides a thorough review of our civilian efforts, identifies significant challenges and areas of progress, and outlines the way forward.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/176809.pdf

3.      Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011: Summary Findings, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
Overview:
The total area under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan in 2011 was estimated at 131,000 hectares (ha), a 7% increase compared to 2010. 95% of total cultivation took place in nine provinces in the Southern and Western regions6, which include the most insecure provinces in the country. This confirms the link between insecurity and opium cultivation observed since 2007.
The number of poppy-free provinces decreased from 20 in 2010 to 17 in 2011 as Baghlan and Faryab provinces in the Northern region and Kapisa province in the Eastern region lost their poppy-free status.
Potential opium production in 2011 was estimated at 5,800 mt, a 61% increase compared to 2010, when opium yields were much reduced due to plant diseases.
http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Executive_Summary_2011_web.pdf

4.      Message from the Director: Setting the Record Straight on Our Afghanistan Analysis, Statement to CIA Employees by Director David H. Petraeus, October 14, 2011
An Associated Press article published today presents an inaccurate picture of my thoughts on the CIA's Afghanistan analysis. The article asserts that a change in process introduced to enhance coordination, to get our officers even earlier access to more information, and to ensure we gain the benefit of hearing from those on the ground full-time—intelligence base chiefs, civilian experts, and military officers alike—was somehow designed to impose a military viewpoint on our analysis. That is flat wrong.
https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-2011/setting-the-record-straight-on-our-afghanistan-analysis.html

5.      2014 and Beyond: U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan, Part I, Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
Testimony:
a.       Steve Chabot, Subcommittee Chairman http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/cha110311.pdf
b.      Zalmay Khalilzad http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/kha110311.pdf
c.       LTG David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/bar110311.pdf
d.      Ashley J. Tellis http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/tel110311.pdf
e.       C. Christine Fair http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/fai110311.pdf

6.      Crackdown in Iraq: Former Ba’athists Still Pose Lingering Security Challenge

Executive Summary
Hundreds of people have been arrested all around Iraq in an operation launched by the security forces against members of the banned Ba’ath party. The crackdown came a few days after U.S. President Barack Obama announced that U. S. forces will pull out from Iraq by the end of 2011, a deadline assigned by the United States and Iraq two years previously. The operation is one of the biggest of its kind in post—war Iraq. More significantly Iraqi officials introduced it as a pre-emptive strike against an alleged plan to overthrow the government and the whole Iraqi political order. However, tension over the Iraqi government’s decision to move forward with the operation has created discord at the highest levels. It was reported that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had a verbal encounter with one of his Deputy Prime Ministers—Saleh al-Mutlaq [1]—over the issue during a cabinet session. (al-Mada October 26, Asharq al-Awsat October 27). The authorities have depended on a membership list of the old party, and claimed that it had revived its old structure. People from both Sunni and Shia areas were arrested but in general the crackdown was welcomed by the Shia parties. Critics, especially from the dominantly Sunni Iraqia party, have vocally opposed the operation claiming that the arrests were politically motivated. The issue of dealing with Iraq’s Ba’athist past has been one of the most divisive factors in Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion. With the recent developments, it is clear that it will cause even more tensions in the post-American era. The whole affair came amid a recent surge in violence across Iraq.  
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38618&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=26&cHash=d1b6a06f91304f3d57677251fb71841a

7.      The Haqqanis as the Pivot in the Deteriorating US-Pakistan Relations by Shahid Javed Burki, National University of Singapore

The author of this article addresses the question as to what kind of Afghanistan Washington should leave behind. To leave the country at peace, one of the more important things is to have the powerful Haqqani network in the country’s south and with a sanctuary in Pakistan to align itself with Washington’s broad objectives. Would the use of force bring this about or would negotiations among different interest parties produce the desired result?
http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/133438/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/9fa28ccf-340f-4d1d-912b-b5be86183c68/en/EVELINE_ISAS_Insights_138.pdf

8.      Constitutional Interpretation and the Continuing Crisis in Afghanistan, Scott Worden and Sylvana Q. Sinha, United States Institute of Peace
Summary
The recent controversy in Afghanistan over the outcome of the 2010 parliamentary elections ultimately resolved the question of who sits in Parliament, but left a more fundamental question
unanswered: “Who has the power to interpret the Afghan Constitution?”
• Ambiguities in the language of the Constitution make it difficult to determine who has the legal authority to interpret it. The Supreme Court maintains that the Constitution gives it the power of judicial review, but the Constitution also calls for the Independent Commission on the Supervision of Implementation of the Constitution (ICSIC), which the Parliament has mandated to decide constitutional issues instead.
• Without political and legal consensus over who has final authority to decide different types of constitutional claims, Afghanistan cannot achieve a rule of law where government activities are subject to consistent and transparent rules.
• Afghanistan must establish clear and unambiguous rules for constitutional interpretation to avoid damaging crises about political leadership and the separation of powers as the security transition and Presidential election approach in 2014.
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%20113.pdf

Reconstruction Indexes

1. Iraq Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf

2. Afghanistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx

3. Pakistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/pakistan%20index/index.pdf