- “Afghanistan Casualties: Military Forces and Civilians”, Congressional Research Service, December 2012.
This
report collects statistics from a variety of sources on casualties sustained
during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which began on October 7, 2001, and is
ongoing. OEF actions take place primarily in Afghanistan; however, OEF
casualties also include American casualties in Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Guantanamo
Bay (Cuba), Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Jordan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, the
Philippines, Seychelles, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Yemen.
Casualty
data of U.S. military forces are compiled by the U.S. Department of Defense
(DOD), as tallied from the agency’s press releases. Also included are
statistics on those wounded but not killed. Statistics may be revised as
circumstances are investigated and as records are processed through the U.S.
military’s casualty system.
- “In Brief: Next Steps in the War in Afghanistan? Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, December 2012.
On
May 1, 2012, President Obama gave a speech from Bagram Air Field in which he
laid out
U.S. government approaches for “winding down” the war in Afghanistan. While a number
of observers have challenged the logical plausibility of a unilateral decision
to “wind
down” a war, the Administration’s commitment to decreasing U.S. involvement in
the war in Afghanistan is clear.
Many
observers point to a coalescing vision of the way forward—shared by the
governments of the United States, Afghanistan, and other international
partners—that includes bringing the current campaign to a close by the end of
2014, and pursuing a political settlement among the parties in conflict, while
extending U.S. and other international commitments to Afghanistan beyond 2014.
In evaluating this emerging vision, some observers emphasize that the overall
level of ambition has been lowered, while others stress that the timeline for
international engagement has been extended.
- “The Governor's Solution: How Alaska’s Oil Dividend Could Work in Iraq and Other Oil-Rich Countries”, Center for Global Development, November 2012.
Reliance
on natural resource revenues, particularly oil, is often associated with bad
governance, corruption, and poverty. Worried about the effect of oil on Alaska,
Governor Jay Hammond had a simple yet revolutionary idea: let citizens have a
direct stake.
The
Governor’s Solution features his firsthand account that describes, with
brutal honesty and piercing humor, the birth of the Alaska Permanent Fund
dividend, which has been paid to each resident every year since 1982.
Thirty
years later, Hammond’s vision is still influencing oil policies throughout the
world. This reader, part of the Center for Global Development’s Oil-to-Cash
initiative, includes recent scholarly work examining Alaska’s experience and
how other oil-rich societies, particularly Iraq, might apply some of the
lessons. It is as a powerful reminder that the combination of new ideas and
determined individuals can make a tremendous difference—even in issues as
seemingly complex and intractable as fighting the oil curse.
- “Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan After U.S. Pullout”, U.S. Institute of Peace, January 2013.
The Islamic Republic considers the U.S. presence in
Afghanistan a major security concern along its 600-mile eastern border. It was
deeply suspicious of the 2010 U.S. surge to dislodge Taliban forces from
southern Afghanistan. Iranian leaders are now more concerned about a residual
U.S. presence—albeit in smaller numbers—after 2014. On January 11, President
Hamid Karzai visited the White House and announced that coalition forces will
transition to a support role this spring. Tehran is keeping a close eye on the
Bilateral Security Agreement under negotiation between Kabul and Washington,
and actively trying to influence that debate inside Afghanistan as well as at
the regional level.
Iran’s influence since 2001—when it supported the
U.N.-backed effort to topple the Taliban and establish a new political
order—has gone through different phases.
It used mainly soft power to strengthen its foothold in Afghanistan
through investment, trade and cultural linkages. Over the years, Iranian security
and intelligence institutions have become increasingly active in prodding a
Western withdrawal and shaping Afghan politics.
- “How to prevent the next Benghazi”, Amb. James Jeffrey, Washington Post, January 2013.
For
most of America’s history, our diplomacy was based on establishing rapport with
foreign leaders, negotiating military alliances, promoting trade and reporting
back to Washington on key developments, all while watching out for our citizens
abroad. But since World War II, and particularly under Presidents Obama and
George W. Bush, our approach has expanded: Our diplomats now move beyond host
government offices to work directly with populations to help mediate conflicts,
press economic development and serve shoulder to shoulder with the military in
the fight against terrorism.
This
new type of mission, dubbed “expeditionary diplomacy,” is hands-on and often
effective. But, as we saw with the Sept. 11, 2012, attack on the Benghazi
outpost that killed Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other
Americans, it can also be very dangerous. In hearings this past week before
Senate and House committees, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton
reiterated her conviction that direct-to-the-population diplomatic work is
essential for U.S. security. But to make sure the risks of expeditionary
diplomacy are worth the rewards, we need a clear, formal framework for deciding
when these missions should be undertaken, avoided or rolled back.
- “How We Fight: Fred Kaplan’s ‘Insurgents,’ on David Petraeus”, New York Times, January 2013.
The American occupation of Iraq in its early years was a
swamp of incompetence and self-delusion. The tales of hubris and reality-denial
have already passed into folklore. Recent college graduates were tasked with
rigging up a Western-style government. Some renegade military units blasted
away at what they called “anti-Iraq Forces,” spurring an inchoate insurgency.
Early on, Washington hailed the mess a glorious “mission accomplished.”
Meanwhile, a “forgotten war” simmered to the east in Afghanistan. By the low
standards of the time, common sense passed for great wisdom. Any American
military officer willing to criticize his own tactics and question the
viability of the mission brought a welcome breath of fresh air.
Most alarming was the atmosphere of intellectual
dishonesty that swirled through the highest levels of America’s war on terror.
The Pentagon banned American officers from using the word “insurgency” to
describe the nationalist Iraqis who were killing them. The White House decided
that if it refused to plan for an occupation, somehow the United States would
slide off the hook for running Iraq. Ideas mattered, and many of the most
egregious foul-ups of the era stemmed from abstract theories mindlessly applied
to the real world.
- “Leadership
in COIN Operations,” U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, January 2009. http://cryptome.org/dodi/2013/coin-leadership.pdf
- “Remembering 1960s Afghanistan, the photographs of Bill Podlich,” Denver Post, January 2013.
In
1967, Dr. William Podlich took a two-year leave of absence from teaching at
Arizona State University and began a stint with UNESCO (United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) to teach in the Higher
Teachers College in Kabul, Afghanistan, where he served as the “Expert on
Principles of Education.” His wife Margaret and two daughters, Peg and Jan,
came with him. Then teenagers, the Podlich sisters attended high school at the
American International School of Kabul, which catered to the children of
American and other foreigners living and working in the country.
Outside
of higher education, Dr. Podlich was a prolific amateur photographer and he
documented his family’s experience and daily life in Kabul, rendering frame
after frame of a serene, idyllic Afghanistan. Only about a decade before the
1979 Soviet invasion, Dr. Podlich and his family experienced a thriving,
modernizing country. These images, taken from 1967-68, show a stark contrast to
the war torn scenes associated with Afghanistan today.
- “Afghanosphere” http://unamoore.com/afghanosphere/
- “Alleged terrorism ties foil some Afghan interpreters’ U.S. visa hopes”, Washington Post, February 2013.
KABUL
— According to the U.S. military, Tariq is an interpreter who risked his life
to aid the American mission in Afghanistan and for seven years had access to
sensitive information about U.S. tactical operations.
According
to the State Department, there’s a very good chance he is a terrorist who poses
a threat to national security and should never be allowed on American soil.
Tariq,
one of southern Afghanistan’s longest-serving interpreters, wants to know: How
is it that one man can be praised as a hero and labeled a terrorist by the same
government?
- Battlefield journalists http://www.xl-shop.com/forum/viewtopic.php?p=140695&sid=5ccf97c9b3180153f50a6d3784d0de71
- “Why Is The United States Subsidizing Iran?”, Foreign Policy, February 2013.
U.S.
President Barack Obama has often spoken of the ever-tightening ring of
sanctions against Iran. The hope is that the sanctions will eventually bring
the Islamic Republic to the bargaining table, if not to its knees. The effort,
however, would be more effective if these sanctions did not go hand in hand
with a longstanding and lucrative annual bonus to Iran from Washington. That's
right: The United States is effectively funding its adversary.
- Capital of Corruption, BBC, February 2013.
The cost of corruption in Afghanistan rose sharply last
year to $3.9 billion, and half of all Afghans bribed public officials for
services, the U.N. said Thursday. The findings came despite repeated promises
by President Hamid Karzai to clean up his government.
The international community has long expressed concern
about the problem of corruption in Afghanistan because it reduces confidence in
the Western-backed government.
- “Despite progress, Afghanistan's total corruption cost increases to $3.9 billion”, UNODC, January 2013.
Since
2009, Afghanistan has made some tangible progress in reducing corruption in the
public sector, as fewer people now report paying bribes. Nonetheless, the total
corruption cost has increased by some 40 per cent over the last three years to
reach $3.9 billion. Moreover, in 2012, half of Afghan citizens paid a bribe
while requesting a public service, says a new joint High Office for Oversight
and Anti-Corruption (HOO) and UNODC survey on trends and patterns of corruption
in Afghanistan.
Nearly
30 per cent of Afghan citizens paid a bribe when requesting a service from
individuals not employed in the public sector of Afghanistan in 2012, as
opposed to the 50 per cent who paid bribes to public officials. The national
economic impact of non-governmental bribery is also lower, with an estimated
total cost of $600 million.
- “A Resilient Oligopoly: A Political-Economy of Northern Afghanistan”, Afghanistan Research Evaluation Unit, December 2012.
This
paper studies the political and social dynamics of Northern Afghanistan, not
just from
the short-term perspective of political rivalry and personal competition, but also
from the wider and longer-term perspective of the resilience and weaknesses of
organisations, patronage networks, and institutions, by looking at the social
and economic
interests underpinning them. While much has been written about Northern Afghanistan,
no overview of the Northern political landscape has been written previously and
this paper is meant to fill the gap.
The
Northern region, defined here as the provinces of Faryab, Jowzjan, Sar-i Pul,
Balkh and
Samangan, has some peculiarities compared to the rest of Afghanistan in its
politics, economics
and social structure. It is: the only region dominated by Uzbek speakers; the
second largest hinterland of a major city (after Kabul); and the only region
where a
duopoly of power exists. No other region is dominated by the struggle for
influence between
two major strongmen like Abdul Rashid Dostum and Atta Mohammad Nur- a feature
of Northern politics this report argues has become permanent.
- “Political Economy and Conflict Dimensions of Afghanistan’s Mineral Resources: A Preliminary Exploration”, United States Institute of Peace, December 2012.
Mining,
currently a localized, largely informal, and mostly small-scale sector in
Afghanistan, is widely seen as a potential leading economic growth driver and
source of government revenues. Afghanistan is well-endowed with underground
mineral resources, but not much systematic exploitation using modern technology
has occurred, and exploration remains in its infancy. Linkages to other
economic activities and substantial employment generation also are envisioned,
with development of “resource corridors” exploiting multi-use infrastructure
and regional transport and trading opportunities. The potential positive
impacts on Afghanistan’s economy, jobs, budget and on regional development have
been assessed by the World Bank and others.
Set
against these potential benefits is the so-called “resource curse” often
associated with underground
minerals in countries lacking strong institutions and effective rule of law.
Adverse macroeconomic (“Dutch Disease”), developmental (loss of comparative
advantage in other sectors, environmental damage), fiscal (expenditure
distortions, disincentives to mobilize other revenues), governance (risk of
grand corruption, diversion of revenues, lack of accountability), political
(undermining of social contract with and political accountability to the
population), and conflict (grievances of have-nots, fighting over spoils)
effects have been noted, to varying degrees in different countries.
- “Afghanistan: Meeting the Real World Challenges of Transition”, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, January 2013.
The
more one looks at Afghanistan today, the more likely it seems that Transition
will at best produce a weak and divided state and at worst a state that either
continues its civil war or comes under Taliban and extremist control. More than
a decade of Western intervention has not produced a strong and viable central
government, an economy that can function without massive outside aid, or
effective Afghan forces. There are no signs that insurgents are being pushed
towards defeat or will lose their sanctuaries in Pakistan, and outside aid
efforts have generally produced limited benefits – many of which will not be
sustainable once Transition occurs and aid levels are cut.
There
has also been a steady erosion of outside support for the war – first in Europe
and increasingly in the US, where some 60% of Americans no longer see a
prospect of victory or any reasons to stay. While governments talk about
enduring efforts, each time the US and its allies have reviewed their Afghan
policy since 2010, their future level of commitment has seemed to shrink and
more uncertainties have arisen.
- “Eagle's Summit Revisited: Decision-Making in the Kajaki Dam Refurbishment Project”, Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 2013.
- “Money Pit: The Monstrous Failure of US Aid to Afghanistan”, World Affairs, January/February 2013.
More
than half of Afghanistan’s population is under twenty-five, which shouldn’t be
surprising since the average life span there is forty-nine. But the United
States Agency for International Development looked at this group and decided it
needed help because, it said, these young people are “disenfranchised,
unskilled, uneducated, neglected—and most susceptible to joining the
insurgency.” So the agency chartered a three-year, $50 million program intended
to train members of this generation to become productive members of Afghan
society. Two years into it, the agency’s inspector general had a look at the
work thus far and found “little evidence that the project has made progress
toward” its goals.
The
full report offered a darker picture than this euphemistic summary, documenting
a near-total failure. It also showed that USAID had handed the project over to
a contractor and then paid little attention. Unfortunately, the same can be
said for almost every foreign-aid project undertaken in Afghanistan since the
war began eleven years ago.
- “How It All Began: A Short Look at the Pre-1979 Origins of Afghanistan's Conflicts”, Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 2013.
- “Is Pakistan's Behavior Changing?”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 2013.
Islamabad
has been trying to send signals over the last few months indicating that it is
pursuing a new course of action, both internally and externally, that is more
in line with international norms. Pakistan has tried to improve its
relationship with India. It has also indicated a preference for a negotiated
peace in Afghanistan and demonstrated a new attitude toward terrorism.
Of
course, claims that Pakistan’s policies are changing in one way or another are
not new. And in the past, the status quo ante has almost always prevailed. But
this could be different.
The
context is different this time. The looming international troop withdrawal from
Afghanistan brings considerable risks for the region in general and for
Pakistan in particular. Islamabad fears that, come 2014, it will face an
unstable Afghanistan and find itself isolated regionally and globally.
- “Difficult Times Ahead for Iraq”, Council on Foreign Relations, January 2013.
The
Iraqi government, headed by Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, faces difficult
times ahead, says Meghan L. O'Sullivan, a former top official dealing with Iraq
in the Bush administration. "The coming year will not be an easy one for
Iraq," she says. "It will need not only to address a host of
persistent internal issues, but also must contend with regional forces
which--in themselves--would be sufficient to challenge Iraq's progress."
She says Maliki is under strong pressure not only from Sunnis and Kurds, but
also from fellow Shiites, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, who is now opposed to many of
Maliki's policies. O'Sullivan says that even though Iraq is now rich with oil
profits, the ordinary Iraqi is still not benefiting much. "[M]ost Iraqis do
not see these significant revenues as translating into better lives for
themselves and blame the government for incompetence and corruption," she
says.
- “Afghanistan Index”, Brookings Institution, January 3012.
- “The case for an enduring mission in Afghanistan”, Foreign Policy, January 2013.
Denying
al Qaeda's re-emergence in Afghanistan requires ensuring that Afghanistan can
be sufficiently stable and capable of defending itself, as President Barack
Obama explained during the surge announcement at West Point on Dec. 1, 2009. Al
Qaeda is not present in large numbers (perhaps less than 1,000) in Afghanistan
now, but Secretary Leon Panetta stated in November 2012
that "intelligence continues to indicate that they are looking for some
kind of capability to be able to go into Afghanistan as well." The U.S.
and NATO cannot allow war weariness and economic conditions to obscure the
realities and requirements they face. The recently announced accelerated shift
to a "support role" in Afghanistan could become a guise to withdraw
if "support" means just a few thousand counterterrorism forces and
trainers.
In
the eyes of many officials, a sound counterterrorism strategy rests on the
assumption that the U.S. and NATO can kill their way toward a better future,
against the Taliban and the Haqqanis or against al Qaeda and its affiliates. A
decade of war proves the falsehood of this assumption. Experts outside the
military are better qualified to determine how best to assist Afghanistan in
the areas of governance, economic development, and reconciliation, and how best
to move forward in Pakistan. But my experience in accelerating the growth of
the Iraqi security forces -- in size, capacity, and confidence -- during the
Iraqi "surge" of 2007 to 2008 qualifies me to speak about what is
necessary to help the Afghan army succeed in taking lead responsibility.
