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Sunday, January 6, 2013

Reconstruction Update


  1. "In Afghanistan, Humor Finds Its Way in Lost Translation," New York Times, December 2012.
Funny isn’t an adjective often used to describe Afghanistan. Yet to many Afghans, the war and the foreigners waging it can present a surprising source of humor.
Afghans around the country tell anecdotes about encounters with NATO troops. The best of these are encapsulated, shared and sometimes aggrandized in the form of half-funny, half-sad tales told over warm chai or at picnics. Sometimes told with a laugh, sometimes told with a tone of bitterness, these stories tend to be about cultural mishaps and miscommunication that, 11 years after the start of the international intervention, still occur with alarming frequency.

  1. "The U.S. is abandoning its loyal friends in Afghanistan," Washington Post, December 2012.            
The United States has abandoned our most effective and loyal friends in Afghanistan by   deliberately failing to implement the Afghan Allies Protection Act. In 2011, I served as the chief adviser on rule of law for the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul (ISAF). I witnessed the heroism and steadfast courage of our Afghan employees as they resisted threats from the Taliban and from their own government. Now, as we draw down   and leave them vulnerable, our government refuses to follow its own laws to save them.             http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-us-is-abandoning-its-loyal-friends-in-afghanistan/2012/12/06/cc8b7416-38b5-11e2-8a97-363b0f9a0ab3_story.html             

  1. "Kabul Sets Tax Breaks to Aid Economy," Wall Street Journal, December 2012. 
KABUL—Afghanistan is planning major tax breaks and incentives for investors ahead of U.S.-led forces' withdrawal at the end of 2014, part of an effort to stem accelerating capital flight, the country's finance minister said.
A proposal drafted by the finance ministry and endorsed by President Hamid Karzai would grant a 10-year tax break and provide free land to companies that invest in Afghanistan over the next two years, Finance Minister Omar Zakhilwal told The Wall Street Journal. 

  1. ”Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 2012. 

  1. “Anti-Corruption Measures: Persistent Problems Exist in Monitoring Bulk Cash Flows at Kabul International Airport,” Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, December 2012. 
The international community, including the U.S. government, has long held serious concerns about the flow of cash out of the Kabul International Airport (KBL). According to the Congressional Research Service, an estimated $4.5 billion was taken out Afghanistan in 2011. While large cash movements are typical in Afghanistan because it is a cash-based economy, these bulk cash flows raise the risk of money laundering and bulk cash smuggling—tools often used to finance terrorist, narcotics, and other illicit operations.
Recognizing the seriousness of this problem, a civilian-military interagency working group based at the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan developed the “bulk cash flow action plan” in 2010 to better regulate cash flow at KBL. That same year, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) pledged to adopt and implement regulations or laws within one year to govern the bulk transfers of cash outside the country.

  1. "Will The Kurds Get Their Way?" The American Interest, December 2012.
The turn of the 21st century marks a definite period of Kurdish awakening. This social revolution is occurring separately within each of the four communities, but also through trans-border activities that are increasingly bringing the groups’ political consciousness together. It is a revolution that is very likely to shake the geostrategic pillars of the Middle East to their foundations. 
In some ways, the rising Kurdish wave resembles the somewhat more advanced Tuareg wave in North Africa and the western Sahel. The Tuareg rising has already destroyed the territorial integrity and political order of one state, Mali, and threatens others. The Kurdish rising may very well do the same.

  1. "Delays at Chinese-Run Afghan Mines Raise Security Fears," Wall Street Journal, December 2012. 
BAMIYAN, Afghanistan—Foreign investment in Afghanistan's mining sector was meant to bring peace and prosperity. But here in Bamiyan province, it has so far put locals out of jobs and fueled a spreading insurgency.
For decades, thousands of Afghans have dug for coal in the unregulated mines of Bamiyan's Kahmard district, in a valley dotted with timber-framed entrances to dangerous, narrow shafts. This summer, the Afghan government evicted these squatters to make way for a Chinese consortium that has won one of the biggest natural-resources concessions in a country that sits atop vast, largely untapped mineral wealth.

  1. “Spinoff: The Syrian Crisis and the Future of Iraq,” The American Interest, January 2013.
There is an unremarked paradox in the tumult of the contemporary Middle East. Syria is an economically impoverished country of a little more than 20 million people that has been politically stagnant until 23 months ago. Egypt, by contrast, never socially at rest and with its ancient energies newly bestirred, is at 80.5 million people more than four times larger. Yet it is the carnage in Syria, not the continuing multiparty political tightrope act in Egypt, that is more likely to unleash a torrent of violence and instability throughout the Middle East. Before it has run its course it could undo multiple existing regimes and even alter the region’s post-World War I territorial boundaries.  This is because as a consequence of the Syrian uprising the fate of Iraq now hangs in the balance and, with it, the fate of the Middle East.

  1. Abbas Al Mosawi and the Colours of Bahrain.
Abbas Al-Mosawi learned his craft first under the tutelage of the Bahraini artist, Ahmed Baqer. Later as a student in Cairo he was attracted to the impressionist style of Sabry Ragheb, whom he considers to this day to be the prince of painters. The sources for his work derive principally from the old souk of Manama and its surrounding villages. Given the irreversible changes of the urban and rural landscape, his paintings provide the viewer with the necessary imaginative and aesthetic bridge to the past. Indeed such is the power of his native Bahrain on his artistic output that it colours both literally and figuratively his abstract paintings.

  1.  “Pakistan in 2013,” House of Commons Library, United Kingdom, December 2012.
2013 will be another important year for Pakistan. Federal and provincial elections will be held during the first half of the year. If, as seems increasingly likely, the Pakistan People’s Party-led Government sees out its full term in office and hands over to a civilian successor, it will be the first time in Pakistan’s history that this has happened. But the political and economic situation remains highly volatile and unpredictable. In addition, by the end of 2013 the coalition allies, led by the United States, are expected to have withdrawn more of their combat forces from neighbouring Afghanistan – with total withdrawal the following year. Pakistan’s policies and actions will be pivotal in shaping the outcome there. Further, the run-up to elections in India in 2014 could affect the fragile peace efforts once again underway between these enduring rivals.
During 2013, the wider world will probably continue to view developments in Pakistan primarily through the prism of Islamist militancy and the actions taken (or not) to combat it by the Federal Government. This is understandable, but it is crucial not to oversimplify the country’s politics by neglecting the many other factors which shape its trajectory. This paper seeks to create that wider lens on Pakistan. It begins by surveying the electoral landscape in Pakistan as 2013 draws near, before going on to assess the record in office of the Federal Government, led by the Pakistan People’s Party, since 2008. The paper then looks at Pakistan’s complex and often fraught relationships with other countries since 2008, focusing specifically on the US, India, Afghanistan, China, the UK and the EU. It also reviews development and humanitarian aid to Pakistan since 2008. The paper ends with a summary of recent expert views of Pakistan’s ‘possible futures’.

  1. “Representation Without Taxation! An Analysis of MPs' Income Tax Returns for 2011,” Centre for Peace and Development Initiatives and the Center for Investigative Reporting in Pakistan, December 2012.

  1. “Iraq in Hindsight: Views on the U.S. Withdrawal,” Center for a New American Security, December 2012.  
A year ago, all U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq, bringing to an end the nation’s “American era” that began in 2003. Iraq rarely even makes the Western news these days. During the presidential campaign, both President Barack Obama and Governor Mitt Romney skirted quickly over the subject. Obama boasted about how he had ended the war in Iraq, and the only point of contention between the two candidates was over whether the United States should have kept troops in Iraq beyond 2011.
Wars of intervention have essentially become wars of domestic communication. The real victims are elsewhere – and seem not to count in the public discourse. The Iraq war had unintended consequences that left over 100,000 Iraqis dead, enabled the resurgence of Iran and tarnished the reputation of U.S. democracy promotion. Yet there is now a temptation to assign the experience to history. The American public exhibits no appetite for holding officials accountable for the decision to go to war or for the mismanagement of the occupation. However, now that the American era in Iraq has ended, the time is ripe for a bipartisan effort to learn the right lessons about intervention. The nation owes it to those Americans who volunteered to serve there – and to the 4,488 service members who gave their lives.

  1. “Central Asia Prepares for Post-2014 Afghanistan,” The Jamestown Foundation, December 2012. 
On December 4, Kazakhstan’s parliament and the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies held a joint conference on the future of Central Asia–Afghanistan relations. This conference was attended by representatives of Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, including diplomats, researchers and political experts, as well as the deputy speaker of the Afghan Parliament. As the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is preparing to leave Afghanistan by 2014, the security situation in this country continues to represent a serious challenge to its neighbors, while the problem of drug trafficking, which originates on Afghan soil, is unanimously understood as a transcontinental threat impacting both Russia and Europe (Bnews.kz, December 4).

  1. “India and Pakistan's Afghan Endgames: What Lies Ahead?,” World Affairs Journal, December 2012. 
In 1960, Aslam Siddiqui, an important figure in Pakistan’s Bureau of National Reconstruction, wrote that because Pakistan faced simultaneous threats from India to the east and Afghanistan in the west, Islamabad ought to seek “a fusion of the two states of Afghanistan and Pakistan in some way or other.”
This fusion, he believed, would provide “strategic depth,” filling two of Pakistan’s needs. The first was physical space to defend against an Indian attack. Most of Pakistan’s population centers and economic resources lay along the Indus River, adjacent to the Indian border and vulnerable to a sudden Indian offensive. To absorb such an attack, Pakistan would need to seek defense northward into Afghanistan. It would not be difficult to acquire some influence. Afghanistan has historically been dependent on Pakistani land for access to maritime trade from the Arabian Sea, giving Islamabad a monopoly on most trade with Kabul and influence over much of Afghanistan’s economic and political life.
The second Pakistani need that “fusion” with Afghanistan would satisfy was domestic, in the sense of ensuring Pakistan’s internal cohesiveness….
  1. “Central Asia's Stability Increasingly Compromised by Ongoing Grain Crisis,” The Jamestown Foundation, November 2012.
In early September, the United Nations once again warned of the growing risks of another global food crisis, following particularly bad harvests in the United States, Russia, Ukraine and other grain-producing countries. These negative developments have already led to a rapid erosion of grain reserves to their lowest level since 1974. While the average volume of such reserves was sufficient to ensure continued consumption within 107 days back in 2002, today’s stocks would not last beyond 74 days, with consumption rates steadily hovering above currently observed production levels. In October 2012, the Rome-based UN agency the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) released the results of its worldwide survey assessing the number of people suffering from chronic malnutrition at more than 870 million, whereas the most vulnerable populations continue to be those of the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa.
  1. “Five Truths About India,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 2012.
For over sixty years, India, a low-income country occupying a sprawling geography and serving as a home to a dizzying diversity of ethnic and linguistic groups, has managed to survive—indeed, thrive—as a functioning democracy. Its political system in particular has the capacity to confound even the most knowledgeable and insightful Indian, so it should come as no surprise that for outsiders, interpreting Indian politics can be downright daunting.
But trying to fit India into neat categories to get a handle on the South Asian behemoth misses much of the nuance at the heart of the Indian polity. For instance, India’s politics have grown more regionalized, yet powerful forces of centralization remain intact. Old caste divides have lost social relevance but often thrive in the domain of politics. Five trends playing out in India today highlight the tensions between continuity and change in the country.

  1. “Between the Times: India's Predicaments and its Grand Strategy.” Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, December 2012.
On the eve of India’s founding, no one could have imagined how successfully it would come to navigate the international system. At that time, there were legions of skeptics who believed that the half-life of this new country would be measured in years, perhaps decades at most. The question of when India would split apart was one of the staples of public discussion going back to Churchill’s celebrated remark, “India is a geographical term. It is no more a united nation than the Equator.” Since then, legions of commentators believed that it would be a miracle if India survived.  
Today, however, India’s unity is taken for granted. In one of the greatest feats of modern history, India has built a cohesive nation despite incredible poverty and diversity. India has done just as well in regard to its territorial integrity. Yes, it lost one major war and it has lost bits and pieces of territory, but India as a unified territorial entity has survived despite being located in an extremely contested and unsettled regional environment.  And, to everyone’s surprise, India has managed, despite great material weakness, to protect its political autonomy.

  1. Afghanistan Index, Brookings Institution, December 2012. http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index

  1. "US-Pakistan Relations and the ‘End-Game’ in Afghanistan," Institute of South Asian Studies, December 2012.
As the rush towards the Afghan end-game intensifies, the United States and Pakistan are back to mending their fences. After more than a year of frayed relationship following the May 2011 raid that killed Osama bin Laden, the Salala incident and the increased drone strikes, the two allies are on the road to making amends to repair the relationship.

  1. “Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics and Religion.” Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, January 2013.
The longest war the United States has ever fought is the ongoing war in Afghanistan. But when we speak of "Afghanistan," we really mean a conflict that straddles the border with Pakistan--and the reality of Islamic militancy on that border is enormously complicated.
In Talibanistan, an unparalleled group of experts offer a nuanced understanding of this critical region. Edited by Peter Bergen, author of the bestselling books The Longest War and The Osama Bin Laden I Know, and Katherine Tiedemann, these essays examine in detail the embattled territory from Kandahar in Afghanistan to Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas. They pull apart the distinctions between the Taliban and al Qaeda--and the fractures within each movement; assess the effectiveness of American and Pakistani counterinsurgency campaigns; and explore the pipeline of militants into and out of the war zone. Throughout, these scrupulously researched studies challenge convenient orthodoxies. Counterterrorism expert Brian Fishman criticizes the customary distinction between an Afghan and Pakistani Taliban as being too neat to describe their fragmented reality. Hassan Abbas paints a subtle portrait of the political and religious forces shaping the insurgency in the Northwest Frontier Province, uncovering poor governance, economic distress, and resentment of foreign troops in nearby Afghanistan. And Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann try to identify the real numbers of drone strikes and victims, both militants and civilians, while disputing claims for their strategic effectiveness.
These and other essays provide profound new insight into this troubled region. They are required reading for anyone seeking a fresh understanding of a central strategic challenge facing the United States today.

 

 

Wednesday, November 28, 2012

Reconstruction Update


  1. Risky business: U.S. diplomats abroad, Dante Paradiso, October 2012.
In June 2003, U.S. Ambassador John Blaney had a choice to make. Two rebel groups assaulted the Liberian capital to overthrow Charles Taylor. Taylor was wanted by an international criminal court and he controlled Liberia with commandos and unruly militia. There was a real risk that his forces would attack the U.S. Embassy. The city was swollen with thousands of internally displaced people, and there was no food, potable water or electricity.
The U.S. Embassy was the last Western diplomatic presence and there was no way out of the country, as the port was under attack, no airlines were flying, and roads were impassable. At the low point, the embassy had only a handful of Marines and a skeletal staff. Ambassador Blaney had every reason to take down the flag and go home. What would you have done?

  1. Lara Logan 2012 BGA Annual Luncheon Keynote Speech, October 2012.  http://www.bettergov.org/about_us/2012_bga_annual_luncheon_2.aspx  

  1. Institute for War & Peace Reporting – Afghanistan http://iwpr.net/programme/afghanistan  

  1. Kabul Politics Block Bank Probe, Panel Finds, Wall Street Journal, November 2012.
KABUL—Political interference has impeded an investigation into the collapse of Afghanistan's largest private lender, with some investors, including President Hamid Karzai's brother Mahmood, escaping scrutiny, a joint Afghan-international watchdog said in a report released Wednesday.
The Afghan Attorney General's investigation into Kabul Bank's 2010 collapse has led to the prosecution of several bank executives, who have been on trial in the Afghan capital for about a month.
But the investigation is sparing shareholders with strong political connections, according to the report by the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, which comprises three Afghan anticorruption experts named by Mr. Karzai and three international representatives. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323330604578145323831172956.html?mod=googlenews_wsj

  1. Report of the Public Inquiry into the Kabul Bank Crisis, Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, Kabul, Afghanistan.  November 2012     http://mec.af/files/knpir-final.pdf
 
  1.  “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: A Risk Assessment Report”, Carlton University, October 2012.
The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has a long history of power struggles and regime changes. A landlocked country in a volatile region, Afghanistan is home to many ethnic and religious minorities. It has struggled with corruption, civil unrest, and outside influences since its independence in 1919. It transitioned from a constitutional monarchy in 1964, to a declared republic after a political coup in 1973. Shortly after leader Mohammed Daoud was overthrown by the leftist People’s Democratic Party in 1978, Afghanistan was invaded by USSR troops trying to end an Islamist insurgency. Soviet control lasted until 1989, when religious guerrilla Mujahadeen successfully in ousted their presence. In 1996, the Taliban (a militant movement of Pashtun extremists), took control of the government and established a repressive regime, enforcing Sharia Law, and remaining unacknowledged by the majority of the international community. Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan, put an end to the Taliban regime, and Hamid Karzai took over as President of Afghanistan. Since 2001, Afghanistan has been dependent on international aid in helping to stabilize infrastructure and development and has been faced with serious challenges. With a promise of NATO troop withdrawal by 2014, Afghanistan continues to face political and civil unrest. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1415.pdf

  1. “Afghanistan: Development progress and prospects after 2014”, House of Commons International Development Committee, United Kingdom, 25 October 2012. 
The future of Afghanistan is uncertain. There will be changes in its leadership, the withdrawal of international forces and a reduction in total overseas aid. It is not known what attitude neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan, will take. The Taliban is stronger in many parts of Afghanistan than it was when our predecessor Committee visited the country in 2007. Despite these uncertainties we believe the UK should have a major aid budget in the country. We have an obligation to the millions of Afghans who have resisted the Taliban and the British soldiers who have died in the country.
Nevertheless, because of the uncertainties in the country, DFID will need to be flexible. For example, there might come a point at which DFID would need to stop funding the Afghan Government through the ARTF; in which case, it should ensure it has other channels open to it such as NGOs to which funding can then flow to prevent Afghan communities from suddenly being cut off from aid.
The UK Government’s overarching strategy for its engagement in Afghanistan has given DFID the lead in creating a viable state. DFID has had some successes, for example in increasing tax revenue, but these gains will be difficult to sustain and further progress will not be made unless the Afghan Government is determined to achieve a similar outcome. We recommend the UK Government reconsider DFID’s focus on creating a ‘viable state’, giving greater emphasis to the provision of services and alleviating poverty.
  1. “Economic Assistance in Conflict Zones. Lessons from Afghanistan”, Centre for Global Development, October 2012.
The upcoming departure of NATO forces from Afghanistan highlights the question of whether that country will find lasting peace and prosperity without a significant foreign military presence. Has the international community been able to lay the foundations for a stable Afghanistan? Is the Afghan government now capable of formulating and implementing economic and security policies widely perceived as welfare- enhancing? Or will the country collapse into anarchy as Taliban and anti-Taliban forces struggle for power in the wake of the coming security vacuum?
This paper examines these questions through the lens of foreign-assistance policy. We argue that donors face a fundamental tension between the short-rundemands of financing a war effort and the long-run demands of sustainable economic development. In short, this paper explores the question of whether or not foreign aid has helped to build state strength and legitimacy in Afghanistan, and not just bolster state capacity to fight a war.

  1. “Afghanistan: The Long, Hard Road to the 2014 Transition”, International Crisis Group, October 2012.
Plagued by factionalism and corruption, Afghanistan is far from ready to assume responsibility for security when U.S. and NATO forces withdraw in 2014. That makes the po-litical challenge of organising a credible presidential election and transfer of power from President Karzai to a successor that year all the more daunting. A repeat of previous elec-tions’ chaos and chicanery would trigger a constitutional crisis, lessening chances the present political dispensation can survive the transition. In the current environment, pro-spects for clean elections and a smooth transition are slim. The electoral process is mired in bureaucratic confusion, institutional duplication and political machinations. Elec-toral officials indicate that security and financial concerns will force the 2013 provincial council polls to 2014. There are alarming signs Karzai hopes to stack the deck for a favoured proxy. Demonstrating at least will to ensure clean elections could forge a degree of national consensus and boost popular confidence, but steps toward a stable transi-tion must begin now to prevent a precipitous slide toward state collapse. Time is running out.
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/236-afghanistan-the-long-hard-road-to-the-2014-transition.pdf  
  1. Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 2012.

  1. NATO Must Refocus on Afghanistan, Heritage Foundation, October 2012.
On October 9–11, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 28 defense ministers will meet in Brussels. The top priority for the United States at this ministerial meeting should be ensuring that NATO demonstrates resolve and commitment to Afghanistan—especially in light of the recent “green on blue” attacks. The Alliance needs to realize that reforms such as Smart Defense will be meaningless and the credibility of the Alliance will be in doubt if it is not successful in its current operations.

  1. Contracting the Commanders: Transition and the Political Economy of Afghanistan’s Private Security Industry, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, October 2012.
As Afghanistan approaches the 2014 deadline for assuming responsibility for its own security, and the international community becomes preoccupied with the challenge of reducing its vast entanglement with the country’s politics, economy, and society, the critical question is whether NATO’s transition will succeed in stabilizing Afghanistan - or whether it will result in further destabilization, as seen following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, which eventually led to the collapse of the central government, large-scale civil war, and the country’s development into a haven for international terrorism.
Under the liberal state-building paradigm that has informed the international intervention, this challenge is largely seen in terms of institution and capacity building, as measured by the strength of the ANSF, the effectiveness of the civil service and bureaucracy, fiscal and macroeconomic stability, as well as, to a lesser degree, qualitative metrics for rule of law, gender equality, and human rights. The emphasis on such metrics is evident in the preoccupation with ANSF troop levels and funding commitments at international conferences such as the NATO summit in Chicago this past May.
Without denying the importance of these factors, this policy brief argues that the country’s near- and medium-term stability is less contingent on institution-building than it is on the political settlement between Afghanistan’s diverse and fragmented political networks and powerbrokers…

  1. Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, October 2012. 
  1. Drone Politics in Pakistan, Council on Foreign Relations, October 2012.
Imran Khan, a former cricket star-turned-politician, led a two-day march last weekend that focused new attention on U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan. For Joshua Foust, a fellow at the American Security Project, the march demonstrates how Khan, who is running for prime minister as head of the party Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI), is exploiting public anger over U.S. drone strikes. Foust questions Khan's silence on the subject of the Pakistani Taliban, especially in light of Tuesday's shooting of teen activist Malala Yousufzai. "It's important to remember that the Taliban were rampaging in Pakistan before there were drones," he says. As far as U.S.-Pakistan relations on terrorism, he says the relationship needs to be renegotiated to "shift to a more collaborative system, where the U.S. actively engages in target selection and ultimately target neutralization with the Pakistani government."

  1. A Wake-Up Call for Pakistan, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, October 2012.
Pakistani women are being targeted by Islamic terrorists who fear that women’s emancipation would ultimately reduce their influence over a society that has become increasingly conservative. It appears that the possible rise of women will not go unchallenged, particularly in the country’s more conservative areas such as the tribal belt on the border with Afghanistan.
Just when women in Pakistan have begun to use education to improve their economic and social conditions, they have run into another obstacle: the obstinate resistance offered by Islamic extremists.

  1. The Long and Rocky Road to India-Pakistan Rapprochement, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, October 2012.
The India-Pakistan peace process, has gained momentum since minister-level talks were restarted in early 2011. Recent months have brought considerable progress in improving bilateral ties. This includes a new visa accord, an energy agreement, and Pakistan’s decision to grant most-favoured nation status to India.
However, the relationship remains hampered by territorial disputes; the Kashmir problem is nowhere close to being resolved. Bilateral ties are also undermined by hostile public opinion. Recent polling finds significant majorities in each country harbouring unfavourable views of the other, hardline narratives remain entrenched and criticism of each with a greater emphasis on regional reconciliation. And over the last year both countries have responded with restraint during periods of crisis. At the same time, country’s policies continues to prevail. Nonetheless, there is cause for hope. with a greater emphasis on regional reconciliation. And over the last year both countries have responded with restraint during periods of crisis. http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/9180f96a5cc844447344620d87bd216d.pdf

  1. Political Islam's Adaptive Radiation, The National Interest, November 2012.   
The cascading riots that spread across the Middle East and North Africa took many experts and policymakers by surprise. The riots in Libya would probably have faded into history, but the recent election cycle put them under a microscope. Much of the attention to date has focused on the decisions about security resources in the days leading up the attack and the subsequent White House response. These are important issues, but we must move beyond the retrospective assessment and consider implications for Middle East policy going forward.  
The events of the Arab Spring that began in late 2010 captured global attention as thousands of Muslims across the Middle East and North Africa took to the streets at great personal risk to condemn corrupt dictators and poor governance. The early days were exciting and hopeful. A rising generation of Muslims armed with courage and vision, aided by technology, brought major changes in countries like Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen.  
Eighteen months later, the United States stood in disbelief as mobs stormed embassies and burned flags…

  1. “Afghanistan Order of Battle”, Institute for the Study of War, November 2012.
This document describes the composition and placement of U.S. and other Western combat forces in Afghanistan down to battalion level. It includes the following categories of units: maneuver (i.e. infantry, armor, and cavalry) units, which in most cases are responsible for particular districts or provinces; artillery units, including both those acting as provisional maneuver units and those in traditional artillery roles; aviation units, both rotary and fixed-wing; military police units; most types of engineer and explosive ordnance disposal units; and “white” special operations forces, described in general terms. It does not include “black” special operations units or other units such as logistical, transportation, medical, and intelligence units or Provincial Reconstruction Teams.

  1. “Afghanistan: Transition needs investment, involvement to replace troops in 2014,” CBS News. November 2012.
KABUL - The date "2014" looms over this country like an unblinking neon sign, a coming attraction no one wants to see. The more people here talk and fret about the pending departure of Western troops, the more it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy -- it becomes a year in which things will change, and insecurity could return.
Already, people are leaving, and they aren't part of the official drawdown. The director of one conservation group told me he discovers every week that another NGO friend has left the country -- Afghans and foreigners alike. They pretend to fly out for a conference, and they just never come back.
Afghan Americans who had returned to their country to build businesses are slowly squirreling money out of it, unsure if the banks will survive in a few years' time. They are still desperately rooting for their country to succeed, but they're not quite willing to bet on it.
  1. “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: Down but not out,” ForeignPolicy.com, November 2012.
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a militant group based in Pakistan's tribal agencies, has suffered a series of major battlefield setbacks over the past year. But despite the loss of several senior leaders and a key media operative since 2011, the group remains one of the most militarily capable and media savvy militant outfits operating in the region.  It maintains working relationships with a number of other Sunni militant groups active in the region including al-Qaeda Central, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the Afghan Taliban.  The IMU has particularly close ties to the TTP, with whom it has launched joint military operations against Pakistani military targets inside Pakistan, as well ISAF and Afghan government targets in Afghanistan.  In April, an estimated 150 IMU and TTP fighters launched a successful attack on Bannu Prison in northwestern Pakistan, freeing nearly 400 prisoners, including Adnan Rashid, who was convicted in 2008 of involvement in an assassination plot against then-Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf. Rashid was subsequently featured in videos released by the IMU and TTP. http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/20/the_islamic_movement_of_uzbekistan_down_but_not_out

  1. “Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the Afghan People,” The Asia Foundation, November 2012. 
The Asia Foundation has released findings from Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the Afghan People, the broadest public opinion poll in the country. In June 2012, 742 Afghan pollsters—both men and women—fanned out across all 34 provinces to gather first-hand opinions from nearly 6,300 Afghan citizens on a wide range of topics critical to the future of Afghanistan. This marks the eighth in the Foundation's series of surveys in Afghanistan.

  1. “Afghanistan Index,” The Brookings Institution, November 2012,  http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index

 

Saturday, October 6, 2012

Reconstruction Update


  1. “Skateboarding in Kabul,” ForeignPolicy.com, Sep 2012.
A skateboarding park in Afghanistan might seem a little out of place, but in a country where nearly 70 percent of the population is under the age of 25, Oliver Percovich -- the founder of  the NGO Skateistan -- decided there was an unique opportunity to work for peace. In “Skateistan: The Story of Skateboarding in Afghanistan,” Oliver explains, "The whole idea was that we're building something for the kids, in Afghanistan, and it doesn't matter if they're poor, or rich, or coming from different ethnicities." As soon as he loaned out a few boards, he says, "I saw the gleam in their eyes and knew they were hooked." Since 2007, Skateistan has grown into an organization that employs youth from the street, teaches kids a new sport, and provides a please for boys and girls to play together.

  1. “Kabul's fallen skateboard fanatics,” BBC, Sep 2012.
In a video filmed in June, 14-year-old Khorshid tips her skateboard off the high edge of a quarter-pipe, at Kabul's indoor skatepark.
She appears fearless - and she was, say her friends, until she was killed by a Taliban suicide bomber last weekend.

  1. “Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia,” Alexander Cooley.
The struggle between Russia and Great Britain over Central Asia in the nineteenth century was the original "great game." But in the past quarter century, a new "great game" has emerged, pitting America against a newly aggressive Russia and a resource-hungry China, all struggling for influence over the same region, now one of the most volatile areas in the world: the long border region stretching from Iran through Pakistan to Kashmir.
In Great Games, Local Rules, Alexander Cooley, one of America's most respected international relations scholars, explores the dynamics of the new competition for control of the region since 9/11. All three great powers have crafted strategies to increase their power in the area, which includes Afghanistan and the former Soviet republics of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan. Each nation is pursuing important goals: basing rights for the US, access to natural resources for the Chinese, and increased political influence for the Russians.
However, overlooked in all of the talk about this new great game is fact that the Central Asian governments have proven themselves critical agents in their own right, establishing local rules for external power involvement that serve to fend off foreign interest. As a result, despite a decade of intense interest from the United States, Russia, and China, Central Asia remains a collection of segmented states, and the external competition has merely reinforced the sovereign authority of the individual Central Asian governments. A careful and surprising analysis of how small states interact with great powers in a vital region, Great Games, Local Rules greatly advances our understanding of how global politics actually works in the contemporary era.

  1. “All-out Middle East war as good as it gets,” AsiaTimes, Sep 2012.
TEL AVIV - It is hard to remember a moment when the United States' foreign policy establishment showed as much unanimity as in its horror at the prospect of a unilateral Israeli strike on Iran.
In a September 10 report for Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies, Anthony Cordesman warns, "A strike by Israel on Iran will give rise to regional instability and conflict as well as terrorism. The regional security consequences will be catastrophic."
And a "bi-partisan" experts' group headed by former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and co-signed by most of the usual suspects states, "Serious costs to US interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war."
If a contrarian thought might be permitted, consider the possibility that all-out regional war is the optimal outcome for American interests…

  1. “So Much for the Good War,” ForeignPolicy.com, Sep 2012
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, the plight of the Afghan woman was a minor, but important part of the narrative that shaped the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan. Girls, for the first time in years, headed to schools, and women -- at least in Kabul -- were able to move without the blue shuttlecock burqas that symbolized their bondage under the Taliban.
So it is with great irony that this week, one of the worst ever for coalition forces in Afghanistan, foreigners were killed in Kabul by a suicide bomber who was neither male nor linked to the Taliban. The perpetrator was a young woman affiliated with the Hezb-i-Islami (HIG) militant group led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a bitter foe of the Taliban and former U.S. proxy who on 9/11 was self-exiled in Iran.
The ever pragmatic Hekmatyar is a weather vane, indicating the trajectory of the conflict in Afghanistan and the ever shifting domestic and regional power game. His role in the Sept. 18 bombing shows that the insurgents have the upper hand, their fight against the United States and Kabul government will continue, and Afghanistan is headed toward a messy, full-scale civil war.

  1. “Failed Efforts and Challenges of America’s Last Months in Iraq,” New York Times, Sep 2012. 
The request was an unusual one, and President Obama himself made the confidential phone call to Jalal Talabani, the Iraqi president.
Marshaling his best skills at persuasion, Mr. Obama asked Mr. Talabani, a consummate political survivor, to give up his post. It was Nov. 4, 2010, and the plan was for Ayad Allawi to take Mr. Talabani’s place.
With Mr. Allawi, a secular Shiite and the leader of a bloc with broad Sunni support, the Obama administration calculated, Iraq would have a more inclusive government and would check the worrisome drift toward authoritarianism under Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki.
But Mr. Obama did not make the sale.

  1. “Pictures of Afghanistan in the Fifties and Sixties Are Totally Depressing,” Reason.com, Oct 2012.
"Given the images people see on TV, many conclude Afghanistan never made it out of the Middle Ages," writes Mohammad Qayoumi at Retronaut. "But that is not the Afghanistan I remember. I grew up in Kabul in the 1950s and ’60s. Stirred by the fact that news portrayals of the country’s history didn’t mesh with my own memories, I wanted to discover the truth."  
Qayoumi's gallery of what the Graveyard of Empires looked like before it was brought into contemporary civilization by the Hippie Trail, Soviet modernization, Taliban discipline and American nation-building is at once endearing, heartbreaking and disturbing. Because it turns out pre-modern Afghanistan looked pretty, well, modern.

  1. “Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund: Quarterly Report,” World Bank, Sep 2012.
Donors have contributed a total of US$5.7 billion since the inception of ARTF in 2002. SY1390 was a record year with US$933 million paid in, the majority of which was paid in during the second half of the year (US$877 million). SY1391 has started out strong with US$526 million contributed during the first quarter from four donors: Japan, Canada, Finland and the United States. At the same time last year the ARTF had received only US$57 million…In addition to the funds already received in SY1391 Q1, another US$430 million has been pledged for the remainder of the solar year. This amounts to a total of projected contributions of US$930 million. As a resultof the restructuring of the Afghan financial year, SY1391 will last only 9 months (March 21 to December 20, 2012) and consist of only three quarters. US$930 million divided over only three quarters, an average of US$311 million per quarter, is therefore a very high level of contributions compared to previous years.

  1. “The U.S. Surge and Afghan local Governance,“ United States Institute of Peace, Sep 2012.
This report focuses on both the U.S. military’s localized governance, reconstruction, and development projects and U.S. civilian stabilization programming in Afghanistan from 2009 through 2012. Based on interviews with nearly sixty Afghan and international respondents in Kabul, Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Washington, this report finds that the surge has not met its transformative objectives due to three U.S. assumptions that proved unrealistic. It also examines lessons from the U.S.surge’s impacts on local governance that can be applied toward Afghanistan’s upcoming transition.

  1. “Afghanistan Monthly Progress Report. July and August 2012,” Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Aug 2012.
On 8 July at the Tokyo Conference the international community, including the UK, agreed to help the Government of Afghanistan meet its country’s development needs for the years up to and after security transition in 2014. Specific pledges were made to 2017, with strong commitments from the international community to provide financial assistance to Afghanistan through the ‘Transformation Decade’ to the end of 2024. This support is vital to ensure that the Government can provide continued stability and prospects for its people when international military troops withdraw at the end of 2014. Our support will depend on the Government taking forward key governance and economic reforms, including on protecting the rights of women and girls, outlined in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (TMAF). At the request of the Government of Afghanistan, the UK agreed to co-chair the first Ministerial review of the TMAF benchmarks in 2014.

  1. “Six Conditions for an Effective Transfer of Power in Afghanistan,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Sep 2012.
The subject is the transition of power in Afghanistan and I’ve been given seven minutes to summarize what needs to be done in a way that is intended to be controversial and stimulate discussion.
Let me begin by saying that even if you ignore Afghanistan’s neighbors, you cannot ignore the complexity of the challenges. Unless we take far more realistic and effective action than we have to date, there is a significant probability that Afghanistan will go from the center ring of America’s strategic circus in 2010 to an awkward cross between its freak show and its clown car by 2016.
To be specific, we need to learn from past experiences and cases like Afghanistan and Iraq, that a successful transfer of power has six elements. The first is effective leadership, not honest elections…

  1. “Infantry Battalion Operations in Afghanistan: Lessons from 1st Battalion, 6th Marines (1/6),” Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, August 2012.

  1. “A slightly different approach: Norwegian non-military collaboration with Afghanistan,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, August 2012.
Norway has a long history of providing humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan through non-governmental organisations and the United Nations, and has played an active role in aiding the rebuilding and development of the country since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The Norwegian approach has tried to balance support for military and civilian efforts, fully engage with the Government of Afghanistan (GoA) and at the same time help protect the humanitarian space. Norway has been loyal to the development strategies and priorities agreed upon among the GoA, donors and international organisations. It has promised to continue its development collaboration with Afghanistan beyond 2014 when the military engagement is to end. However, the form and extent of this collaboration is likely to depend on developments in Afghanistan over the coming years – and not least on the ability of the GoA to handle and implement development projects in a transparent and corruption-free manner.

  1. “Lessons from Afghanistan’s History for the Current Transition and Beyond,” United States Institute of Peace, Sep 2012.
Despite interesting patterns from the past and at least superficially striking parallels with the present, policies on Afghanistan have not been adequately informed by an understanding of the country’s history. Nor has the extensive academic literature on Afghan history been translated into policy; on the contrary, much that has been attempted in Afghanistan since late 2001 has been remarkably ahistorical. This report identifies broad historical patterns and distills relevant lessons that may be applicable to policies during the 2011 to 2014 transition and beyond.

  1. “The Haqqani Network: A Foreign Terrorist Organization,” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 2012.
The Haqqani Network is the most lethal terrorist network operating in Afghanistan. It has been linked to several of the most high-profile attacks on U.S. and foreign personnel and is responsible for most spectacular attacks and high level assassinations in Kabul and northern Afghanistan. Formerly led by aging patriarch Jalaluddin Haqqani, the Haqqani Network is currently run by his sons, Sirajuddin, Badruddin and Nasiruddin and their uncle, Ibrahim. In late August, news reports surfaced that Badruddin, the day to day operational commander of the network was killed in a drone strike in North Waziristan. Badruddin’s death will seriously alter the day to day efficacy of the network’s strategic and operational capabilities. However, his death will not have a serious effect on the network’s financial empire, which will ultimately give the network an opportunity to regenerate an operational replacement.
The network also includes many family members living abroad, from Pakistan to the Persian Gulf. Under the leadership of Jalaluddin’s sons, the network operates out of a support zone in North Waziristan, Pakistan, opposite Afghanistan’s eastern border in the provinces of Khost, Paktia and Paktika.

  1. “Taliban Perspectives on Reconciliation,” Royal United Services Institute, Sep 2012.
In July 2012, the authors of this report interviewed four senior Taliban interlocutors about the Taliban’s approach to reconciliation. The primary objective was to draw them out on three key issues:
1. International terrorism and the Taliban’s links with Al-Qa’ida and other armed non-state actors.
2. The potential for a ceasefire.
3. Parameters for conflict resolution and continuing presence of US military bases.
The interlocutors we interviewed referred mainly to the so-called Quetta Shura Taliban led by Mullah Mohammad Omar. This is, as they all confirmed, the primary vehicle driving the insurgency, and, in their view, continues to enjoy the allegiance of other key groups dotting the insurgent landscape.
The unwavering consensus amongst our interviewees was that for an agreement to hold, it would ultimately require approval by Mullah Mohammad Omar…

  1. “Kabul: City Number One,” BBC, Sep 2009.
Part One - 1971
There are many individuals and fragmentary events that have led to the present situation in Afghanistan. But there was a moment in 1971 when four separate things happened in and around Kabul that in their different ways reached back into the past and forward into the future.
That year the BBC sent a film crew to Kabul to recreate the first great military disaster of the British Empire - the retreat from Kabul in 1841. The BBC began by gathering Afghan tribesmen together to be extras. They acted out being taught cricket by the British. The Afghans then pretended to be fierce rebels storming out of the Kabul Bazaar to attack the British camp outside the city. 

  1. “Huge Uncertainty' in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, Sep 2012.
President Obama has withdrawn the last of the so-called 30,000 "surge troops" he sent to Afghanistan in 2009 and 2010, but Max Boot, a veteran military analyst for CFR, says there are "huge uncertainties about the outcome" in the country. He says that "we certainly do not have the sense of victory in sight that we saw in Iraq when the surge troops were pulled out of there." Even though President Obama campaigned in 2008 on a platform of bolstering forces in Afghanistan, "he has done very little to rally public support for the war effort, again because I think he's fundamentally ambivalent about the war himself," Boot says. He also says there are significant questions about long-term U.S. commitment "because neither President Obama nor [Republican presidential nominee] Governor Mitt Romney is eager to talk about Afghanistan."

  1. “Waiting for the Taliban,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Sep 2012.
The withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan will leave the country worse than it was before 2001 in some respects. There is no clear plan for the future. Washington will progressively lose its influence over Kabul, and drone operations in Pakistan are not a credible way to fight jihadist groups on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The situation will only worsen after 2014, when most U.S. troops are out of the country and aid going to the Afghan government steeply declines.

  1. “No Time to Go Wobbly in Afghanistan: Focus on Stability, Not Exit Deadlines,” Armed Forces Journal, Sep 2012.
In a parody of Army Gen. David Petraeus’ famous assessment of progress in Afghanistan — “fragile and reversible” — the transition process there is fragile and irreversible. There is no turning back. Propelled by the logic of war, economic necessity and war weariness, the allies — the U.S., the 50 nations of the International Security Assistance Force and Afghanistan — are force-marching toward a new strategic paradigm.

  1. “Afghanistan Index,” The Brookings Institution, Sep 2012.