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Sunday, June 3, 2012

Reconstruction Update


  1. H.R. McMaster: The Warrior's-Eye View of Afghanistan.  Wall Street Journal.
The two-star general wrote the book on Vietnam and showed the way for the surge in Iraq. Now he's back from 20 months in Afghanistan—and says the war can be won.

  1. SIGAR Quarterly Report, April 2012. 
From the covering letter:
“The APPF, a state-owned enterprise established by the Afghan government to replace private security companies, began assuming responsibility for providing security for development projects during this reporting period. On March 29, I testified before the Congress about SIGAR’s ongoing audit work, which has identified a number of concerns about the transition to the APPF, including the potential for rising costs and the possible disruption or termination of reconstruction projects if the APPF cannot provide the required security.
“In addition to these developments, corruption remains a major threat to the reconstruction effort. During my visit to Kabul this quarter, I met with U.S. and Afghan officials to discuss and assess their anti-corruption efforts. I also shared with them SIGAR’s work to combat corruption: nearly 30% of our investigations involve public corruption and bribery. This quarter, our investigators partnered with other federal and Afghan law enforcement agents to recover $446,000 in stolen fuel and $175,000 in cash in cases involving Afghan attempts to bribe U.S. officials. In addition, three individuals who had been convicted of bribery were sentenced to prison terms and ordered to pay fines and restitutions totaling $269,000. The three had been arrested and charged in cases in which SIGAR participated.
“Also this quarter, SIGAR investigations resulted in the termination for default or voiding of five contracts, protecting $131 million in unspent funds. In addition, SIGAR issued seven referrals for the suspension or debarment of individuals and companies for illegal activities or poor performance.”

  1. “When America Leaves: Asia after the Afghan War.”  The American Interest.
Afghanistan is passing inexorably into a post-American phase that will have far-reaching consequences for the interconnected space encompassing the Indian and Pakistani portions of Kashmir, Pakistan proper, Afghanistan, the five Central Asian “Stans”, eastern Iran, China’s western province of Xinjiang, and the seven republics of Russia’s South Caucasus region. In this zone, Greater Central Asia, multiple sources of conflict already exist even as new patterns of trade and investment are emerging, not least in energy. Increasing competition between long preponderant powers and challengers whose presence has heretofore been minimal are changing the calculus of risks and opportunities. Note as well that Greater Central Asia provides a bridge for competition and conflict to migrate and shape the larger interactions among China, India, Russia and the United States.

  1. “The Looming Catastrophe in Afghanistan.”  Registan.com
This past weekend, I attended the NATO Summit in Chicago. There I heard from many heads of state, foreign ministers, defense ministers, secretary-generals, officials, and analysts about what NATO is doing and how it’s evolving into an enlightened global actor for peace.
The challenge with what I heard is that a lot of is little more than gussied up magical thinking. While NATO’s broader issues merit discussion (I did some of that for U.S. News here), the way it is approaching Afghanistan leaves much to be desired.

  1. “Has War in Afghanistan Ruined Central Asia?”   Registan.com
While Central Asia’s international political profile has risen considerably since 2001, it has primarily been seen in the West through the prism of Afghanistan. The policies of Western governments towards Central Asia as a whole and as individual states have widely fluctuated, but in almost every case, been heavily shaped by policies toward Afghanistan. U.S. and ISAF Afghanistan policy has been short-sighted and messy enough, making policy toward Central Asia even more so.
In recent years, Central Asia’s governments have backslid, becoming more authoritarian and less able to provide services to all of society. This contributes to greater risks for instability in the future.

  1. “Look Before You Leap.”  The American Interest.
It used to be, I think, that the vast majority of strategists and statesmen played chess, or in non-Western cultures some comparably complex game that required players to anticipate what their opponents might do in an extended sequence of moves. This was good training for the real world. If you read in the history of diplomacy, you can find many excellent examples of careful statecraft resembling what we may call sequence assessment. (A masterful and also quite brief description of the phenomenon, as seen by a social scientist, may be found in Erving Goffman’s little-known 1969 book Strategic Interaction.) One can also find examples of hotheads going off half-cocked, usually to their and everyone else’s regret. Big mistakes make big news historically. But my sense is that responsible individuals, who made up the vast majority a century and two ago, generally understood the difficulty of their task, and worked at it in a fairly disciplined fashion.
Now consider some recent events in that light…

  1. “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014”, The World Bank, May 2012.


  1. “Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Threat Assessment”, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, May 2012.
In 2010 an estimated 25 per cent of the 380 tons of heroin manufactured in Afghanistan
-some 90 tons- was trafficked northwards through Central Asia via the Northern route
and onward to the Russian Federation. The 90-ton total includes heroin consumed
within Central Asia and the Russian Federation, as well as heroin seized by law
enforcement or trafficked onward. More than three quarters of this amount are destined
for the Russian market, with a small portion (approximately 3-4 tons) continuing to
eastern and northern Europe. Furthermore, in 2010 between 35 and 40 tons of raw
opium were trafficked through northern Afghanistan towards Central Asian markets. The
entire 2010 opiate demand of the Northern route is required to transit or be produced in
northern Afghanistan.

  1. “Measures of ‘Progress’ in Afghanistan in the Spring of 2012: The Need for Strategic Focus, Transparency and Credibility”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 09 May 2012, by Anthony H. Cordesman.  http://csis.org/publication/measures-progress-afghanistan-spring-2012  

  1. “Afghanistan Trip Report V: The Afghan Local Police: ‘It’s Local, So It Must Be Good’- Or Is It?” The Brookings Institution, 09 May 2012, by Vanda Felbab-Brown.
Among the most controversial aspects of the transition strategy in Afghanistan are various efforts to stand up self-defense forces around the country. These Afghan ―militias‖ are supposed to increase security in areas where Afghan National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and ISAF presence are highly limited. With ISAF denying that the various programs amount to a militia effort (calling the units everything else but militias and insisting that they are based on Afghan traditions, such as arbakai), the most visible version of these efforts right now is the Afghan Local Police (ALP). The ALP currently numbers around 13,000 members and is slated to increase to at least 30,000 by the end of 2014.
The purpose of the ALP is to extend at least a modicum of security to communities where Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are unlikely to be deployed for a long time. In those communities, the ALP is relied on to weaken the Taliban, Hezb-i-Islami, and the Haqqanis by either hiring their soldiers away for the ALP or having the ALP fight them, and to generate intelligence for ISAF.
U.S. military officials claim to be thrilled with the program. In conversations with me (during my recent research in Afghanistan in April 2012 and previous research trips), they describe the program in glowing terms and portray it as tremendous success. They report that the ALP is enthusiastically embraced by local communities and effective in fighting the Taliban—often characterizing it as a ―game changer.  As a U.S. Special Operations Forces officer explained to me: ―All politics is local. The ALP’s local, so it must be good. After all, that’s what counterinsurgency theory teaches us. http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/7084~v~The_Afghan_Local_Police___It_s_Local_So_It_Must_Be_Good__-_Or_is_it_.pdf

  1. “Afghan civilian protection during security transition: briefing ahead of NATO summit 20-21 May 2012.” Consortium of NGOs, May 2012.
As heads of state prepare to gather for the NATO summit in Chicago, the undersigned NGOs call on NATO member states and the Afghan Government to prioritize improving the accountability of the Afghan National Security Forces as well as measures to enhance their capability to protect civilians more broadly.
Over the last decade, millions of Afghan women and men have experienced significant progress in areas such as equal constitutional rights, political participation, and access to health and education. However, these impressive but fragile gains will be at serious risk should the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) prove incapable of taking on full security responsibilities as transition progresses.
Despite welcome efforts by NATO member states, their allies and the Afghan government to improve the quality of the ANSF, serious concerns remain about their conduct and the lack of adequate accountability mechanisms. Reliance on irregular forces such as the Afghan Local Police (ALP) in some areas has been problematic, with reported abuses linked to inadequate vetting and training, and command and control issues. In addition, transition is taking place in a context of rising violence against civilians; growing internal displacement and increasing protection concerns – raising the stakes for security forces that are effective, responsive and accountable.

  1. “Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan.” Heads of State and Government of Afghanistan and Nations contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), May 2012.
We, the nations contributing to ISAF, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, met today in Chicago to renew our firm commitment to a sovereign, secure and democratic Afghanistan. In line with the strategy which we agreed at the Lisbon Summit, ISAF’s mission will be concluded by the end of 2014. But thereafter Afghanistan will not stand alone: we reaffirm that our close partnership will continue beyond the end of the transition period.
In the ten years of our partnership the lives of Afghan men, women and children, have improved significantly in terms of security, education, health care, economic opportunity and the assurance of rights and freedoms. There is more to be done, but we are resolved to work together to preserve the substantial progress we have made during the past decade. The nations contributing to ISAF will therefore continue to support Afghanistan on its path towards self-reliance in security, improved governance, and economic and social development. This will prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world. A secure and stable Afghanistan will make an important contribution to its region, in which security, stability and development are interlinked.
ISAF nations and Afghanistan join in honouring all those – civilian or military, Afghan or foreign – who have lost their lives or been injured in the fight for our common security and a prosperous, peaceful and stable Afghanistan. We pay particular tribute to the courage of the armed forces of Afghanistan and ISAF countries who live, train and fight next to each other every day. We are determined that all our sacrifices will be justified by our strong long-term partnership, which will contribute to a better future for the people of Afghanistan.

  1. “Drugs in Afghanistan: A Forgotten Issue?” United States Institute of Peace, May 2012, by William Byrd and David Mansfield.  
Opium will continue to be an important part of the Afghan landscape—with political and security as well as economic ramifications.
The ongoing security transition (2011-2014) will be accompanied by greater risks to Afghani­stan's polity, security and economy from the illicit drug industry—including through likely further increases in opium production.
The priority attached to drug issues by the international community appears to be declining; it would be perilous, however, to neglect the drugs issue.

  1. “Afghanistan Monthly Progress Report, April 2012.” UK Department for International Development, May 2012.
At the NATO Joint Foreign and Defence Ministers Meeting on 18 April, the UK announced a contribution of £70 million per annum to help fund the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) for a period after our forces withdraw from their combat role at the end of 2014. Developing strong and capable Afghan security forces that will help foster enduring stability in the country is critical to our long-term strategy in Afghanistan. Their continued viability is in our national interest and that of our partners. We must ensure that Afghanistan can never again be used as a safe haven for terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda, to plan and launch attacks against the UK and our allies. This of contribution is aligned with international objectives for the Chicago Summit and underlines our enduring commitment to a stable and secure Afghanistan after 2014.

  1. In May 2012, a tribal court in Khyber Agency sentenced Dr. Shakil Afridi to 30 years in prison under the colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), a set of laws adhered to in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas.  The text of the FCR is at http://fatapakistan.blogspot.com/2011/11/full-text-of-frontier-crimes-regulation.html       

  1. Women's World in Qajar Iran: Explore the lives of women during the Qajar era (1796-1925) through a wide array of materials from private family holdings and participating institutions.  The site features bilingual access to thousands of personal papers, manuscripts, photographs, publications, everyday objects, works of art and audio materials. http://www.qajarwomen.org/en/index.html      

  1. The US Cost of the Afghan War: FY2002-FY2013.”  CSIS.
It is surprisingly difficult to get a meaningful estimate of the total cost of the Afghan conflict, total spending on Afghan forces and total spending on various forms of aid. More data are available on US efforts – which have dominated military and aid spending, but even these data present serious problems in reliability, consistency, and definition. Moreover, it is only since FY2012 that the US provided an integrated request for funding for the war as part of its annual budget request. ...
It addresses the fiscal cost to the US of the Afghan War from FY2000-FY2013. It provides estimates of total cost, cost to the Department of Defense, and estimates concerning aid costs to State, USAID, and other federal agencies. It also reports on the total cost of international aid when this takes the form of integrated aid to Afghan development and Afghan forces – a fraction of total aid spending.

  1. “U.S.-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership.”  Council on Foreign Relations.     
Turkey is a rising regional and global power facing, as is the United States, the challenges of political transitions in the Middle East, bloodshed in Syria, and Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. As a result, it is incumbent upon the leaders of the United States and Turkey to define a new partnership "in order to make a strategic relationship a reality," says a new Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)–sponsored Independent Task Force.
The bipartisan Task Force is chaired by former secretary of state Madeleine K. Albright and former national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley, and is directed by Steven A. Cook, CFR's Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies. The Task Force includes twenty-three prominent experts who represent a variety of perspectives and backgrounds.

  1. Borders Hardening Throughout Central Asia in Anticipation of NATO Pullout.” Myles G. Smith. Jamestown Foundation. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=borders%20hardening&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39398&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=d0c68fbcb0833af3b11e4df0ecc7c4cf  

  1. Democracy in Central Asia: Sowing in Unfertile Fields.” Jos Boonstra. EUCAM: EU-Central Asia Monitoring - Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior and the Centre for European Policy Studies.
Central Asia is one of the most repressive regions in the world. Compared with the two other former-Soviet regions of Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine) and the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), Central Asia shows the least inclination towards democratisation. Although the five Central Asian republics are very different from each other none can be labeled a democracy or even claim to have made substantial progress towards democratic practices.

  1. U.S. State Department Country Reports for Human Rights Practices - 2011
    1. Kazakhstan  http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160465.pdf
    2. Kyrgyz Republic  http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160059.pdf
    3. Tajikistan http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160062.pdf
    4. Turkmenistan http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160480.pdf
    5. Uzbekistan http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160482.pdf 
    6. Afghanistan http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186669.pdf
    7. Pakistan http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186685.pdf        

  1. “Security and Development Approaches to Central Asia: The EU Compared to China and Russia”, Sébastien Peyrouse, Jos Boonstra, Marlène Laruelle. EUCAM: EU-Central Asia Monitoring - Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior and the Centre for European Policy Studies.
The increased involvement of external actors in Central Asia is often characterised as a new great game. If there is a geopolitical game between Russia and China and to a lesser extent the U.S., EU, Turkey, Iran, India and Pakistan over influence in Central Asia it seems to be centered on energy ‒ primarily gas from Turkmenistan. But there are other factors at play that counter this perception of the region as solely a geopolitical struggle between major powers. First, the Central Asian regimes are not merely subordinates of external actors but have emerged as ‘players’ themselves, choosing who to cooperate with and playing countries against each other. Second, there is more at stake in Central Asia then just energy. There is a long list of security threats ranging from internal threats to stability to regional ethnic tensions and from bad interregional relations to negative spill-over effects from Afghanistan. http://www.eucentralasia.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/Working_Papers/WP11.pdf   

  1. “Drugs: A war lost in Afghanistan.”  Foreign Policy.
The May 20 NATO summit in Chicago was dominated by the issue of Afghanistan. Amidst all the talk about withdrawing international combat troops by 2014, funding the Afghan National Security Forces beyond 2014, and a doubtful political settlement with the Taliban, one subject was absent from the formal agenda: drugs.  
Yet in few other countries is the drugs trade so entrenched as it is in Afghanistan. Accounting for between one-quarter and one-third of the national economy, it is an integral part of the insecurity blighting Afghan life for the past 30 years.  
Debate may continue for years as to whether the Western intervention in Afghanistan has made the world safer or more insecure in the post-9/11 era. But it has not only done nothing to reduce global supplies of illicit opium; rather, it has made the problem worse.

  1. “US-Pakistan Relations: Common and Clashing Interests.” Shehzad Qazi, World Affairs Journal.
The last calendar year was by far the most tumultuous in a decade of tense and mistrustful relations between Pakistan and the United States. It began with CIA contractor Raymond Davis shooting and killing two Pakistanis in broad daylight in Lahore, then only worsened in May when Osama bin Laden was found and killed in a US raid at a compound near the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad (an episode that severely angered Pakistanis and embarrassed the Army, which was domestically seen as unable to secure the homeland against foreign intrusion and internationally suspected of providing refuge to America’s worst enemy). Tensions escalated further as the US began pressuring Pakistan to attack the Haqqani Network (HN), a Taliban group with safe havens in North Waziristan. Pakistan refused, and crisis hit when the HN launched a twenty-two hour assault on the US Embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul. An infuriated Admiral Mike Mullen, outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lashed out against Pakistan, saying the HN was a “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. Weeks of diplomatic efforts finally thawed relations, but just as the situation stabilized, a NATO attack on a Pakistani checkpoint in Salala in late November threw the relationship into a tailspin. Twenty-four Pakistani soldiers died in the two-hour assault. Pakistan was furious, immediately suspending NATO supply lines and boycotting the Bonn conference on Afghanistan held in early December.
  1. “Failure in Chicago: No U.S.-Pakistan Deal on NATO Supply Lines.” Reza Jan., American Enterprise Institute.
As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Chicago concluded, the much hoped-for deal between the United States and Pakistan to reopen NATO supply routes through Pakistan did not materialize. In fact, hardened stances on display in Chicago on both sides chipped away at optimism that a deal may be in the offing anytime soon.  
The elusive deal to open the Pakistani Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs) appears in the end to have stumbled on a pricing issue, but it was likely a misreading by both parties of the other’s negotiating red lines and competing external and internal pressures that led to the showdown becoming the spectacle that took center stage in Chicago. Both sides will likely now re-gauge and approach the negotiating table afresh. Securing an agreement on the GLOCs is important enough to both Pakistan and the U.S. that the setback is unlikely to kill negotiating efforts altogether.  It is possible that negotiations can now be conducted in a more level-headed manner free of the artificial deadline and inflated international expectations that the Chicago summit imposed on them. The advantages to both sides of reopening the GLOCs are so great that a deal is likely at some point.  The experience of the closure and the negotiations, however, has laid bare the changed relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan. The idea that the two states are real partners in a common struggle has been replaced by a naked process of horse-trading. The shift to an openly transactional relationship between Islamabad and Washington may be the most important outcome of this process.

  1. “Pakistan Missed Opportunity to Repair Ties with U.S.” Lisa Curtis, Heritage Foundation. 
Pakistan missed a valuable oppor­tunity to create goodwill with the U.S. and other NATO members when it failed to announce a reopening of NATO supply routes to Afghanistan at the summit held Sunday and Monday in Chicago. Not only has Pakistan’s closure of the supply routes over the past six months made the war effort more expensive for NATO members, but its failure to crack down on Taliban and Haqqani network sanctuaries on its soil has prolonged the war and under­mined the overall NATO mission in Afghanistan.
Unless Pakistan demonstrates that it is willing to make greater efforts to help bring peace and stability to Afghanistan, the U.S. and NATO should shift their diplo­matic focus to working more closely with other countries in the region, including the Central Asian states and India.

  1. “U.S.-Pakistan Reset: Still Need to Deal with Terrorist Sanctuaries.” Lisa Curtis, Heritage Foundation.
A Pakistan parliamentary commit­tee has released its recommen­dations for “resetting” the param­eters of U.S.–Pakistan relations. U.S.–Pakistan ties have been severely strained since the November 26, 2011, NATO attack that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers along the border with Afghanistan. Since then, there have been no high-level U.S. visits to Pakistan, and NATO supply routes running through Pakistani territory have been shut down. The Pakistani parliament’s efforts to reframe the relationship could be helpful in restoring ties, as long as the U.S. brings its own terms to the table.

  1. “Getting Back to a Functional Relationship with Pakistan: The United States Needs to Stay Engaged.” Brian Katulis, Center for American Progress.
As the United States focuses on transitioning out of Afghanistan, rebalancing its national security strategy, and pivoting toward East Asia, it needs to remain engaged with Pakistan and encourage it to play a leadership role in its region. Even after a downturn in relations over the past year, disengaging and isolating Pakistan is not a practical option due to its size and impact on broader security. The news that Pakistan will participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s summit in Chicago next week is a small sign that efforts to get Pakistan to play a more constructive role in Afghanistan and the region are working. But much more needs to be done.

  1. “Fixing Pakistan's Civil-Military Imbalance: A Dangerous Temptation.” Moeed Yusuf, United States Institute of Peace.
 As the mistrust in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship deepens, Washington’s frustration with Islamabad has also grown. Over the past few months, influential voices have begun to recommend that the U.S. take a more aggressive approach to Pakistan by playing up Pakistan’s civil-military divide: prop up civilians while dealing harshly with the military and its spy agency, the Inter-Services Intel­ligence (ISI). Specifically, views range from moving to a more hostile “containment” approach that would box in the Pakistan military; to seeing “progressive” civilians as partners and declaring the military as an adversary; to labeling specific members of the military and ISI found to be involved in supporting militants as “terrorists.”
The premise for this view is that the Pakistani military and intelligence apparatus is undermining U.S. interests in Afghanistan and that it has held civilian governments—who otherwise would be amenable to reversing Pakistan’s traditional strategic paradigm—hostage to its own agenda. Underlying this is the implicit belief that if the strength of the military is undercut and if the civil­ians are able to take charge in letter and spirit, resulting revisions in Pakistani threat perceptions and national priorities would overlap more neatly with U.S. interests.

Thursday, May 10, 2012

Reconstruction Update


  1. “Market Order in War-Torn Iraq.”  Joel Poindexter.
In the course of my deployments to Iraq I learned a great deal about economics, though I didn't realize it at the time. I hadn't yet been introduced to the Austrian School or a Rothbardian view of laissez-faire capitalism. Looking back, however, I can see quite clearly that in several important areas voluntary systems not only existed in that country but thrived.
My first deployment was to Baghdad, that ancient Mesopotamian city positioned on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. It was there I discovered how, even during the most violent and unstable times, markets can adapt to the needs of consumers and peacefully provide essential services to humanity.

  1. “Transition in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond 2014.”  The World Bank.
Transition—the full assumption of Afghan responsibility for security by end-2014, the drawdown of most international military forces and the likely reduction in overall assistance—will have a profound impact on Afghanistan’s economic and political landscape, extending well beyond 2014.
This study assesses the medium to longer term impacts of declining aid and military spending on economic growth, poverty, fiscal management, service delivery and government capacity.
It suggests options to Government of Afghanistan (GoA) and the international donor community to manage and mitigate the adverse impacts of transition while exploiting the opportunities to improve aid effectiveness and encourage inclusive growth.
This is the beginning of the process – additional analysis from the World Bank will develop these themes further over the coming months. http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0,,contentMDK:23052411~menuPK:305990~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:305985,00.html

  1. “Coddling Iraqi Kurds.”  Foreign Policy.
Iraqi Kurdish leaders are pressing Washington to codify a "special relationship" with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The idea has gained support among certain members of the U.S. Congress, think-tanks, and others concerned about diminishing U.S. influence in Baghdad, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's concentration of power, and the destabilizing Iranian role in Iraq. A special United States-KRG relationship, they argue, could hedge against these threats and better assure U.S. interests in the region. Others assert that the United States has a responsibility to protect Iraqi Kurds, who have proven to be a valuable and dependable ally.
But, in fact, the United States has little to gain by creating a privileged relationship with the KRG. Not only would it send the wrong message to Iraqi Arab populations and aggravate communal relations, but it would create another cushion for the KRG leadership and dissuade political accommodation with Baghdad. The key issue for the United States is not about reciprocating Kurdish goodwill but clarifying the conditions in which a United States-KRG partnership can be sustained based on American principles and larger commitments in the region. 

  1. Audio: Statesmen's Forum: Afghanistan Minister of Defense Wardak and Minister of Interior Mohammadi. CSIS.
The CSIS International Security Program and Program on Crisis, Conflict, and Cooperation (C3) hosted a Statesmen’s Forum on The Afghanistan – U.S. Partnership: Opportunities to Move Forward with distinguished speakers: His Excellency Adbul Rahim Wardak, Minister of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and  His Excellency Bismellah Mohammadi, Minister of Interior of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

  1. Blogs by diplomats:
-          The DiploMad 2.0 http://thediplomad.blogspot.com/
-          Consul-at-Arms http://consul-at-arms2.blogspot.com/
-          Daily Demarche http://dailydemarche.blogspot.com/
-          Diplomatic Baggage http://diplowife.wordpress.com/
-          Weblog of a Syrian Diplomat in America China http://imad_moustapha.blogs.com/my_weblog/ 
-          The Life Diplomatic http://www.thelifediplomatic.com/ 
-          Charles Crawford http://charlescrawford.biz/MSH8MB288721
-          Midlife Diplomatic Crisis http://hogline.wordpress.com/   

  1. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/17/afghanistan_the_beautiful       

  1. Historysis. “Can conquests centuries ago explain the democratic deficit in the Arab world today?”  http://www.economist.com/node/21552198      

  1. Conflict Management and ‘Whole of Government’: Useful Tools for U.S. National Security Strategy?” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
Today, America faces security challenges that are exceedingly dynamic and complex, in part because of the ever changing mix and number of actors involved and the pace with which the strategic and operational environments change. To meet these new challenges more effectively, the Obama administration advocated strengthening civilian instruments of national power and enhancing America’s whole of government (WoG) capabilities. Although the need for comprehensive integration and coordination of civilian and military, governmental and nongovernmental, and national and international capabilities to improve efficiency and effectiveness of post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding efforts is widely recognized, Washington has been criticized for its attempts at creating WoG responses to international crises and conflicts that result in the overcommitment of resources, lack of sufficient funding and personnel, competition between agencies, ambiguous mission objectives, and the undermining of the military’s primary purpose of defending the national interest. Presenting the results of an international symposium held at Kennesaw State University in February 2011, this volume traces the genesis of WoG, critically examines current WoG practices, and draws lessons from the operational contexts of Iraq and Afghanistan. The first part of the book describes the overall global security context within which peacebuilding and stability operations are currently conducted, examines the merits of WoG approaches, and discusses their efficacy for responding to a range of emerging threats. The second part addresses some of the practical challenges of implementing WoG approaches for international conflict management and specifically for U.S. intervention in fragile states. The third and final part examines WoG efforts in the field and draws lessons learned from operational experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq that may be useful in future interventions.

  1. “Are Afghans Too Depressed to Beat the Taliban?” Wired.com.
Maybe the reason that the Afghan counterinsurgency has been such a flop is that the people there are too traumatized and depressed to make nation-building work.
That’s the controversial conclusion of an Air Force colonel who recently spent a year in Afghanistan as the head of a reconstruction team. In an unpublished paper, Col. Erik Goepner, currently serving as a military fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argues that the Afghan counterinsurgency was all-but-doomed before U.S. troops ever landed there. The reason, he writes, is “the high rate of mental disorders” in Afghanistan and other fragile states. Pervasive depression and post-traumatic stress disorder leads to a sense of “learned helplessness” among the people. And that makes it next-to-impossible to build up the country’s economy and government.

  1. “Afghan Reintegration Dilemma.”  The Diplomat.
Off and on for a decade, the Afghan government and its allies in the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (IASF) have tried to convince Taliban fighters to lay down their weapons and rejoin mainstream society.
But so-called "reintegration" has proved difficult, to say the least. Across Afghanistan, government authorities have reported only a handful of documented, successful reintegrations among the thousands of active Taliban fighters.
Efforts in Paktika Province, in remote eastern Afghanistan on the border with Pakistan, illustrate the obstacles to large-scale reintegration.

  1. “Grasping the nettle: why reintegration is central to operational design in southern Afghanistan.”  Australian Civil-Military Centre.
On initial consideration, the idea of reintegration might seem peripheral to achieving the objectives of a counterinsurgency campaign, and that demanding surrender should be the order of the day, not seeking mutual forgiveness.  However, nothing could be further from reality.  In countering an insurgency the motives of each fighter and supporter dictate their adversarial actions, and the potential size of the insurgency is theoretically limited only by the population of the country itself.  On deeper reflection then, the salience of reintegration rapidly emerges as central to any successful strategy to conclude an insurgency.
An enduring peace among antagonists in an insurgency and a lasting recourse to the sovereignty of the in-power government can only be properly expressed in terms that encompass the reintegration of the host society.  In its most holistic form, reintegration encompasses not only fighters who have taken up violent resort to obtain their own ends, but also fragments and factions in society that are disenfranchised, ostracised or otherwise excluded from participating in a country’s social-political construct between its government and the people.
Lasting reintegration is much harder to foster and generate than simply announcing a policy.  Personal allegiances, misgivings, fear, and human and institutional frailty all seem arrayed against even attempting reintegration, yet is a valid and indeed fundamental aim in counterinsurgency that must be grasped, like a nettle, with confidence and vigour.  Reintegration not only has a role for all actors – police, civil and military – but indeed demands of them a common purpose, and a truly concerted effort to attain it.  This paper draws on six months of field work in southern Afghanistan grappling with these challenges.

  1. “The Fate of India’s Strategic Restraint”, Brookings Institution, April 2012, by Sunil Dasgupta.
In February 2012, India selected a French jet, the Rafale, as the new mainstay fighter for its air force. A month earlier, the country had leased a nuclear submarine from Russia. The acquisition of the fighter aircraft and submarine is part of an ambitious military modernization that has made India the number one arms importer in the world.
This rearmament effort, riding on the nation’s unprecedented economic growth, has prompted some observers to wonder whether India has decided to balance Chinese power in Asia or is seeking to correct the anomaly of strategic parity with Pakistan, a country one fifth its size. Indians themselves want their country to act more assertively, and India’s primary rival, Pakistan, has never bought into neighborly restraint.
So, could we be witnessing the start of an India-China arms race in Asia that would become the defining global conflict of the twenty-first century— as the United States returns to its traditional role of offshore balancer, reduces its overseas presence, and husbands resources for domestic recovery? Could we also be standing on the precipice of a nuclear confrontation with Pakistan?

  1. “No Boutique State”: Understanding the Debate on Turkey’s Involvement in Afghanistan”, German Marshall Fund, 13 April 2012, by Şaban Kardaş.
The debate about Turkish involvement in Afghanistan has provided interesting clues about the parameters of Turkish foreign policy in general and Turkish perceptions of the future of Afghanistan in particular. The debate revealed two competing visions for Turkish foreign policy among political actors. The AK Party has so far been pragmatic enough to recalibrate Turkey’s policy on Syria, Iran, and Afghanistan and work in tandem with the United States. The West can count on cooperation from Turkey, provided that it develops a nuanced understanding of the sensitivities of the ruling AK Party.

  1. “Annual Report on Afghanistan”, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, April 2012.

  1. “Afghanistan Factsheet”, Asian Development Bank, May 2012. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/PDF_181.pdf      

  1. Stop Being Stupid: “There Is No ‘Kinder, Gentler’ Taliban.”  Commentary.
Are the Taliban the sort of people we can successfully negotiate with to guarantee the future of Afghanistan? You would think so based on the number of voices in Washington claiming the Taliban have learned lessons from the past decade and they will not be as dedicated to their hateful agenda in the future. We hear they supposedly are willing to give up their alliance with al-Qaeda, their insistence on enslaving the Afghan people to their fundamentalist philosophy, and so on. If only it were so. Alas, this is all wishful thinking from those who want to pull out of the war but avert their eyes from the consequences of an American pullout.

  1. Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement Between The United States of America And The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”, 02 May 2012.

  1. “Afghanistan Price Bulletin, April 2012”, Famine Early Warning Systems Network and the United States Agency for International Development, April 2012.

  1. “U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001–2010”, RAND Corporation, 2012, by Arturo Munoz.

  1. “Local institutions, livelihoods and vulnerability: lessons from Afghanistan”, Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, Overseas Development Institute, April 2012, by Adam Pain and Paula Kantor. http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7653.pdf  

  1. “The State of Telecommunications and Internet in Afghanistan Six Years later (2006-2012)”, United State Agency for International Development and Internews, March 2012, by Javid Hamdard.

  1. “Complex Environments: A Sociopolitical Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan.”  U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center. 
This assessment introduces an alternative way of thinking about corruption in Afghanistan. Corruption is explained both as a habituated, systemic outcome of the sociopolitical environment and as a deliberate strategy of governments and governed. This assessment is intended to help improve operations in theater by introducing an anthropological framework for recognizing and understanding the different conditions, causes, and forms of corruption in Afghanistan and their effect on society.

  1. “Post Occupation Iraq: The Brittleness of Political Institutions.”  Peggy Garvin, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
As in other Arab countries, mass demonstrations did make an appearance in Iraq, but these were comparatively small and lacked the staying power of the ones that had toppled regimes and/or plunged countries into bloodshed. What distinguished the protests in Iraq was the nature of their declared goals, in which the demands for free elections and fresh faces that had defined the uprisings in other Arab countries were almost absent. And this was hardly surprising; the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki had been in power for less than six years, having been put there by the Iraqis themselves in two free and fair elections in December 2005 and March 2010. If the protestors were demonstrating about anything, it was the abysmal performance of the freely elected Maliki government ...

  1. “Global Jihad Sustained Through Africa.”  Adrian Janes, Royal United Services Institute (UK).
As the central leadership of Al-Qa’ida is weakened and challenged, the terrorist movement is looking to partnerships in Saharan and Sub-Saharan Africa to re-group and re-energise itself.
Despite greater co-operation, there seems to be an unresolved tension between transnational aims of Al-Qa’ida-core and the local grievances of African partners.
Following the alliance with Al-Qa’ida-core, regional affiliates such as Al-Qa’ida in the Maghreb and Al-Shabaab have undergone similar patterns of strategic, tactical and propagandistic evolution.
Nigeria’s Boko Haram is still focused on a local campaign, but recent operational refinement and ability to stage deadly ‘spectaculars’ suggests disturbing connections with other regional terror groups.
Links between Al-Qa’ida-core and some jihadist groups in Africa have been established over the last decade which vary in strategic and operational significance.
A range of new challenges are possible as jihadism evolves and disperses into territories of ungoverned space across large stretches of the African continent. Among these are the potential for radicalisation and mobilisation of a new subset of British youth in the UK.

Monday, April 2, 2012

Reconstruction Update

  1. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized? Congressional Research Service.
The United States has been party to multilateral and bilateral agreements addressing the status of U.S. armed forces while present in a foreign country. These agreements, commonly referred to as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), generally establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country.  SOFAs provide for rights and privileges of covered individuals while in a foreign jurisdiction and address how the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction apply to U.S. personnel.  SOFAs may include many provisions, but the most common issue addressed is which country may exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S.  personnel.  The United States has agreements where it maintains exclusive jurisdiction over its personnel, but more often the agreement calls for shared jurisdiction with the receiving country.                                                                            http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34531.pdf  

  1. Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign. RUSI.
In spring 2011, Western military operations, backed by the Arab League, began against the regime of Muammar Qadhafi. Libyan rebels, after being penned in by the regime, began to take ground and ultimately deposed Qadhafi seven months later. But with all eyes on Syria, does Libya offer a new model for intervention? http://www.rusi.org/publications/whitehallreports/ref:O4F631FBA20DF9/#.T2mgdhPGG2k.facebook

  1. Pakistan: A Hard Country.  Anatol Lieven.
In the past decade Pakistan has become a country of immense importance to its region, the United States, and the world. With almost 200 million people, a 500,000-man army, nuclear weapons, and a large diaspora in Britain and North America, Pakistan is central to the hopes of jihadis and the fears of their enemies. Yet the greatest short-term threat to Pakistan is not Islamist insurgency as such, but the actions of the United States, and the greatest long-term threat is ecological change. Anatol Lieven's book is a magisterial investigation of this highly complex and often poorly understood country: its regions, ethnicities, competing religious traditions, varied social landscapes, deep political tensions, and historical patterns of violence; but also its surprising underlying stability, rooted in kinship, patronage, and the power of entrenched local elites. Engagingly written, combining history and profound analysis with reportage from Lieven's extensive travels as a journalist and academic, Pakistan: A Hard Country is both utterly compelling and deeply revealing.                        http://www.amazon.com/Pakistan-Hard-Country-Anatol-Lieven/dp/1610390210
  1. Quran Copy Burning in Afghanistan and the US ‘Exit’ Strategy.  Shanthie Mariet D’Souza. Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.
The latest violent protestation in Afghanistan over the burning of copies of the Holy Quran has a demonstrative effect. It has yet again brought to light the nature of the international intervention and the challenges of stabilising this war-torn country. While on the surface the incident appears to be a religiously motivated episode, a growing sense of anxiety and seething anger among a segment of the Afghan populace over other issues is being exploited by the Taliban and its allies in the wake of this incident. More importantly, this episode has raised important questions on the possibility of early international withdrawal and prospects for an effective transition of authority into Afghan hands. http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Insights_158_-_Quran_Copy_Burning_(Amended)_08032012174623.pdf
  1. Time for Afghan Political Settlement Talks: Reinvigorated Diplomatic Efforts with All Parties to the Conflict Is Needed.  Colin Cookman and Caroline Wadhams. Center for American Progress.  
Violent protests in Afghanistan over the past week in reaction to the burning of Korans at Bagram Air Base have, as of this writing, claimed the lives of more than 30 Afghans and six U.S. military personnel around the country. These protests also exposed the vulnerabilities of the current U.S. and NATO strategy and reinforced the importance of pursuing a political settlement strategy in close synchronization with military and economic efforts.
For the past three years U.S. strategy largely centered on taking the fight to the insurgency while building up the Afghan police and military. As U.S. and NATO forces transition out of the country, these Afghan forces are expected to take over responsibility for fighting the insurgency as international forces draw down through 2014. But training, mentoring, and embedding with the Afghan police and military have all become more challenging in the wake of last week’s violence. This weekend U.S. Marine Gen. John Allen and other NATO countries withdrew hundreds of advisors from Afghan ministries. The protests reveal deep anger even among Afghans who support the current government, as well as diminishing patience for a foreign military presence that still struggles to adapt to Afghan political realities. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/03/afghan_negotiations.html
  1. Afghanistan: Improvements Needed to Strengthen Management of U.S. Civilian Presence, Government Accountability Office.
U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority and the Department of Defense (DOD) have reported expanding their civilian presence in Afghanistan and took steps to improve their ability to track that presence. Since January 2009, U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority more than tripled their civilian presence from 320 to 1,142. However, although State could report total Chief of Mission numbers by agency, in mid-2011 GAO identified discrepancies in State’s data system used to capture more-detailed staffing information such as location and position type. State began taking steps in the fall of 2011 to improve the reliability of its data system. Also, DOD reported expanding its overall civilian presence from 394 civilians in January 2009 to 2,929 in December 2011 to help assist U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. The extent to which DOD’s data is reliable is unknown due to omissions and double counting, among other things. In a 2009 report, GAO noted similar data issues and recommended DOD improve data concerning deployed civilians. DOD concurred with the recommendation and expects the issues will be addressed by a new tracking system to be completed in fiscal year 2012.                                                                            http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588869.pdf
  1. Afghanistan Security: Department of Defense Effort to Train Afghan Police Relies on Contractor Personnel to Fill Skill and Resource Gaps, Government Accountability Office.
The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan depends in part on building that country’s capacity to provide for its own security by training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces, which includes the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police (ANP).  Since 2002, the United States has allocated over $43 billion to train, equip, and sustain the Afghan National Security Forces, which includes about $14 billion to train, equip, and sustain the ANP. The ANP training program is intended to create and sustain a professionally-led police force that is accountable to the Afghan people and is capable of enforcing laws and maintaining civil order. Currently, U.S., coalition, and Department of Defense (DOD) civilian contractor personnel assist the Afghan Ministry of Interior in training the ANP at 23 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) training sites and in mentoring ANP units in the field. http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588816.pdf
  1. How Will the Withdrawal of International Forces Affect Afghanistan?  Transcript of a Chatham House event featuring Fawzia Koofi, Member of Parliament, Afghanistan. http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/170212koofi.pdf 

  1. The Looming Storm in Pakistan's Kurram Agency,John Ty Grubbs. Jamestown Foundation.
Security has worsened significantly in Pakistan’s Kurram Agency this year. In the latest incident, Pakistani fighter jets responded to a series of attacks by bombing militant positions in the Kurram and Orakzai tribal agencies on March 1, killing an estimated 22 Islamist fighters (Dawn [Karachi], March 1; Central Asia Online, March 1). This rise in violence can be attributed to the area’s increasing strategic importance. Physically jutting into Afghanistan, Kurram is an attractive haven for fighters fleeing from drone strikes in North Waziristan and is the ideal entry point into Afghanistan for the Haqqani Network. Therefore, it is crucial for the Haqqani Network and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) elements that support them to marginalize any group that could disrupt this flow of fighters (see Terrorism Monitor, December 16, 2010). The most significant obstacles are the Shi’a Turi and Bangash tribes and the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under the command of Hakimullah Mahsud (see Terrorism Monitor, April 17, 2010). Although the ISI has recently been able to break up and court portions of the TTP, the bloodshed has not abated in Kurram. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39110&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=588
  1. Gauging Taliban Moves in Pakistan, Daniel Markey. Council on Foreign Relations.
There are reports of efforts to unify various Taliban groups under a single umbrella (NYT) and of a growing rift within the Pakistani Taliban that could open a door for peace deals between the Pakistani government and insurgents in the restive border region. "This could be the beginning of an effort to get all of the militants on the Pakistani side of the border pushing in a similar direction, which would clarify matters in terms of negotiation with the United States," says CFR Senior Fellow Daniel Markey. He adds: "I'm still skeptical that it would make it easy to reach some sort of accommodation that would ultimately serve U.S. purposes." Markey says Washington's lack of clarity on its intentions in Afghanistan and in talks with the Taliban is the "single biggest problem" in its policy toward the region.      http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/gauging-taliban-moves-pakistan/p27591
  1. Pakistan in a Changing Regional and Global Environment. Transcript of a Chatham House event featuring Hina Rabbani Khar, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pakistan http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/220212khar.pdf                                                                                                           
  2. Sino-Pakistan Strategic Entente: Implications for Regional Security, Rajshree Jetly. Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Working_Paper_143_-_Email_-_Sino_Pakistan_Strategic_Entente_14022012160926.pdf                                                  
  3. Pakistan’s Long and Ordinary Crisis, Atul Mishra. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Longevity and ordinariness mark Pakistan’s on-going crisis. Fluttering apart, nothing dramatic or decisive has happened in the recent past. This is because the institutions – the army, the judiciary and the political-executive – that could decisively impact the crisis have gone errant. They are not performing the functions they are mandated to perform. They aren’t letting other institutions perform the functions the other institutions must perform. And though these institutions are being mutually meddlesome, they show no inclination to perform the functions of the meddled institutions. This functional derangement of key state institutions has produced Pakistan’s stalemated, and thus ordinary, crisis. Tendencies of the crisis are traceable to the October 1999 coup and its aftermath. Regime actions against the political-executive and the judiciary distorted Pakistan’s already wobbly institutional architecture. Apart from stoking general scepticism against the effectiveness of army rule, regime actions created incentives in whose pursuit the three institutions have become errant. The conditions that structure this crisis also diminish the effectiveness of policy anticipation. Whatever currently exists in Pakistan does not resemble democracy in any meaningful sense. In Pakistan, India faces an assembly of vigorously malfunctioning institutions, which should not be mistaken for a set of weak institutions servicing a fledgling democracy. Nor should Pakistan be considered a failed state. A decisive army coup could clear the space for Pakistan’s domestic politics and for sustainable bilateral relations. But given the army’s disinclination for a political role, India must adopt a studied indifference as its Pakistan policy for a while. http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/PakistansLongandOrdinaryCrisis   
  1. Factsheet: The Fight for Eastern Afghanistan, Institute for the Study of War, March 2012, Isaac Hock.
Security gains made by the addition of U.S. “surge” forces in southern Afghanistan have denied the Taliban its historical safe havens in Kandahar and Helmand. The campaign in Afghanistan must now focus on the East, which received few surge troops. The provinces surrounding Kabul are strategically important for controlling the capital and connecting the city with the rest of Afghanistan.                        http://www.understandingwar.org/reference/fact-sheet-fight-eastern-afghanistan  

  1. The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat, Institute for the Study of War, March 2012, Jeffrey Dressler.
The Haqqani Network represents hh a strategic threat to the enduring stability of the Afghan state and U.S. national security interests in the region. The Haqqanis are currently Afghanistan’s most capable and potent insurgent group, and they continue to maintain close operational and strategic ties with al-Qaeda and their affiliates. These ties will likely deepen in the future.  Unlike the Quetta Shura Taliban in southern Afghanistan, the counterinsurgency campaign has not weakened the Haqqanis’ military capabilities significantly. Few of the “surge” resources deployed to their strongholds in Eastern Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network has increased its operational reach and jihadist credentials over the past several years. The Haqqani Network has expanded its reach toward the Quetta Shura Taliban’s historical strongholds in southern Afghanistan, the areas surrounding Kabul, as well as the Afghan north. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf

  1. Factsheet: U.S.-Afghan Strategic Agreement, Institute for the Study of War, March 2012, Paraag Shukla.                                                      http://www.understandingwar.org/reference/fact-sheet-us-afghan-strategic-agreement  

  1. Their drill may be out of step, but Afghan army is ready for the fight, The Telegraph, 11 March 2012, Sean Rayment. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9135883/Their-drill-may-be-out-of-step-but-Afghan-army-is-ready-for-the-fight.html      

  1. Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts, The RAND Corporation, 2011 by Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel and Olga Oliker.
Security force assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. The outcome of the campaign hinges, in large measure, on the effectiveness of the assistance given to the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other security forces, assistance that the International Security Force must provide while fighting the insurgents. Yet senior U.S. military and civilian officials have posed many questions about the effectiveness of SFA in Afghanistan, and no empirically rigorous assessments exist to help answer these questions. This monograph analyzes SFA efforts in Afghanistan over time and documents U.S. and international approaches to building the Afghan National Security Forces from 2001 to 2009. Finally, it provides observations and recommendations that emerged from extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2009 and their implications for the U.S Army.                           http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1066.html

  1. SIGAR: Cost of security in Afghanistan to rise sharply.
On March 9, 2012, we provided a management alert letter to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), detailing a number of concerns regarding the transition to the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) and providing three suggested action items for the agency to consider.  The rushed approach we observed to establish agreements with the APPF and the Risk Management Companies compelled us to develop this alert letter to caution both USAID and policy makers of the risks. Our work was conducted in accordance with our professional standards and quality control procedures. Specifically, it was conducted by independent staff, objectively designed and planned, and supported by sufficient and appropriate evidence. We believe that the work performed provides a reasonable basis for the letter’s observations.
On March 13, 2012, the USAID Mission Director in Kabul, Afghanistan provided a written response to this alert letter, which took exception to our findings, conclusions, and suggested action items. Unfortunately, as shown by its comments, USAID has interpreted this alert letter as an affront to its management of the transition, instead of as a constructive document that would aid it in assessing and responding to the risks we identified. Therefore, we are compelled to respond to these comments.                                    http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/alerts/2012-03-15-appf-alert.pdf