- “Market Order in War-Torn Iraq.” Joel Poindexter.
In the course
of my deployments to Iraq I learned a great deal about economics, though I
didn't realize it at the time. I hadn't yet been introduced to the Austrian
School or a Rothbardian view of laissez-faire capitalism. Looking back,
however, I can see quite clearly that in several important areas voluntary
systems not only existed in that country but thrived.
My first
deployment was to Baghdad, that ancient Mesopotamian city positioned on the
Tigris and Euphrates rivers. It was there I discovered how, even during the
most violent and unstable times, markets can adapt to the needs of consumers
and peacefully provide essential services to humanity.
- “Transition in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond 2014.” The World Bank.
Transition—the full assumption of Afghan responsibility for
security by end-2014, the drawdown of most international military forces and
the likely reduction in overall assistance—will have a profound impact on
Afghanistan’s economic and political landscape, extending well beyond 2014.
This study assesses the medium to longer term impacts of declining
aid and military spending on economic growth, poverty, fiscal management,
service delivery and government capacity.
It suggests options to Government of Afghanistan (GoA) and the
international donor community to manage and mitigate the adverse impacts of
transition while exploiting the opportunities to improve aid effectiveness and
encourage inclusive growth.
This is the beginning of the process – additional analysis from
the World Bank will develop these themes further over the coming months. http://www.worldbank.org.af/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/AFGHANISTANEXTN/0,,contentMDK:23052411~menuPK:305990~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:305985,00.html
- “Coddling Iraqi Kurds.” Foreign Policy.
Iraqi
Kurdish leaders are pressing Washington to codify a "special relationship"
with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The idea has gained support among
certain members of the U.S. Congress, think-tanks, and others concerned about
diminishing U.S. influence in Baghdad, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's
concentration of power, and the destabilizing Iranian role in Iraq. A special
United States-KRG relationship, they argue, could hedge against these threats
and better assure U.S. interests in the region. Others assert that the United
States has a responsibility to protect Iraqi Kurds, who have proven to be a
valuable and dependable ally.
But,
in fact, the United States has little to gain by creating a privileged
relationship with the KRG. Not only would it send the wrong message to Iraqi
Arab populations and aggravate communal relations, but it would create another
cushion for the KRG leadership and dissuade political accommodation with
Baghdad. The key issue for the United States is not about reciprocating Kurdish
goodwill but clarifying the conditions in which a United States-KRG partnership
can be sustained based on American principles and larger commitments in the
region.
- Audio: Statesmen's Forum: Afghanistan Minister of Defense Wardak and Minister of Interior Mohammadi. CSIS.
The
CSIS International Security Program and Program on Crisis, Conflict, and
Cooperation (C3) hosted a Statesmen’s Forum on The Afghanistan – U.S.
Partnership: Opportunities to Move Forward with distinguished speakers: His
Excellency Adbul Rahim Wardak, Minister of Defense of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan and His
Excellency Bismellah Mohammadi, Minister of Interior of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan.
- Blogs by diplomats:
-
The
DiploMad 2.0 http://thediplomad.blogspot.com/
-
Consul-at-Arms
http://consul-at-arms2.blogspot.com/
-
Daily
Demarche http://dailydemarche.blogspot.com/
-
Diplomatic
Baggage http://diplowife.wordpress.com/
-
Weblog
of a Syrian Diplomat in America China http://imad_moustapha.blogs.com/my_weblog/
-
The
Life Diplomatic http://www.thelifediplomatic.com/
-
Charles
Crawford http://charlescrawford.biz/MSH8MB288721
- Historysis. “Can conquests centuries ago explain the democratic deficit in the Arab world today?” http://www.economist.com/node/21552198
- “Conflict Management and ‘Whole of Government’: Useful Tools for U.S. National Security Strategy?” Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.
Today, America faces security challenges that are
exceedingly dynamic and complex, in part because of the ever changing mix and
number of actors involved and the pace with which the strategic and operational
environments change. To meet these new challenges more effectively, the Obama
administration advocated strengthening civilian instruments of national power
and enhancing America’s whole of government (WoG) capabilities. Although the
need for comprehensive integration and coordination of civilian and military,
governmental and nongovernmental, and national and international capabilities
to improve efficiency and effectiveness of post-conflict stabilization and
peacebuilding efforts is widely recognized, Washington has been criticized for
its attempts at creating WoG responses to international crises and conflicts
that result in the overcommitment of resources, lack of sufficient funding and
personnel, competition between agencies, ambiguous mission objectives, and the
undermining of the military’s primary purpose of defending the national
interest. Presenting the results of an international symposium held at Kennesaw
State University in February 2011, this volume traces the genesis of WoG,
critically examines current WoG practices, and draws lessons from the
operational contexts of Iraq and Afghanistan. The first part of the book
describes the overall global security context within which peacebuilding and
stability operations are currently conducted, examines the merits of WoG
approaches, and discusses their efficacy for responding to a range of emerging
threats. The second part addresses some of the practical challenges of
implementing WoG approaches for international conflict management and
specifically for U.S. intervention in fragile states. The third and final part
examines WoG efforts in the field and draws lessons learned from operational
experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq that may be useful in future interventions.
- “Are Afghans Too Depressed to Beat the Taliban?” Wired.com.
Maybe
the reason that the Afghan counterinsurgency has been such a flop is that the
people there are too traumatized and depressed to make nation-building work.
That’s
the controversial conclusion of an Air Force colonel who recently spent a year
in Afghanistan as the head of a reconstruction team. In an unpublished paper,
Col. Erik Goepner, currently serving as a military fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, argues that the Afghan counterinsurgency
was all-but-doomed before U.S. troops ever landed there. The reason, he writes,
is “the high rate of mental disorders” in Afghanistan and other fragile states.
Pervasive depression and post-traumatic stress disorder leads to a sense of
“learned helplessness” among the people. And that makes it next-to-impossible
to build up the country’s economy and government.
- “Afghan Reintegration Dilemma.” The Diplomat.
Off
and on for a decade, the Afghan government and its allies in the U.S.-led
International Security Assistance Force (IASF) have tried to convince Taliban
fighters to lay down their weapons and rejoin mainstream society.
But
so-called "reintegration" has proved difficult, to say the least.
Across Afghanistan, government authorities have reported only a handful of
documented, successful reintegrations among the thousands of active Taliban
fighters.
Efforts
in Paktika Province, in remote eastern Afghanistan on the border with Pakistan,
illustrate the obstacles to large-scale reintegration.
- “Grasping the nettle: why reintegration is central to operational design in southern Afghanistan.” Australian Civil-Military Centre.
On
initial consideration, the idea of reintegration might seem peripheral to
achieving the objectives of a counterinsurgency campaign, and that demanding
surrender should be the order of the day, not seeking mutual forgiveness. However, nothing could be further from
reality. In countering an insurgency the
motives of each fighter and supporter dictate their adversarial actions, and
the potential size of the insurgency is theoretically limited only by the
population of the country itself. On
deeper reflection then, the salience of reintegration rapidly emerges as
central to any successful strategy to conclude an insurgency.
An
enduring peace among antagonists in an insurgency and a lasting recourse to the
sovereignty of the in-power government can only be properly expressed in terms
that encompass the reintegration of the host society. In its most holistic form, reintegration
encompasses not only fighters who have taken up violent resort to obtain their
own ends, but also fragments and factions in society that are disenfranchised,
ostracised or otherwise excluded from participating in a country’s
social-political construct between its government and the people.
Lasting
reintegration is much harder to foster and generate than simply announcing a
policy. Personal allegiances,
misgivings, fear, and human and institutional frailty all seem arrayed against
even attempting reintegration, yet is a valid and indeed fundamental aim in counterinsurgency
that must be grasped, like a nettle, with confidence and vigour. Reintegration not only has a role for all
actors – police, civil and military – but indeed demands of them a common
purpose, and a truly concerted effort to attain it. This paper draws on six months of field work
in southern Afghanistan grappling with these challenges.
- “The Fate of India’s Strategic Restraint”, Brookings Institution, April 2012, by Sunil Dasgupta.
In
February 2012, India selected a French jet, the Rafale, as the new mainstay
fighter for its air force. A month earlier, the country had leased a nuclear
submarine from Russia. The acquisition of the fighter aircraft and submarine is
part of an ambitious military modernization that has made India the number one
arms importer in the world.
This
rearmament effort, riding on the nation’s unprecedented economic growth, has
prompted some observers to wonder whether India has decided to balance Chinese
power in Asia or is seeking to correct the anomaly of strategic parity with
Pakistan, a country one fifth its size. Indians themselves want their country
to act more assertively, and India’s primary rival, Pakistan, has never bought
into neighborly restraint.
So,
could we be witnessing the start of an India-China arms race in Asia that would
become the defining global conflict of the twenty-first century— as the United
States returns to its traditional role of offshore balancer, reduces its
overseas presence, and husbands resources for domestic recovery? Could we also
be standing on the precipice of a nuclear confrontation with Pakistan?
- “No Boutique State”: Understanding the Debate on Turkey’s Involvement in Afghanistan”, German Marshall Fund, 13 April 2012, by Şaban Kardaş.
The
debate about Turkish involvement in Afghanistan has provided interesting clues
about the parameters of Turkish foreign policy in general and Turkish
perceptions of the future of Afghanistan in particular. The debate revealed two
competing visions for Turkish foreign policy among political actors. The AK
Party has so far been pragmatic enough to recalibrate Turkey’s policy on Syria,
Iran, and Afghanistan and work in tandem with the United States. The West can
count on cooperation from Turkey, provided that it develops a nuanced
understanding of the sensitivities of the ruling AK Party.
- “Annual Report on Afghanistan”, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, April 2012.
- “Afghanistan Factsheet”, Asian Development Bank, May 2012. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/PDF_181.pdf
- Stop Being Stupid: “There Is No ‘Kinder, Gentler’ Taliban.” Commentary.
Are
the Taliban the sort of people we can successfully negotiate with to guarantee
the future of Afghanistan? You would think so based on the number of voices in
Washington claiming the Taliban have learned lessons from the past decade and
they will not be as dedicated to their hateful agenda in the future. We hear
they supposedly are willing to give up their alliance with al-Qaeda, their
insistence on enslaving the Afghan people to their fundamentalist philosophy,
and so on. If only it were so. Alas, this is all wishful thinking from those
who want to pull out of the war but avert their eyes from the consequences of
an American pullout.
- Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement Between The United States of America And The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan”, 02 May 2012.
- “Afghanistan Price Bulletin, April 2012”, Famine Early Warning Systems Network and the United States Agency for International Development, April 2012.
- “U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghanistan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001–2010”, RAND Corporation, 2012, by Arturo Munoz.
- “Local
institutions, livelihoods and vulnerability: lessons from Afghanistan”,
Humanitarian Policy Group Working Paper, Overseas Development Institute,
April 2012, by Adam Pain and Paula Kantor. http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7653.pdf
- “The State of Telecommunications and Internet in Afghanistan Six Years later (2006-2012)”, United State Agency for International Development and Internews, March 2012, by Javid Hamdard.
- “Complex Environments: A Sociopolitical Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan.” U.S. Army National Ground Intelligence Center.
This
assessment introduces an alternative way of thinking about corruption in
Afghanistan. Corruption is explained both as a habituated, systemic outcome of
the sociopolitical environment and as a deliberate strategy of governments and
governed. This assessment is intended to help improve operations in theater by introducing
an anthropological framework for recognizing and understanding the different
conditions, causes, and forms of corruption in Afghanistan and their effect on
society.
- “Post Occupation Iraq: The Brittleness of Political Institutions.” Peggy Garvin, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
As
in other Arab countries, mass demonstrations did make an appearance in Iraq,
but these were comparatively small and lacked the staying power of the ones
that had toppled regimes and/or plunged countries into bloodshed. What
distinguished the protests in Iraq was the nature of their declared goals, in
which the demands for free elections and fresh faces that had defined the
uprisings in other Arab countries were almost absent. And this was hardly
surprising; the Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki had been in
power for less than six years, having been put there by the Iraqis themselves
in two free and fair elections in December 2005 and March 2010. If the
protestors were demonstrating about anything, it was the abysmal performance of
the freely elected Maliki government ...
- “Global Jihad Sustained Through Africa.” Adrian Janes, Royal United Services Institute (UK).
As
the central leadership of Al-Qa’ida is weakened and challenged, the terrorist
movement is looking to partnerships in Saharan and Sub-Saharan Africa to
re-group and re-energise itself.
Despite
greater co-operation, there seems to be an unresolved tension between
transnational aims of Al-Qa’ida-core and the local grievances of African
partners.
Following
the alliance with Al-Qa’ida-core, regional affiliates such as Al-Qa’ida in the
Maghreb and Al-Shabaab have undergone similar patterns of strategic, tactical
and propagandistic evolution.
Nigeria’s
Boko Haram is still focused on a local campaign, but recent operational
refinement and ability to stage deadly ‘spectaculars’ suggests disturbing
connections with other regional terror groups.
Links
between Al-Qa’ida-core and some jihadist groups in Africa have been established
over the last decade which vary in strategic and operational significance.
A
range of new challenges are possible as jihadism evolves and disperses into
territories of ungoverned space across large stretches of the African
continent. Among these are the potential for radicalisation and mobilisation of
a new subset of British youth in the UK.
