Reconstruction Update

1. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What Is It, and How Has It Been Utilized? Congressional Research Service.

The United States has been party to multilateral and bilateral agreements addressing the status of U.S. armed forces while present in a foreign country. These agreements, commonly referred to as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), generally establish the framework under which U.S. military personnel operate in a foreign country.  SOFAs provide for rights and privileges of covered individuals while in a foreign jurisdiction and address how the domestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction apply to U.S. personnel.  SOFAs may include many provisions, but the most common issue addressed is which country may exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S.  personnel.  The United States has agreements where it maintains exclusive jurisdiction over its personnel, but more often the agreement calls for shared jurisdiction with the receiving country.                                                                            http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34531.pdf  

2. Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign. RUSI.

In spring 2011, Western military operations, backed by the Arab League, began against the regime of Muammar Qadhafi. Libyan rebels, after being penned in by the regime, began to take ground and ultimately deposed Qadhafi seven months later. But with all eyes on Syria, does Libya offer a new model for intervention? http://www.rusi.org/publications/whitehallreports/ref:O4F631FBA20DF9/#.T2mgdhPGG2k.facebook

3. Pakistan: A Hard Country.  Anatol Lieven.

In the past decade Pakistan has become a country of immense importance to its region, the United States, and the world. With almost 200 million people, a 500,000-man army, nuclear weapons, and a large diaspora in Britain and North America, Pakistan is central to the hopes of jihadis and the fears of their enemies. Yet the greatest short-term threat to Pakistan is not Islamist insurgency as such, but the actions of the United States, and the greatest long-term threat is ecological change. Anatol Lieven's book is a magisterial investigation of this highly complex and often poorly understood country: its regions, ethnicities, competing religious traditions, varied social landscapes, deep political tensions, and historical patterns of violence; but also its surprising underlying stability, rooted in kinship, patronage, and the power of entrenched local elites. Engagingly written, combining history and profound analysis with reportage from Lieven's extensive travels as a journalist and academic, Pakistan: A Hard Country is both utterly compelling and deeply revealing.                        http://www.amazon.com/Pakistan-Hard-Country-Anatol-Lieven/dp/1610390210

4. Quran Copy Burning in Afghanistan and the US ‘Exit’ Strategy.  Shanthie Mariet D’Souza. Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore.

The latest violent protestation in Afghanistan over the burning of copies of the Holy Quran has a demonstrative effect. It has yet again brought to light the nature of the international intervention and the challenges of stabilising this war-torn country. While on the surface the incident appears to be a religiously motivated episode, a growing sense of anxiety and seething anger among a segment of the Afghan populace over other issues is being exploited by the Taliban and its allies in the wake of this incident. More importantly, this episode has raised important questions on the possibility of early international withdrawal and prospects for an effective transition of authority into Afghan hands. http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Insights_158_-_Quran_Copy_Burning_(Amended)_08032012174623.pdf

5. Time for Afghan Political Settlement Talks: Reinvigorated Diplomatic Efforts with All Parties to the Conflict Is Needed.  Colin Cookman and Caroline Wadhams. Center for American Progress.  

Violent protests in Afghanistan over the past week in reaction to the burning of Korans at Bagram Air Base have, as of this writing, claimed the lives of more than 30 Afghans and six U.S. military personnel around the country. These protests also exposed the vulnerabilities of the current U.S. and NATO strategy and reinforced the importance of pursuing a political settlement strategy in close synchronization with military and economic efforts.

For the past three years U.S. strategy largely centered on taking the fight to the insurgency while building up the Afghan police and military. As U.S. and NATO forces transition out of the country, these Afghan forces are expected to take over responsibility for fighting the insurgency as international forces draw down through 2014. But training, mentoring, and embedding with the Afghan police and military have all become more challenging in the wake of last week’s violence. This weekend U.S. Marine Gen. John Allen and other NATO countries withdrew hundreds of advisors from Afghan ministries. The protests reveal deep anger even among Afghans who support the current government, as well as diminishing patience for a foreign military presence that still struggles to adapt to Afghan political realities. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2012/03/afghan_negotiations.html

6. Afghanistan: Improvements Needed to Strengthen Management of U.S. Civilian Presence, Government Accountability Office.

U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority and the Department of Defense (DOD) have reported expanding their civilian presence in Afghanistan and took steps to improve their ability to track that presence. Since January 2009, U.S. agencies under Chief of Mission authority more than tripled their civilian presence from 320 to 1,142. However, although State could report total Chief of Mission numbers by agency, in mid-2011 GAO identified discrepancies in State’s data system used to capture more-detailed staffing information such as location and position type. State began taking steps in the fall of 2011 to improve the reliability of its data system. Also, DOD reported expanding its overall civilian presence from 394 civilians in January 2009 to 2,929 in December 2011 to help assist U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. The extent to which DOD’s data is reliable is unknown due to omissions and double counting, among other things. In a 2009 report, GAO noted similar data issues and recommended DOD improve data concerning deployed civilians. DOD concurred with the recommendation and expects the issues will be addressed by a new tracking system to be completed in fiscal year 2012.                                                                            http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588869.pdf

7. Afghanistan Security: Department of Defense Effort to Train Afghan Police Relies on Contractor Personnel to Fill Skill and Resource Gaps, Government Accountability Office.

The U.S. strategy in Afghanistan depends in part on building that country’s capacity to provide for its own security by training and equipping the Afghan National Security Forces, which includes the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police (ANP).  Since 2002, the United States has allocated over $43 billion to train, equip, and sustain the Afghan National Security Forces, which includes about $14 billion to train, equip, and sustain the ANP. The ANP training program is intended to create and sustain a professionally-led police force that is accountable to the Afghan people and is capable of enforcing laws and maintaining civil order. Currently, U.S., coalition, and Department of Defense (DOD) civilian contractor personnel assist the Afghan Ministry of Interior in training the ANP at 23 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) training sites and in mentoring ANP units in the field. http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/588816.pdf

8. How Will the Withdrawal of International Forces Affect Afghanistan?  Transcript of a Chatham House event featuring Fawzia Koofi, Member of Parliament, Afghanistan. http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/170212koofi.pdf 

9. The Looming Storm in Pakistan's Kurram Agency,John Ty Grubbs. Jamestown Foundation.

Security has worsened significantly in Pakistan’s Kurram Agency this year. In the latest incident, Pakistani fighter jets responded to a series of attacks by bombing militant positions in the Kurram and Orakzai tribal agencies on March 1, killing an estimated 22 Islamist fighters (Dawn [Karachi], March 1; Central Asia Online, March 1). This rise in violence can be attributed to the area’s increasing strategic importance. Physically jutting into Afghanistan, Kurram is an attractive haven for fighters fleeing from drone strikes in North Waziristan and is the ideal entry point into Afghanistan for the Haqqani Network. Therefore, it is crucial for the Haqqani Network and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) elements that support them to marginalize any group that could disrupt this flow of fighters (see Terrorism Monitor, December 16, 2010). The most significant obstacles are the Shi’a Turi and Bangash tribes and the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) under the command of Hakimullah Mahsud (see Terrorism Monitor, April 17, 2010). Although the ISI has recently been able to break up and court portions of the TTP, the bloodshed has not abated in Kurram. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39110&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=588

10. Gauging Taliban Moves in Pakistan, Daniel Markey. Council on Foreign Relations.

There are reports of efforts to unify various Taliban groups under a single umbrella (NYT) and of a growing rift within the Pakistani Taliban that could open a door for peace deals between the Pakistani government and insurgents in the restive border region. "This could be the beginning of an effort to get all of the militants on the Pakistani side of the border pushing in a similar direction, which would clarify matters in terms of negotiation with the United States," says CFR Senior Fellow Daniel Markey. He adds: "I'm still skeptical that it would make it easy to reach some sort of accommodation that would ultimately serve U.S. purposes." Markey says Washington's lack of clarity on its intentions in Afghanistan and in talks with the Taliban is the "single biggest problem" in its policy toward the region.      http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/gauging-taliban-moves-pakistan/p27591

11. Pakistan in a Changing Regional and Global Environment. Transcript of a Chatham House event featuring Hina Rabbani Khar, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Pakistan http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Meetings/Meeting%20Transcripts/220212khar.pdf                                                                                                           
12. Sino-Pakistan Strategic Entente: Implications for Regional Security, Rajshree Jetly. Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. http://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/Attachments/PublisherAttachment/ISAS_Working_Paper_143_-_Email_-_Sino_Pakistan_Strategic_Entente_14022012160926.pdf                                                  
13. Pakistan’s Long and Ordinary Crisis, Atul Mishra. Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.

Longevity and ordinariness mark Pakistan’s on-going crisis. Fluttering apart, nothing dramatic or decisive has happened in the recent past. This is because the institutions – the army, the judiciary and the political-executive – that could decisively impact the crisis have gone errant. They are not performing the functions they are mandated to perform. They aren’t letting other institutions perform the functions the other institutions must perform. And though these institutions are being mutually meddlesome, they show no inclination to perform the functions of the meddled institutions. This functional derangement of key state institutions has produced Pakistan’s stalemated, and thus ordinary, crisis. Tendencies of the crisis are traceable to the October 1999 coup and its aftermath. Regime actions against the political-executive and the judiciary distorted Pakistan’s already wobbly institutional architecture. Apart from stoking general scepticism against the effectiveness of army rule, regime actions created incentives in whose pursuit the three institutions have become errant. The conditions that structure this crisis also diminish the effectiveness of policy anticipation. Whatever currently exists in Pakistan does not resemble democracy in any meaningful sense. In Pakistan, India faces an assembly of vigorously malfunctioning institutions, which should not be mistaken for a set of weak institutions servicing a fledgling democracy. Nor should Pakistan be considered a failed state. A decisive army coup could clear the space for Pakistan’s domestic politics and for sustainable bilateral relations. But given the army’s disinclination for a political role, India must adopt a studied indifference as its Pakistan policy for a while. http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/PakistansLongandOrdinaryCrisis   

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16. Factsheet: The Fight for Eastern Afghanistan, Institute for the Study of War, March 2012, Isaac Hock.

Security gains made by the addition of U.S. “surge” forces in southern Afghanistan have denied the Taliban its historical safe havens in Kandahar and Helmand. The campaign in Afghanistan must now focus on the East, which received few surge troops. The provinces surrounding Kabul are strategically important for controlling the capital and connecting the city with the rest of Afghanistan.                        http://www.understandingwar.org/reference/fact-sheet-fight-eastern-afghanistan  

15. The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat, Institute for the Study of War, March 2012, Jeffrey Dressler.

The Haqqani Network represents hh a strategic threat to the enduring stability of the Afghan state and U.S. national security interests in the region. The Haqqanis are currently Afghanistan’s most capable and potent insurgent group, and they continue to maintain close operational and strategic ties with al-Qaeda and their affiliates. These ties will likely deepen in the future.  Unlike the Quetta Shura Taliban in southern Afghanistan, the counterinsurgency campaign has not weakened the Haqqanis’ military capabilities significantly. Few of the “surge” resources deployed to their strongholds in Eastern Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network has increased its operational reach and jihadist credentials over the past several years. The Haqqani Network has expanded its reach toward the Quetta Shura Taliban’s historical strongholds in southern Afghanistan, the areas surrounding Kabul, as well as the Afghan north. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf

16. Factsheet: U.S.-Afghan Strategic Agreement, Institute for the Study of War, March 2012, Paraag Shukla.                                                      http://www.understandingwar.org/reference/fact-sheet-us-afghan-strategic-agreement  

17. Their drill may be out of step, but Afghan army is ready for the fight, The Telegraph, 11 March 2012, Sean Rayment. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/9135883/Their-drill-may-be-out-of-step-but-Afghan-army-is-ready-for-the-fight.html      

18. Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts, The RAND Corporation, 2011 by Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel and Olga Oliker.

Security force assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the counterinsurgency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. The outcome of the campaign hinges, in large measure, on the effectiveness of the assistance given to the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Police, and other security forces, assistance that the International Security Force must provide while fighting the insurgents. Yet senior U.S. military and civilian officials have posed many questions about the effectiveness of SFA in Afghanistan, and no empirically rigorous assessments exist to help answer these questions. This monograph analyzes SFA efforts in Afghanistan over time and documents U.S. and international approaches to building the Afghan National Security Forces from 2001 to 2009. Finally, it provides observations and recommendations that emerged from extensive fieldwork in Afghanistan in 2009 and their implications for the U.S Army.                           http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1066.html

19. SIGAR: Cost of security in Afghanistan to rise sharply.

On March 9, 2012, we provided a management alert letter to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), detailing a number of concerns regarding the transition to the Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) and providing three suggested action items for the agency to consider.  The rushed approach we observed to establish agreements with the APPF and the Risk Management Companies compelled us to develop this alert letter to caution both USAID and policy makers of the risks. Our work was conducted in accordance with our professional standards and quality control procedures. Specifically, it was conducted by independent staff, objectively designed and planned, and supported by sufficient and appropriate evidence. We believe that the work performed provides a reasonable basis for the letter’s observations.

On March 13, 2012, the USAID Mission Director in Kabul, Afghanistan provided a written response to this alert letter, which took exception to our findings, conclusions, and suggested action items. Unfortunately, as shown by its comments, USAID has interpreted this alert letter as an affront to its management of the transition, instead of as a constructive document that would aid it in assessing and responding to the risks we identified. Therefore, we are compelled to respond to these comments.                                    http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/alerts/2012-03-15-appf-alert.pdf

Reconstruction Update

1. Dereliction of Duty II: Senior Military Leaders Loss of Integrity Wounds Afghan War Effort, Lt. Col. Daniel L. Davis, USA. 

Senior ranking US military leaders have so distorted the truth when communicating with the US Congress and American people in regards to conditions on the ground in Afghanistan that the truth has become unrecognizable. This deception has damaged America’s credibility among both our allies and enemies, severely limiting our ability to reach a political solution to the war in Afghanistan. It has likely cost American taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars Congress might not otherwise have appropriated had it known the truth, and our senior leaders’ behavior has almost certainly extended the duration of this war. The single greatest penalty our Nation has suffered, however, has been that we have lost the blood, limbs and lives of tens of thousands of American Service Members with little to no gain to our country as a consequence of this deception.  http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/291793/dereliction-of-duty-ii-january-15-2012.pdf

2.      Al Qaeda in Its Third Decade, By Heather Negley, RAND Corporation.

In the minds of most Americans, al Qaeda descended from the heavens in Wagnerian-opera fashion, on September 11, 2011, putting the organization today at the beginning of its second decade. But al Qaeda was formally established in Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1988. It claims connection with assaults on American forces in Somalia and Saudi Arabia in the early 1990s, declared war on the United States in 1996, and launched its terrorist campaign in earnest in 1998. By 2001, the struggle was already in its second decade.

Whether al Qaeda is in its third decade or third century matters little to its leaders, who see the current conflict as the continuation of centuries of armed struggle between believers and infidels, and who expect it to transcend their lifetimes.

This is unnerving to Americans, who seek precision in dating their wars. The American Revolutionary War began when the Minutemen opened fire on advancing British troops on April 19, 1775. The Civil War began when Confederate forces began shelling Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861. World War II began with the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. Americans seek equal precision in ending conflict. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP362.pdf

3.      Afghanistan: The Failed Metrics of Ten Years of War, Anthony H. Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

The US has now been at war in Afghanistan for more than a decade, and is committed to stay through 2014 – with a possible advisory, aid, and funding presence that may extend to 2025. There still, however, are no convincing unclassified ways to measure progress in the war, and the trends in the fighting or level of violence.

There are, however, a wide mix of “metrics” that provide insight into some areas of progress. These range from analyses of the pattern in violence to estimates of casualties, attempts to show areas of insurgent influence, and efforts to measure the effectiveness of Afghan governance and aid.

This analysis looks at the reporting available on the state of the war at the end of 2011, in terms of the data, trends, and maps available from the US Department of Defense, the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the NATO/ISAF command, and the UN. It attempts to explore the meaning of these data, the reasons for the sharp difference between them, and what they say about the fighting to date and its progress.

http://csis.org/files/publication/120209_Afghanistan_Failed_Metrics.pdf

4.      Maximizing Chances for Success in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Michael E. O'Hanlon and Bruce Riedel, Brookings Institution.

Four years ago, Barack Obama ran for president arguing that Afghanistan and Pakistan were the most crucial national security issues for the United States and that he would prioritize his attention and the nation’s resources in their direction if elected. His reasons began with the fact that Afghanistan was the preferred sanctuary for al Qaeda, where the 9/11 attacks were planned. In addition, Afghanistan offered huge swaths of land where al Qaeda and other extremist groups—mainly, Pakistan’s own Taliban, which seeks to destabilize that country, and Lashkar-e-Taiba, which seeks to attack India—would likely take refuge if the Afghan Taliban again seized power in much or all of that country. And Pakistan, soon to be the most populous country in the Islamic world and the fifth largest in the world, also has the fastest growing nuclear arsenal in the world and is on track to be the world’s third largest nuclear weapons state.

The Obama administration has had major successes. The good news is that Osama bin Laden is dead and much of the broader al Qaeda leadership has similarly met its demise. Since preventing attacks by transnational terrorists against the United States and its allies was the core objective of military operations in Afghanistan, this is no mean feat. Also, Pakistan has arrested the progress of its own Taliban in threatening its internal stability. No further terrorist incidents like that of Mumbai in 2008 have brought India and Pakistan to the brink of what could be nuclear war. In addition, the momentum of the Taliban within Afghanistan has been stanched. By 2011, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was documenting fewer enemy-initiated attacks than had been witnessed in 2010 (though still more than were observed in 2009).

But, there is ample bad news as well…

http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2012/0215_afpak_ohanlon_riedel/0215_afpak_ohanlon_riedel.pdf

5. Peace and Development Efforts in Afghanistan: A Lost Decade, Patryk Kugiel, Polish Institute of International Affairs.

When international intervention put an end to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in late 2001 thousands of Afghans went out to the streets to celebrate a new beginning. After 20 years of bloody civil wars in the country, many had hoped that a new era of stability and prosperity was about to begin. The devastating terrorist attacks in the U.S., which brought the international coalition to Afghanistan, was seen as a guarantee that the West would not abandon the country before it was put back in order. Afghanistan could have been a model of post-conflict reconstruction.

After 10 years of international engagement in Afghanistan, it is clear that those hopes didn’t turn out to be true. The last 10 years have been mainly lost in terms of peace and the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Important questions to be asked are whether this grim outcome could have been prevented, if the intervention could have been done differently, what went wrong, and what lessons can be drawn for the future of Afghanistan and other similar post-conflict situations. When world leaders gather in Bonn to discuss a better strategy for Afghanistan it will be a good moment to re-assess those dilemmas. This paper aims to bring some proposals for answers to those questions. http://www.pism.pl/files/?id_plik=9193

6.      Baluchistan. Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 8 Feb 2012.  Testimony of:

C. Christine Fair http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA-WState-CFair-20120208.pdf

Ralph Peters http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA-WState-RPeters-20120208.pdf

T. Kumar http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA-WState-TKumar-20120208.pdf

M. Hosseinbor http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA-WState-HHosseinbor-20120208.pdf

Ali Dayan Hasan http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/HHRG-112-FA-WState-AHasan-20120208.pdf

7.      Pakistan Floods Emergency: Lessons from a Continuing Crisis, Shaheen Chughtai and Cate Heinrich. OxFam International.

http://policy-practice.oxfam.org.uk/publications/download?Id=444771&dl=http://oxfamilibrary.openrepository.com/oxfam/bitstream/10546/210829/3/bn-pakistan-floods-emergency-160212-en.pdf

8.      Rethinking the Pakistan Plan, Amitai Etzioni, The National Interest

THE QUEST for improvement in the deeply troubled relationship between the United States (along with its Western allies) and Pakistan focuses largely on Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and on the country’s approach to governing. But this quest has not yielded much, and relations between Washington and Islamabad are spiraling downward. Lost in this American struggle to induce change in Pakistani behavior is a fundamental reality—namely, that there probably can’t be any significant progress in improving the relationship so long as the India-Pakistan conflict persists. For Pakistanis, that conflict poses an ominous existential challenge that inevitably drives their behavior on all things, including their approach to the West and the war in Afghanistan. But if the India-Pakistan confrontation could be settled, chances for progress on other fronts would be greatly enhanced.

http://nationalinterest.org/article/rethinking-the-pakistan-plan-6285

9.      In Brief: Pakistan's Multiple Crises, Jon Lunn. House of Commons Library, United Kingdom.

Pakistan is facing multiple crises at present. Relations with the US are at an all-time low as a result of a number of incidents during 2011, including the unilateral US raid that led to the killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad in May and the border clash in late November in which US forces killed at least 24 Pakistani soldiers.

Relations between the military and the civilian government, led by the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), are no better. Contempt proceedings against Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, brought by the Supreme Court, are due to resume on 1 February. If he is eventually found guilty, he would in all probability be obliged to resign. Early elections could be triggered, with cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan, after years on the political margins, well placed to perform strongly.

http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06207.pdf  

10. Prospects for Youth-Led Movements for Political Change in Pakistan, Michael Kugelman. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.

This policy brief assesses the potential for two types of youth-led political change movements in Pakistan. One is an Arab Spring-like campaign, fuelled by demands for better governance and new leadership. The other is a religious movement akin to the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which seeks to transform Pakistan into a rigid Islamic state.

The brief discusses the presence in Pakistan of several factors that suggest the possibility of the emergence of an Arab Spring-type movement. These include economic problems; corruption; a young, rapidly urbanising and disillusioned population; youth-galvanising incidents; and, in Imran Khan, a charismatic political figure capable of channelling mass sentiment into political change.

Pakistan is too fractured, unstable and invested in the status quo to launch a mass change movement, and talk of an Arab Spring is misguided in a nation that already experienced mass protests in 2007. Moreover, religion is too divided and polarised, and religious leadership too lacking in charisma and appeal to produce such a movement. Notwithstanding, there are several reasons why Pakistan could witness a religiously rooted revolution. These include Pakistanis’ intense religiosity and the growing influence in Pakistan of an Islamist political party that seeks to install caliphates in Muslim countries. 

http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/c530d5c5390dc83b08a97052c606ff57.pdf

11.  Pakistan: Charting a Course for Revival, Shada Islam, Friends of Europe.

More than at any time in its troubled history, Pakistan faces an uncertain future. The country’s political institutions are fragile, the economy is struggling while religious extremism and militancy cast a dark shadow over the landscape. Nuclear-armed Pakistan has long suffered from chronic political instability: long bouts of military rule have been followed by elections, the installation of weak civilian leaders who are, in turn, ousted by military coups d’état. The current situation is particularly disturbing. Often described as the “most dangerous place in the world”, Pakistan today risks further turmoil and destabilisation as a powerful army, a weak civilian government and the judiciary engage in a damaging standoff.

http://www.friendsofeurope.org/Portals/13/Documents/Policy_Briefings/Policy-Briefing-Pakistan-Conference.pdf

12.  Pakistan's Perspective on Investigation Report Conducted by BG Stephen Clark into 26th November 2011 US Led ISAF/NATO Forces Attack on Pakistani Volcano and Boulder Posts in Mohmand Agency, Inter Services Public Relations, Government of Pakistan

http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/press/pakistan.pdf

13. Report: Investigation Into the Incident in Vicinity of the Salala Checkpoint on the Night of 25-26 Nov 2011, http://www.centcom.mil/images/stories/Crossborder/report%20exsum%20further%20redacted.pdf      

14.  The Limits of the Pakistan-China Alliance, Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors, Heritage Foundation.

After the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan in May 2011, Pakistani political leaders played up their country’s relations with China, touting Beijing as an alternative partner to Washington. But China’s concerns over Pakistan’s future stability will likely limit the extent to which it will help Pakistan out of its economic difficulties. While China has an interest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan, the eco­nomic relationship is not very extensive and the notion that Chinese ties could serve as a replacement for U.S. ties is far-fetched. Instead of wringing its hands over Chinese influence on Pakistan, the U.S. should seek cooperation from Beijing in encouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan—which will benefit all parties involved. http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/B2641.pdf

Reconstruction Update

1. “Afghanistan: The Death of a Strategy”. Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2012 by Anthony Cordesman.  It is always tempting to ride the headlines and focus on events like the marines urinating on a Taliban corpse, the burning of the Qur’ans, and the attacks on U.S. and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel that have followed in even the most secure and best-vetted facilities. It has been a truly grim week and one where these events raise questions about U.S. strategy and the value of continuing with the current approach to the war.

This analysis covers the critical weaknesses that have left the United States without an effective strategy in Afghanistan. It has been revised to provide specific force numbers and spending data and to cite additional studies that show the different estimates of military progress and the problems in creating an effective transition strategy.  http://csis.org/publication/afghanistan-death-strategy  

2. Achieving Unity of Effort“, InterAgency Journal, Vol. 3, Issue 1, Winter 2012, by Matthew K. Wilder.  It  has been well established by the nation’s leadership and current experience that military conflict has evolved in response to the increasingly complex realities of the global war on terrorism. Part of this reality is the introduction of a whole-of-government strategy as a key enabler to operations that were once the exclusive purview of military units. An example of this strategy is the introduction of interagency civilian intelligence and cultural advisors at all levels of military command, from joint task force to battalion. An examination of future threats and potential areas of operation, such as other nations in the Middle East and Africa, indicate that this trend toward greater interagency integration will not only continue, but will likely increase.

Despite a strong commitment from both military and civilian leadership and significant efforts on the part of their agencies to make these partnerships meaningful and productive, the integration of military and civilian professionals into cross-functional interagency teams could be made much more effective. An effective interagency team achieves unity of effort in its activities irrespective of unity of command. From the interagency perspective, achieving unity of command is relatively easy for interagency teams led by a member of the military and incorporated into a military organization because the rank structure is more rigid and transparent. However, true unity of effort as expressed as horizontal (inclusive of all team members and agencies) instead of vertical (along stove-piped chains of command) integration has proven much more elusive, regardless of the composition of the interagency team..  The purpose of this article is to highlight the role of the mid- to senior-level leader (either civilian or military) tasked with leading an interagency team comprised of both military and civilian members in achieving unity of effort. To address some of the challenges and opportunities posed in the leadership of such a team, it is useful to explore an interagency case study involving provincial reconstruction teams (PRT) and then expand on the common problems of integration and the education, training, and selection of successful interagency team leaders and members. http://thesimonscenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/IAJ-3-1-pg40-46.pdf  

3. “The Politics of Water Security between Afghanistan and Iran”, Future Directions International, March 2012, by Paula Hanasz. 

Disagreements between Afghanistan and Iran over the sharing of the Helmand River have been brewing since the ‘Great Game’ of the 19th century. Back then the problem was considered dual – that of border delineation and the respective shares of the two countries in the waters of the Helmandi. Today the problem of transboundary water management festers beneath the otherwise cordial relationship between Afghanistan and Iran. The points of friction now also encompass the other shared water resource, the Harirod-Murghab basin. At stake are the livelihoods of the inhabitants of both basins, the environmental integrity of the region, especially the volatile Sistan wetlands, and the development of hydro-electric power from these shared rivers. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/The%20Politics%20of%20Water%20Security%20between%20Afghanistan%20and%20Iran%20-%20March%201%202012.pdf  

4. “Afghanistan’s Conflict Minerals: The Crime-State-Insurgent Nexus”, CTC Sentinel, Combatting Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, 15 February 2012, by Matthew DuPee.

Afghanistan is most notoriously recognized for its cultivation and production of illegal narcotics, recently galvanizing its position as the world’s number one producer of illicit opium and cannabis resin (hashish). Yet there exists an equally thriving shadow economy revolving around precious stones such as emeralds, lapis lazuli, and increasingly from minerals and ores such as chromite, coal, gold and iron.

In 2010, the U.S. Department of Defense released its findings from a geological survey that confirmed Afghanistan’s untapped mineral reserves are worth an astounding $1 trillion.[2] Wahidullah Shahrani, the current Afghan minister for mines, claimed that other geological assessments and industry reports place Afghanistan’s mineral wealth at $3 trillion or more.[3] Past wars, contemporary conflict and the subsequent influx of international assistance, however, has forced all development and reconstruction efforts to unfold in a highly criminalized political and economic space—including Afghanistan’s immature yet promising mining sector.

This article examines the evolution of natural resource exploitation by various violent entrepreneurs—such as local kachakbarari (smuggling) networks, corrupt powerbrokers, and insurgent groups such as the Taliban, the Haqqani network, and their Pakistani counterparts—in the period before and during Afghanistan’s contemporary conflict. Understanding this connection is important since state, criminal and insurgent elements on both sides of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border continue to reap profits from illegal excavations, protection rackets, informal taxation, and cross-border trafficking. This nexus is helping create new forms of state and private patronage systems as the realms of business, crime, conflict and corruption intersect in the already convoluted war economy of Afghanistan. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/afghanistans-conflict-minerals-the-crime-state-insurgent-nexus

5. “Strategic Support to Security Sector Reform in Afghanistan, 2001–2010”, Centre for International Governance Innovation, January 2012, by Christian Dennys and Tom Hamilton-Baillie.

Since the overthrow of the Taliban government in 2001, the international community and the Afghan government have made numerous attempts to address the strategic and operational issues surrounding the country’s security sector. The 2001 Bonn Conference, the most significant of these initiatives, dealt almost exclusively with strategic issues, particularly with establishing a new Afghan state and political process. By the time of the next major international conference in Berlin in 2004, the focus of international attention had shifted to operational issues, as had many of the United Nations (UN) mandates. The change was driven (in part) by the recognition that efforts to reconstitute the Afghan state were stagnating, and led to ever more intrusive intervention by the international community.

Berlin and subsequent conferences4 focused on operationalconcerns, but without addressing the underlying strategicfailure of the Bonn Agreement: it does not represent a peace process, but rather the continuation of a civil war by other means, and it does not represent a vision that is shared strongly enough by the Afghan state and the main international actors. Instead of addressing the deep-seated strategic issues, the conferences focused on achieving reforms in areas such as disarmament and development. Such operational activities represent discrete practical programs of action that are carried out on the ground, but lacking strategic planning, may becompleted without supporting the overarching goals of peace, security and stability in Afghanistan. The divergent aims of Bonn and Berlin highlight the main argument of this paper: the operational programming of the latter will fail in the absence of the coherent strategic vision that the former aspired to, but ultimately did not produce. http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/6732~v~Strategic_Support_to_Security_Sector_Reform_in_Afghanistan_20012010.pdf

6. “Fragile States Resource Center” [website], by Seth Kaplan.  http://www.fragilestates.org/tag/libya/       

7. “Negotiating Peace in Afghanistan Without Repeating Vietnam”, RAND Corporation, January 2012, by James Dobbins.  http://www.rand.org/commentary/2012/01/13/WP.html

8.      “22 Results in Afghanistan”, United Nations Development Programme, December 2011. http://www.undp.org.af/fnews/22%20Results%20in%20Afghanistan%20-%20final%2011%20Dec%202011.pdf

Reconstruction Indexes

1. Iraq Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Centers/Saban/Iraq%20Index/index.pdf

2. Afghanistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index.aspx

3. Pakistan Index http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/Programs/FP/pakistan%20index/index.pdf

1. Buried Treasure.  Archaeologists are racing to save Afghanistan's cultural heritage before the Chinese start digging on one of the world's most valuable new copper mines.   http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204542404577157281392227936.html#ixzz1lKc8KjrD

2. Afghan First Initiative Has Placed Work with Afghan Companies, but Is Affected by Inconsistent Contract Solicitation and Vetting, and Employment Data Is Limited, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR%20Audit-12-6.pdf  

3. Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Jan2012/Lores%20PDF/2012JanBook.pdf  

4. DOD Improved its Accountability for Vehicles Provided to the Afghan National Security Forces, but Should Follow Up on End-Use Monitoring Findings, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR%20Audit-12-4.pdf  

5. Thirty Years of Conflict: Drivers of Anti-Government Mobilisation in Afghanistan, 1978-2011,
   Antonio Giustozzi and Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.  The literature concerning the last 30 years of war in Afghanistan has over the last few years reached such a critical mass that it is now possible to identify structural factors in Afghan history that contributed to the various conflicts and have been its signal feature from 1978 onward. The state-building model borrowed from the neighbouring British and Tsarist empires in the late 19th century contained the seeds of later trouble, chiefly in the form of rural-urban friction that gained substantial force with the spread of modernity to rural Afghanistan starting in the 1950s. Following the Khalqi regime’s all-out assault on rural conservatism in 1978-79, this friction ignited into large-scale collective action by a variety of localised opposition groups, including political organisations, clerical networks, and Pakistani military intelligence, as well as the intelligence services of several other countries.  http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1203E-Drivers%20of%20Conflict%20IP%202012.pdf  

6. Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan, Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder. Feinstein International Center.  Political and security objectives have always influenced U.S. foreign assistance policies and priorities. Since 9/11, however, development aid for countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan has increasingly and explicitly been militarized and subsumed into the national security agenda. In the U.S. as well as in other western nations, the re-structuring of aid programs to reflect the prevailing foreign policy agenda of confronting global terrorism has had a major impact on development strategies, priorities, and structures. The widely held assumption in military and foreign policy circles that development assistance is an important “soft power” tool to win consent for the presence of foreign troops in potentially hostile areas, and to promote stabilization and security objectives, assumes a relationship between poverty and insecurity that is shared by many in the development and humanitarian community.  http://sites.tufts.edu/feinstein/files/2012/01/WinningHearts-Final.pdf  

7. Healing the Legacies of Conflict in Afghanistan: Community Voices on Justice, Peace and Reconciliation, Emily Winterbotham, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.  Ten years after the overthrow of the Taliban, Afghanistan is an environment of escalating conflict and prevailing impunity. In this context, the narrative of the Afghan government and its international partners has increasingly focused on ending the violence through negotiating with insurgent leaders and reintegrating their fighters into Afghan society. In their attempt to secure peace, policymakers have largely failed to include justice as a component of reconciliation and reintegration processes. This has continued the predominant approach since 2001 (and before) with the need for immediate stability outweighing the need for wartime accountability. The fact that the Afghan government and its international partners have failed to implement a comprehensive programme to provide justice or compensation for past and present wartime crimes has inhibited people’s ability to deal with the legacies of conflict. Subsequently, the majority of people participating in AREU’s research said they were struggling to cope emotionally, psychologically and practically, and the desire for some form of “closure” remains strong.  http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1201E-Healing%20the%20Legacies%20of%20Conflict%20in%20Afghanistan%20SP%202011.pdf  

8. Pakistan's Perspective on Investigation Report Conducted by BG Stephen Clark into 26th November 2011 US Led ISAF/NATO Forces Attack on Pakistani Volcano and Boulder Posts in Mohmand Agency, Inter Services Public Relations, Government of Pakistan http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/press/pakistan.pdf  

9.      The Limits of the Pakistan-China Alliance, Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors. Heritage Foundation.  After the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan in May 2011, Pakistani political leaders played up their country’s relations with China, touting Beijing as an alternative partner to Washington. But China’s concerns over Pakistan’s future stability will likely limit the extent to which it will help Pakistan out of its economic difficulties. While China has an interest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan, the eco­nomic relationship is not very extensive and the notion that Chinese ties could serve as a replacement for U.S. ties is far-fetched. Instead of wringing its hands over Chinese influence on Pakistan, the U.S. should seek cooperation from Beijing in encouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan—which will benefit all parties involved.  http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/B2641.pdf  

10.  Report of the Commission of Inquiry Concerning the Gruesome Incident of the Abduction and Murder of Syed Saleem Shahzad, Submitted to the Government of Pakistan http://www.pid.gov.pk/REPORT.pdf  

11.  Security Sector Governance in Pakistan: Progress, But Many Challenges Persist, C. Christine Fair. Centre for International Governance Innovation.  The utility of the Pakistani army’s domination over nearly all aspects of the state in Pakistan was brought into question following the US Navy SEAL raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideout on May 2, 2011. Pakistanis wondered how these events could have occurred right under the military’s nose. This issue paper examines the prospects for security sector governance in Pakistan and identifies the reforms that are necessary for Pakistan’s government to make meaningful strides in this area. It begins by explaining the hegemonic role of the armed forces in the history of the state of Pakistan and the unique challenges of its contemporary security terrain before surveying security sector governance in several key areas: the security of Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal; the all powerful intelligence agencies; disaster management; law enforcement; the criminal justice system and support to jihadist groups. While the report elucidates persistent shortcomings of security governance in all areas, it also highlights key areas of recent improvement, including disaster management and control of nuclear arms.  http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/SSR_Issue_no5.pdf  

12. Counter-IED Strategic Plan 2012-2016, Joint IED Defeat Organization https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20120106_JIEDDOC-IEDStrategicPlan_MEDprint.pdf

13.  An Afghanistan Without Institutions, A World Without Rest by Kip Whittington, Small Wars Journal.  Let’s not kid ourselves; Afghanistan will still be at war post-2014. Given that the coalition intends to end combat operations in 2014 while security problems linger on, the Afghans will certainly be left to manage the daily activities of a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign well into the “Transformation Decade” (2015-2024), discussed in-depth at the recent Bonn Conference. If the world doesn’t want to see Afghanistan plunge into chaos once again, there must be a serious focus on strengthening the institutions that will protect and run the country as a whole.  http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/an-afghanistan-without-institutions

14. Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report_-_January_2012.pdf#view=fit       

15. Few Contracts Terminated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Resulted in Wasted Funds in Iraq, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-011.pdf#view=fit      

16. The Department of State's Process to Provide Information on Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-009.pdf#view=fit       

17. Development Fund for Iraq: Department of Defense Cannot Fully Account for the Funds it Used after the Coalition Provisional Authority Dissolved, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-008.pdf#view=fit       

18. Status of Recommendations Made by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction to the Department of Defense, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-010.pdf#view=fit       

19. Iraq after America: 2012 Promises to be a Stormy Year for the Beleaguered Country, LTC Joel Rayburn, USA. Defining Ideas, Hoover Institution http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/106226      

20. Development Funds for Iraq Returned to the Central Bank of Iraq, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-012-F.pdf#view=fit

Reconstruction Update

1. The Real Outcome of the Iraq War: US and Iranian Strategic Competition in Iraq, Anthony H. Cordesman, et al. Center for Strategic and International Studies

Iraq has become a key focus of the strategic competition between the United States and Iran. The history of this competition has been shaped by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the 1991 Gulf War, and the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Since the 2003 war, both the US and Iran have competed to shape the structure of Post-Saddam Iraq’s politics, governance, economics, and security.

The US has gone to great lengths to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, including using its status as an occupying power and Iraq’s main source of aid, as well as through information operations and more traditional press statements highlighting Iranian meddling. However, containing Iranian influence, while important, is not America’s main goal in Iraq. It is rather to create a stable democratic Iraq that can defeat the remaining extremist and insurgent elements, defend against foreign threats, sustain an able civil society, and emerge as a stable power friendly to the US and its Gulf allies.

http://csis.org/files/publication/111220_Iran_Chapter_6-Iraq.pdf  

2. End of Mission Ceremony in Baghdad, GEN Martin Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey at the End of Mission Ceremony in Baghdad

Thank you very much Ambassador, Mr. Secretary, Ministers, General Babaker—my brother, and I see out there as well, General Abdul Kader, you’re always going to be General Abdul Kader to me, you know that. As-Salamu Alakum [peace be with you].

Thank you for welcoming me back to Baghdad to mark this new beginning for Iraq, the United States and on some level, the entire region. I’m honored to share this moment with Secretary Panetta, Ambassador Jeffrey, General Mattis, and of course General Austin and his sergeant major [Command Sgt. Maj. Joseph Allen]. They stand tall in a long line of American leaders who have been dedicated to seeing this difficult mission through. They represent a generation of my fellow who came here to keep America safe and to free Iraq from tyranny. They have shouldered their duties in partnership with our very respected Iraqi brothers. http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?ID=1668  

3. Was the Iraq War Worth It?, Andrew J. Bacevich, et al. Council on Foreign Relations

Was the nine-year U.S. war in Iraq worth it? Boston University's Andrew Bacevich says the world is a better place without Saddam Hussein, but stresses that the "disastrous legacy" of the war transcends lives lost or dollars spent. CFR's Max Boot says it may be premature to assess the benefits but there remains a chance for Iraq to serve as "a model for the Arab Spring." Michael Ignatieff, an academic, human rights advocate, and initial supporter of the war, says groups like the Kurds and the Shia in Iraq have gained. But it's "difficult to believe the war was worth it," he says, given the damage to U.S. credibility, the strengthening of Iran, and the lack of stability in Iraq. Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institution expresses hope that over time the "the war will not be seen historically as a mistake or failure." http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-war-worth-/p26820  

4. Iraq: Putting US Withdrawal in Perspective,  Anthony H. Co desman. Center for Strategic and International Studies

The prospects of cuts in defense spending interacts with the US failure to reach a meaningful agreement with the Iraqi government over how to implement the Strategic Framework Agreement. At present, the US security role will continue after the end of 2011, but in an extremely limited way. Plans keep changing, but the US effort to deal with the Iraqi military will consist solely of a small Office of Security Cooperation (OSC), and an increasingly uncertain police training mission that has been transferred to the State Department and which the Congress is unlikely to fund at anything like the planned level. http://csis.org/files/publication/111214_Iraq_US_Withdrawal.pdf  

5. U.S.-Iraq Relations Enter a New Era: U.S. Forces Complete their Strategic Reset as U.S. Diplomats Set New Tone, Peter Juul. Center for American Progress

Our nation is well on its way to withdrawing the last of our troops from Iraq before the holiday season begins, just as President Barack Obama promised. Under the U.S.-Iraq security agreement our troops must be out by the end of the year, but Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s visit to Washington this week will be matched by U.S. military ceremonies in Baghdad and elsewhere highlighting the final strategic reset of our Iraq policy sometime this week.

Prime Minister Maliki’s visit will mark this key achievement of the Obama administration, but so too will his talks with President Obama and other top administration officials as the United States and Iraq enter into a more normal relationship. The U.S. military is leaving Iraq but it is clear that the United States will not be leaving Iraq any time soon. As a result, it’s worth charting out where the new U.S.-Iraq relationship will and should be going in the near future. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/12/us_iraq_relationship.html  

6. The "End" of the War in Iraq?, Anthony H. Cordesman. Center for Strategic and International Studies

It is all too clear that most Americans want the war in Iraq to be over. A Gallup poll in October found that 75% approved of President Obama’s withdrawal of U.S. troops, although Americans divide sharply by party: 96% Democrats, 77% independents, and 43% Republicans. There are good reasons for such feelings. In spite of U.S. military successes in reducing the level of internal violence in Iraq, the war has been a strategic failure when its costs are compared to its benefits. http://csis.org/files/publication/111212_Cordesman_EndWarIraq_Commentary_Formatted.pdf

7. Oversight in Iraq and Afghanistan: Challenges and Solutions, Hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1529%3A12-7-2011-qoversight-in-iraq-and-afghanistan-challenges-and-solutionsq&catid=17&Itemid=25  

8. Central Asia and the Transition in Afghanistan, A Majority Staff Report by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations http://www.foreign.senate.gov/publications/download/central-asia-and-the-transition-in-afghanistan2