Nighttime kill and capture operations (“night raids”) by international military have been one of the most controversial tactics in Afghanistan. They are as valued by the international military as they are reviled by Afghan communities. Night raids have been associated with the death, injury, and detention of civilians, and have sparked enormous backlash among Afghan communities. The Afghan government and the Afghan public have repeatedly called for an end to night raids. International military say they have addressed many of the past concerns with night raids, including improved intelligence and conduct. They argue that night raids are a way to reduce civilian casualties and are an essential part of their military strategy.
The Open Society Foundations and The Liaison Office published an in depth study of night raids in February 2010.1 Since that time, some night raids practices have improved, but the overall number of night raids has multiplied, bringing this divisive practice into more Afghan homes.2 This policy paper will summarize the impact of these changes from both a human rights and a policy perspective. http://www.soros.org/initiatives/washington/articles_publications/publications/the-cost-of-kill-capture-impact-of-the-night-raid-surge-on-afghan-civilians-20110919/Night-Raids-Report-FINAL-092011.pdf
2. Forging New Ties: Report from the First Meeting Between Afghan and Pakistani Women arliamentarians, East West Institute.
During their two-day visit to Islamabad in June 2011, the Afghan delegates and their Pakistani peers met with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari and Speaker of the House Dr. Fehmida Mirza. They also agreed on a plan for a regular, ongoing dialogue between Afghan and Pakistani women parliamentarians.
“Such a dialogue will open a new channel for building trust between the two countries,” said Guenter Overfeld, EWI Vice President and Director of Regional Security. “It will also give Afghan women politicians much-needed support at a crucial time.”
3. Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully Account for Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel, Government Accountability Office
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) designated SPOT as their system in 2010 for tracking statutorily required information on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Citing limitations with SPOT’s implementation, the agencies generally relied on data sources other than SPOT to prepare their 2011 joint report. Only State used SPOT but just for its contractor personnel numbers. However, GAO found that regardless of the data source used, the agencies’ data had significant limitations, many of which were not fully disclosed. For example, while the agencies collectively reported $22.7 billion in fiscal year 2010 obligations, we found that they underreported the value of Iraq and Afghanistan contracts and assistance instruments by at least $4 billion, the majority of which was for DOD contracts. In addition, data presented in the joint report on personnel, including those performing security functions, are of limited reliability because of significant over- and undercounting. For example, DOD did not disclose that its contractor personnel numbers for Afghanistan were overreported for most of the reporting period because of double counting. Additionally, despite the reporting requirement, State did not provide information on its assistance instruments or the number of personnel working under them. As a result of such limitations, data presented in the joint report should not be used to draw conclusions or identify trends over time.
4. A Tougher U.S. Tack on Pakistan, Council on Foreign Relations
Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen testified before Congress (PDF) on September 22 that the Haqqani network, the militant group blamed for the September 13 attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul, is a "strategic arm" of Pakistan's top spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). U.S. allegations of links between the ISI and extremist groups are hardly new (ForeignPolicy). But the latest remarks constitute a firm ultimatum that the United States will act unilaterally if Pakistan doesn't crack down on extremist groups and official ties to those groups, says CFR's South Asia expert Daniel Markey. Mullen's remarks prompted outrage from Pakistani officials (WSJ) who deny such links. Markey warns that unless the United States can make this latest threat to Pakistan credible, Pakistan will not change the status quo. He recommends Washington be clear with the Pakistanis on the steps the United States is willing to take to destroy the Haqqani network, if Pakistan fails to do so.
5. Who Benefits From U.S. Aid to Pakistan?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
After 9/11 and again following the killing of Osama bin Laden, questions have been raised
about the purpose of aid from the United States to Pakistan. If aid was primarily meant for
military and counterterrorism support, the results from an American perspective have been
inadequate at best. Washington has accused the Pakistani government and military of duplicity, and of protecting key militant leaders living within Pakistan. The United States continues to ask the government of Pakistan to “do more.”
There are Pakistani voices, however, who argue that this is America’s war, not a global or
Pakistani war. The fighting has cost Pakistan three times as much as the aid provided and
35,000 victims. Sympathizers of militant groups in Pakistan’s army have also been found to
protect insurgents and have been involved in terrorist activities themselves.
6. Pakistan Seeks Administrative Solution to Terrorism on the Northwest Frontier, The Jamestown Foundation
Although new changes to colonial-era laws known as the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) are aimed at giving more political freedom to the people living in the lawless Pakistani tribal areas, one of the unstated objectives of the government seems to be defeating the militants with political rather than military force. [1] President Asif Ali Zardari hinted at this when he said that a bigger “challenge of defeating the militant mindset awaits us… In the long run, we must defeat the militant mindset to defend our country, our democracy, our institutions and our way of life” (Dawn, August 13).
To achieve this objective in the turbulent Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari signed two executive orders, the Amendments to the FCR (2011) and the Extension of the Political Parties Order (2002), into law on August 12. Most political parties and analysts in Pakistan welcomed the reforms, which will establish a new three-member FATA tribunal and introduce political activity in the area in the form of enfranchisement and the establishment of political parties (The Nation [Islamabad], September 4). There is a consensus that these laws will lead to even more far-reaching social and political reforms in the coming years (Dawn [Karachi], August 13; The News [Islamabad], August 13).
To achieve this objective in the turbulent Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari signed two executive orders, the Amendments to the FCR (2011) and the Extension of the Political Parties Order (2002), into law on August 12. Most political parties and analysts in Pakistan welcomed the reforms, which will establish a new three-member FATA tribunal and introduce political activity in the area in the form of enfranchisement and the establishment of political parties (The Nation [Islamabad], September 4). There is a consensus that these laws will lead to even more far-reaching social and political reforms in the coming years (Dawn [Karachi], August 13; The News [Islamabad], August 13).
7. Stop Doing Harm in Pakistan, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is under great stress. In a video Q&A, George Perkovich says Washington’s policy toward Pakistan has had the unintended but undeniable effect of empowering Pakistan’s military and intelligence services at the expense of the country’s political future.
To stop doing harm to Pakistan and its own interests, the United States must stop looking at Pakistan as a tool that can be used to help solve America’s other problems and instead focus on Pakistan for its own sake—it is one of the world’s most populous nations, has nuclear weapons, is in a critical region, and produces many of the terrorists looking to strike America. Instead of pressing Pakistan’s army to fight America’s war in Afghanistan, the United States would accomplish more by distancing itself from the Pakistani army, reforming trade and aid policies, and clarifying the defensive purposes of U.S.-Indian cooperation.
To stop doing harm to Pakistan and its own interests, the United States must stop looking at Pakistan as a tool that can be used to help solve America’s other problems and instead focus on Pakistan for its own sake—it is one of the world’s most populous nations, has nuclear weapons, is in a critical region, and produces many of the terrorists looking to strike America. Instead of pressing Pakistan’s army to fight America’s war in Afghanistan, the United States would accomplish more by distancing itself from the Pakistani army, reforming trade and aid policies, and clarifying the defensive purposes of U.S.-Indian cooperation.
8. Iraq: U.S. Diplomatic Mission and Security Personnel for 2012 (Taken Question), U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/10/175059.htm
9. Lessons from Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq, United States Institute of Peace
Embedded provincial reconstruction teams (ePRTs) were small State Department-led units
inserted into U.S. combat brigades in Iraq from 2007 to 2010 to support military counterinsurgency efforts at the local level.
During major combat operations in 2007 and into 2008, ePRTs provided important support
to military counterinsurgency efforts. As U.S. combat units wound down these efforts
and withdrew from towns and cities, ePRTs did useful—but harder to quantify—work in
mentoring local officials.
Combat brigades and ePRTs generally worked well together. However, some units were
unsure of how best to employ civilians. The military and civilians also sometimes had differing views on issues of short-term versus long-term goals.
Despite problems, ePRT veterans believe that they had a positive effect in both supporting
military counterinsurgency efforts and helping local Iraqi officials prepare for self-reliance.
Interviewees identified a variety of operational problems that detracted from ePRT mission
accomplishment. The Iraq ePRTs are now history, but as the United States continues to use civil-military teams in Afghanistan, these observed lessons need to be learned and acted upon.
Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) are civilian-military teams that were first fielded in
Afghanistan in 2002. A significantly modified version was introduced in Iraq in 2005. The
theory was that a stable nation would not emerge unless reconciliation, good governance,
and economic development extended beyond the central government in the capital city to provincial and local officials across the nation. PRTs were envisioned as a key means to achieve these goals.
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR290.pdf
http://www.usip.org/files/resources/SR290.pdf
After years of uncertainty, conflict and instability, the Iraqi state appears to be consolidating by reducing violence sufficiently to allow for a semblance of normalcy. Yet in the meantime, it has allowed corruption to become en-trenched and spread throughout its institutions. This, in turn, has contributed to a severe decay in public services. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government has exacerbated the problem by interfering in anti-corruption cases, ma-nipulating investigations for political advantage and in-timidating critics to prevent a replication of the type of popular movements that already have brought down three regimes in the region. The government’s credibility in the fight against corruption has eroded as a result, and this, together with troubling authoritarian tendencies, is giving ammunition to the prime minister’s critics. To bolster its faltering legitimacy, Maliki’s government will have to launch a vigorous anti-corruption campaign, improve service delivery and create checks and balances in the state system.
11. The U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services http://armed-services.senate.gov/e_witnesslist.cfm?id=5252
12. US and Iranian Strategic Competition: Competition in Iraq, Center for Strategic and International Studies
Iraq has become a key focus of the strategic competition between the United States and Iran. The history of this competition has been shaped by the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the 1991 Gulf War. Since the 2003 Iraq War, both the US and Iran have competed to shape the structure of Post-Saddam Iraq’s politics, governance, economics, and security.
The US has gone to great lengths to counter Iranian influence in Iraq, including using its status as an occupying power and Iraq’s main source of aid, as well as through information operations and more traditional press statements highlighting Iranian meddling.
However, containing Iranian influence, while important, is not America’s main goal in Iraq. It is rather to create a stable democratic Iraq that can defeat the remaining extremist and insurgent elements, defend against foreign threats, sustain an able civil society, and emerge as a stable power friendly to the US.
13. Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, Contractor Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role, Government Accountability Office
DOD has robust plans and processes for determining the sequence of actions and associated resources necessary to achieve the drawdown from Iraq, which is well underway with a significant amount of equipment removed from Iraq and bases transitioned, among other things. However, several factors contribute to making this phase more challenging than the previous drawdown phase. First, DOD will have less operational flexibility in this phase of the drawdown, yet will need to move a greater amount of equipment than in prior drawdown phases. Second, DOD is closing the largest bases with fewer available resources left on site, which creates a set of challenges and risks greater than what DOD faced during the prior drawdown phase. Although DOD's plans and processes create flexibility and mitigate risk, it has limited visibility over some equipment remaining in Iraq and does not track equipment found on transitioning bases that is not listed on any property accountability record. Without addressing these issues, DOD may miss opportunities to make the drawdown more efficient. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11774.pdf
14. Iraq and Afghanistan: DOD, State, and USAID Cannot Fully Account for Contracts, Assistance Instruments, and Associated Personnel, Government Accountability Office
The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) designated SPOT as their system in 2010 for tracking statutorily required information on contracts, assistance instruments, and associated personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. Citing limitations with SPOT’s implementation, the agencies generally relied on data sources other than SPOT to prepare their 2011 joint report. Only State used SPOT but just for its contractor personnel numbers. However, GAO found that regardless of the data source used, the agencies’ data had significant limitations, many of which were not fully disclosed. For example, while the agencies collectively reported $22.7 billion in fiscal year 2010 obligations, we found that they underreported the value of Iraq and Afghanistan contracts and assistance instruments by at least $4 billion, the majority of which was for DOD contracts. In addition, data presented in the joint report on personnel, including those performing security functions, are of limited reliability because of significant over- and undercounting. For example, DOD did not disclose that its contractor personnel numbers for Afghanistan were overreported for most of the reporting period because of double counting. Additionally, despite the reporting requirement, State did not provide information on its assistance instruments or the number of personnel working under them.
