- “Dancing with the Devil: The Perils of Engaging Rogue Regimes”, Michael Rubin, 2013.
The
world has never been as dangerous as it is now. Rogue regimes—governments and
groups which eschew diplomatic normality, sponsor terrorism, and proliferate
nuclear weapons—challenge the United States around the globe. The American
response of first resort is to talk. “It never hurts to talk to enemies.”
Seldom is conventional wisdom so wrong. While it is true that sanctions and
military force come at high cost, case studies examining the history of
American diplomacy with North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, the Taliban’s
Afghanistan, and Pakistan demonstrate that problems with both strategies do not
necessarily make engagement with rogue regimes cost-free.
Terrorist
groups also challenge traditional diplomacy, be they the PLO in the 1970s and
1980s, or Hamas and Hezbollah in the last two decades. Moral equivalency
enables often infuses the willingness to talk to terrorists—after all, as many
diplomats note, one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter—but seldom is
the record of talking to terrorists considered. While soldiers spend weeks
developing lessons learned after every exercise, seldom do diplomats consider
why their strategy toward rogues have failed, and whether base assumptions
about how they conduct talks might be to blame.
Indeed,
rogue regimes have one thing in common—they pretend to be aggrieved in order to
put Western diplomats on the defense. Whether in Pyongyang, Tehran, or
Islamabad, rogue leaders understand that the West rewards bluster with
incentives, and that for the State Department process can mean more than
results.
- “The Other War: Winning and Losing in Afghanistan”, Amb. Ron Neumann (Ret.), 2013.
As
the bloodshed in Iraq intensified in 2005, Afghanistan quickly faded from the
nation’s front pages to become the “other war,” supposedly going well and
largely ignored. In fact, the insurgency in Afghanistan was about to break out
with renewed force, the drug problem was worsening, and international
coordination was losing focus. That July, Ronald Neumann arrived in Kabul from
Baghdad as the U.S. ambassador, bringing the experience of a career diplomat
whose professional lifetime had been spent in the greater Middle East,
beginning thirty-eight years earlier in the same country in which it
ended—Afghanistan.
Neumann’s
account of how the war in Afghanistan unfolded over the next two years is rich
with heretofore unexamined details of operations, tensions, and policy
decisions. He demonstrates why the United States was slow to recognize the
challenge it faced and why it failed to make the requisite commitment of
economic, military, and civilian resources. His account provides a new
understanding of the problems of alliance warfare in conducting simultaneous
nation building and counterinsurgency. Honest in recounting failures as well as
successes, the book is must reading as much for students of international
affairs who want to understand the reality of diplomatic policymaking and
implementation in the field as for those who want to understand the nation’s
complex “other war.”
- “The Secret Behind Iraq’s Scientific Resurgence”, Wired, October 2013.
Ten
years ago, the Iraqi scientific establishment was in trouble. Political and
military convulsions following the American invasion made it difficult to maintain
routinized studies critical for robust research. Iraqi scientists were unable
to engage with their peers, and the annual national output of peer-reviewed
publications dipped into the double digits. Mesopotamia, a region so integral
to the rise of human culture, was essentially sidelined from modern science.
Today,
there is a sense of renewed progress. Systematic structural challenges remain,
to be sure (unplanned power outages can interrupt code or ruin biological
samples, for example), but the momentum is tangible – publications have more
than tripled in the intervening decade, with no sign of letting up.
- “Iraq's South Rises Again”, National Interest, October 2013.
With
some exceptions, most Iraq news these days is tucked away in the middle of your
daily paper. The postscript to these stories may add that the situation has
gone from bad to worse since the U.S. withdrawal. Remember “the surge,” anyone?
Maliki
has managed to co-opt the few and isolate the many, while north to south Sunnis
and Shias protest over any number of issues. If the protesters were united that
might be positive but mostly they are not, and Al Qaeda is thriving. The news
seems so grim that Americans might just want to move on and forget it
altogether.
Indirectly,
Iraq still looms large in the news, as it struggles to escape the Syrian conflict
and push forward its energy boom, it may well be the most strategically
important country in the Middle East, as Gen. James Jones recently remarked.
The EU are waking up to this, but it has taken a ferocious alliance of Syrian
and Iraqi Al Qaeda fighters to spur the United States into action.
- “Afghanistan Index", Brookings Institution, November 2013.
The
Afghanistan Index is a statistical compilation of economic, public opinion and
security data. This resource will provide updated and historical information on
various data, including crime, infrastructure, casualties, unemployment, Afghan
security forces and coalition troop strength. It will be updated every two
weeks.
The
index is designed to assemble the best possible quantitative indicators of the
international community’s counterinsurgency and nation-building efforts in
Afghanistan, to track them over time, and to offer an objective set of criteria
for benchmarking performance. It serves as an in-depth, non-partisan assessment
of American and international efforts in Afghanistan, and is based primarily on
U.S. government, Afghan government and NATO data. Although measurements of
progress in any nation-building effort can never be reduced to purely
quantitative data, a comprehensive compilation of such information can provide
a clearer picture and contribute to a healthier and better informed debate.
- “We Are The Not Dead”, MyModernMet.com, November 2013.
Photographer
Lalage Snow, who is currently based in Kabul, Afghanistan, embarked on an
8-month-long project titled We Are The Not Dead featuring portraits of British
soldiers before, during, and after their deployment in Afghanistan. Similar to
Claire Felicie's series of monochromatic triptychs, Snow captures the innocent
expressions of these men transformed into gaunt, sullen faces in less than a
year.
The
three-panel juxtaposition allows the viewer to observe the physical changes a
stationed soldier in a war zone goes through. Time is sped up for these men
under the beating sun, amidst combat. Regardless of age, the boys that went in
came back as men with experiences beyond their years. As weathered and worn as
their skin or sunken in faces may appear, it's their dilated eyes that are the
most telling.
- Alliance in Support of the Afghan People (ASAP)
The
Alliance in Support of the Afghan People (ASAP) is a coalition dedicated to
preserving and protecting progress made by the Afghan people over the last 12
years. We seek to amplify Afghan civil
society voices in policy discussions and support their aspirations for further
political and economic development and the protection of basic human rights.
The
ongoing transition process and military drawdown will determine the country’s
future and shape regional security conditions. Despite formidable obstacles, a
critical opportunity exists to protect and sustain the progress and investments
of the last decade for all Afghans, particularly women and youth. With only a
small number of international forces in a training and deterrence capacity,
Afghanistan’s international partners should prioritize support for a rights
respecting Afghan National Security Force, strengthening the economy,
reinforcing democratic processes and educating Afghanistan’s next generations.
Upcoming elections in 2014 and 2015 pose a vital challenge and a great
opportunity for continued progress in Afghanistan.
- “Why Karzai Doesn't Trust America”, National Interest, October 2013
For
the moment at least, Secretary of State John F. Kerry appears to have patched
up the fraying relationship between the U.S. and Afghan governments that just
two weeks ago appeared to be at the point of rupture. Flying into Kabul on a
previously unannounced visit and engaging in what the New York Times describes
as “nearly 24 hours of talks and meetings” with Afghan President Hamid Karzai,
Kerry revived the floundering negotiations for a bilateral security agreement
that will provide for a limited but long-term U.S. military presence in
Afghanistan following the end of the NATO combat mission in December 2014.
The
security pact, which must be reviewed by a loya jirga (an assembly of some
3,000 Afghan tribal elders) and then approved by parliament, could even now
unravel over the still-unresolved issue of whether remaining U.S. troops will
enjoy the airtight legal protections that Washington is insisting on. But if
the agreement holds, it would represent a striking feat for Mr. Kerry, who is
rapidly emerging as a more consequential figure than his predecessor.
It
also promises to bring some stability to a wartime alliance that has long
pulsed with mistrust and suspicion. The acrimony regularly leads Karzai, once
seen as America’s hand-picked partner in Kabul, to denounce the Western
military presence in Afghanistan as a foreign occupation. Three years ago, he
accused the West of meddling in the country’s internal affairs and bizarrely
threatened to join forces with the Taliban forces that NATO and his regime were
supposedly united in opposing. That particular outburst caused the White House
to warn that it was thinking of retracting Karzai’s invitation to meet Mr.
Obama in Washington.
- “Hero Afghan interpreter finally arrives in US after long visa battle”, FoxNews.com, October 2013.
The
Afghan interpreter who saved the life of an Army intelligence officer and
became a target of the Taliban for his trouble has finally arrived in the U.S.
to start a new life, after a long battle to win a special visa.
Janis
Shinwari arrived at Reagan National Airport in Washington late Tuesday night,
where he was heartily greeted by Matthew Zeller, the Army soldier who says he
owes his life to Shinwari. Zeller campaigned tirelessly for a special visa
reserved for translators who put their lives on the line for U.S. military
personnel. The visa was finally approved last month, but then mysteriously
pulled, according to Zeller.
Shinwari,
36, told FoxNews.com he, his wife and their two children are eager to start a
new life in the U.S., especially after Shinwari spent the last several months
in hiding after he became known for helping the U.S. military.
- “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy”, Congressional Research Service, October 2013.
The
United States and its partner countries are reducing military involvement in
Afghanistan as Afghan security forces assume lead security responsibility
throughout the country. The current international security mission will
terminate at the end of 2014 and likely transition to a far smaller mission
consisting mostly of training and mentoring the Afghanistan National Security Forces
(ANSF). The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000
in June 2011, was reduced to a “pre-surge” level of about 66,000 in September
2012, and is currently about 52,000. That number will fall to 34,000 by
February 2014. The size of the “residual force” that will likely remain in
Afghanistan after 2014 might be announced later in 2013, with options centering
on about 8,000-12,000 U.S. trainers and counterterrorism forces, assisted by
about 5,000 partner forces performing similar missions. The U.S. troops that
remain after 2014 would do so under a U.S.-Afghanistan security agreement that
is under negotiation. Fearing instability after 2014, some ethnic and political
faction leaders are reviving their militia forces should the international
drawdown lead to a major Taliban push to retake power.
The
Administration remains concerned that Afghan stability after 2014 is at risk
from weak and corrupt Afghan governance and insurgent safe havens in Pakistan.
Among efforts to promote effective and transparent Afghan governance, U.S. officials
are attempting to ensure that the next presidential election, scheduled for
April 5, 2014, will be devoid of the fraud that plagued Afghanistan’s elections
in 2009 and 2010. Other U.S. and partner country anti-corruption efforts in
Afghanistan have yielded few concrete results. An unexpected potential benefit
to stability could come from a negotiated settlement between the Afghan
government and the Taliban and other insurgent groups. Negotiations have been
sporadic, but U.S.-Taliban discussions that were expected to begin after the
Taliban opened a political office in Qatar in June 2013 did not materialize.
Afghanistan’s minorities and women’s groups fear that a settlement might
produce compromises with the Taliban that erode human rights and ethnic power-sharing.
- “The Double-Dealing Middle East Is Double-Dealt”, Victor David Hanson, November 2013.
In
sum, the American people think the Middle East is, well, the Middle East:
support democracy and we are derided as cultural chauvinists, Western
interventionists, and clueless about the nuances of Arab culture. Support the
existing status quo, and we care only about oil, not the masses, and geopolitics
rather than democratic reform. Stay out entirely and we have abdicated moral
responsibility. Intervene and we are “nation-building” in the old colonial
fashion.
- “Ending the U.S. War in Iraq”, Rand Corporation, 2013.
Over
the course of the U.S. engagement in Iraq, the U.S. military managed hundreds
of bases and facilities and used millions of pieces of equipment. The military
was not only involved with security-related activities but also assisted in
political and economic functions the host nation government or other U.S.
departments would normally perform. A 2010 assessment identified that
responsibility for 431 activities would need to be handed off to the government
of Iraq, the U.S. embassy, U.S. Central Command, or other U.S. government
departments. Ending the U.S. war in Iraq would also require redeploying over
100,000 military and civilian personnel and moving or transferring ownership of
over a million pieces of property, including facilities, in accordance with
U.S. and Iraqi laws, national policy, and DoD requirements. This book looks at
the planning and execution of this transition, using information gathered from
historical documents and interviews with key players. It examines efforts to
help Iraq build the capacity necessary to manage its own security absent a U.S.
military presence. It also looks at the complications that arose from
uncertainty over just how much of a presence the United States would continue
to have beyond 2011 and how various post-transition objectives would be
advanced. The authors also examine efforts to create an embassy intended to
survive in a hostile environment by being entirely self-sufficient, performing
missions the military previously performed. The authors draw lessons from these
events that can help plan for ending future wars.
- “Should Iraq's Jewish Archives Stay in U.S.?”, Forward.com, November 2013.
Washington
— At the National Archives in Washington, the story of Iraq’s ancient Jewish
community has just gone on display, presented via a priceless collection of
artifacts and documents recovered during America’s 2003 invasion of Iraq. But
behind the scenes, a battle reaching to the highest levels of government is
taking place over the future of those same documents and artifacts.
“Discovery
and Recovery: Preserving Iraqi Jewish Heritage” is the subject of a vigorous
campaign launched by Iraqi Jewish activists, Jewish communal leaders and
members of Congress trying to convince the government of the United States to back
out of an agreement it signed with the Iraqi government, promising to return
these objects after the exhibit ends.
At
issue is not just the fate of the religious artifacts and community documents,
which were forcefully seized by the regime of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein
before American GIs ever arrived. With these items, surviving members of Iraq’s
once thriving but now extinct Jewish community are also seeking to win
recognition from the world for their story, a story they believe other Jews
take for granted.
- “In Afghanistan, interpreters who helped U.S. in war denied visas; U.S. says they face no threat”, WashingtonPost.com, November 2013.
KABUL
— A growing number of Afghan interpreters who worked alongside American troops
are being denied U.S. visas allotted by Congress because the State Department
says there is no serious threat against their lives.
But
the interpreters, many of whom served in Taliban havens for years, say U.S.
officials are drastically underestimating the danger they face. Immigration
lawyers and Afghan interpreters say the denials are occurring just as concerns
about Taliban retribution are mounting because of the ongoing withdrawal of
U.S. forces.
“There
are tons of Talibs in my village, and they all know that I worked with the
Americans,” said one interpreter, Mohammad, who asked that his last name not be
published for security reasons. “If I can’t go to the States, my life is over.
I swear to God, one day the Taliban will catch me.”
Mohammad
received a U.S. form letter saying he had failed to establish that there was a
“serious threat” to his life. He had explained in his application that the
Taliban had spotted him on the job and had spread word in his village that he
was a wanted man.
- Nowzad Dogs
The
aim of the charity is to improve the welfare of the animals of Afghanistan;
which includes humanely reducing the stray dog population which in turn will
reduce the incidents of canine rabies, provide animal welfare education for the
Afghan people and develop training programmes to improve the lives of working
animals. We have also now helped over 550 soldiers serving in Afghanistan to be
reunited back in their home countries (USA, UK, Italy, South Africa, Australia
and Germany) with the dogs or cats they rescued from the front lines of
Afghanistan. - See more at: http://www.nowzad.com/about/our-mission-in-afghanistan/#sthash.i95CIWpj.dpuf
- “Afghanistan: Politics, Elections, and Government Performance”, Congressional Research Service, November 2013.
The
capacity, transparency, and legitimacy of Afghan governance are considered
crucial to Afghan stability after U.S.-led NATO forces turn over the security
mission to Afghan leadership by the end of 2014. The size and capability of the
Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime
fell in late 2001, but the government remains weak and rampant with corruption.
Even as the government has struggled to widen its writ, President Hamid Karzai
has concentrated substantial presidential authority through his powers of appointment
at all levels. But, he is constitutionally term-limited; presidential and
provincial elections are scheduled for April 5, 2014, and Afghanistan is
beginning to transition from the Karzai era. Several major figures—some close
to Karzai and others opposed—have registered to run for president; many of
their slates include faction leaders long accused of human rights abuses. Some
candidates are concerned that Karzai will use state machinery to favor a
particular candidate. Fraud in two successive elections (for president in 2009
and parliament in 2010) was extensively documented, but Afghan officials,
scrutinized by opposition ties, civil society organizations, and key donor
countries, have taken some steps to limit the potential for fraud in the April
2014 elections.
Fears
about the election process are fanned by the scant progress in reducing
widespread nepotism
and other forms of corruption. President Karzai has accepted U.S. help to build emerging
anti-corruption institutions, but these same bodies have faltered from lack of
support from senior Afghan government leaders who oppose prosecuting their
political allies. At a donors’ conference in Tokyo on July 8, 2012, donors
pledged to aid Afghanistan’s economy through at least 2017, on the condition
that Afghanistan takes concrete, verifiable action to rein in corruption.
Afghan progress on that issue was assessed relatively unfavorably at the end of
a Tokyo process review meeting in Kabul attended by major donors on July 3,
2013.
- “The Dogs Are Eating Them Now – Our War in Afghanistan”, Graeme Smith, 2013, “We lost the war in southern Afghanistan and it broke my heart.” So begins Graeme Smith’s The Dogs Are Eating Them Now, and like all heartbreaks, this one happened despite the best intentions. Smith devoted more time to southern Afghanistan than any other Western journalist between 2005 and 2011, and his book offers a candid and critical look at the Taliban’s rising influence and the West’s continued miscalculations.
Smith was not simply
embedded with the military: he operated independently and at great personal
risk to report from inside the war, and the heroes of his story are the
translators, guides, and ordinary citizens who helped him find the truth. They
revealed sad, absurd, touching stories that provide the key to understanding
why the mission failed to deliver peace and democracy.
- “Development Assistance in Afghanistan after 2014: from the Military Exit Strategy to a Civilian Entry Strategy”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, December 2013.
After the departure of
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), delivering development
assistance in Afghanistan can return to common practices and procedures used in
other insecure areas such as Somalia and Sudan (and already in areas of
Afghanistan). This means that the international community must develop a
civilian entry strategy and communicate to the Afghan population that civilian
entry, not military exit, is its strategy for the future.
Donors should ignore
the current commitment to channel 50 per cent of assistance through the central
government budget. Instead, in each sector (e.g. health care, education,
security) an effective division of labour must be established between the
central and provincial governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and
the private sector. Involving NGOs, the private sector and the local population
in the delivery of basic services does not have to be at the expense of
government control or legitimacy. International aid donors need to pay further
attention to security and rule of law. But alternatives to the current
strategy, which is often perceived as being militarized and short-term, have to
be found. It is often more effective to integrate these issues into broader
development programmes. http://books.sipri.org/files/insight/SIPRIInsight1304.pdf
- “Trans-Regional Web Initiative” Sources Sought
- Military Information Support Operations – Improved Coordination, Evaluations, and Training and Equipping Are Needed, Government Accountability Office, April 2013
- Extractive Industries and Peacebuilding in Afghanistan: The Role of Social Accountability, United States Institute of Peace, November 2013.
Recent
estimates of deposits in Afghanistan indicate that mineral extraction could
contribute to the economic growth the country needs to sustain its efforts in
peacebuilding and development after 2014. This report argues that integrating social
accountability measures into governance of the extractive industry can help
alleviate violent conflict by ensuring a more equitable distribution of the
benefits as well as facilitate greater confidence in the state and a molding of
the social contract. The U.S. Institute of Peace is working with Integrity Watch
Afghanistan in testing some of the concepts
in this report through a project to help support social accountability in
Afghanistan’s mining sector.
