- “19 true things generals can't say in public about the Afghan war: A helpful primer.” Foreign Policy, August 2013.
As
a public service, Best Defense is offering this primer for generals on their
way to Afghanistan.
Here
is a list of 19 things that many insiders and veterans of Afghanistan agree to
be true about the war there, but that generals can't say in public. So,
general, read this now and believe it later-but keep your lip zipped. Maybe
even keep a printout in your wallet and review before interviews.
- “At great risk, they helped The Post cover Iraq. Now, they’re remaking their lives in America”, Washington Post, July 2013.
Two
hours into the celebration, after the children had finished scurrying about the
garden, the adults had gossiped under the portico and everyone had indulged in
a buffet of hummus and kebabs, Washington Post photographer Bill O’Leary
clambered onto the roof of the villa serving as The Post’s bureau in Baghdad.
“Let’s
take a group photo,” he beckoned.
And
so they gathered. The interpreters, drivers and guards. Their wives. Their sons
and daughters. Sixty-eight in all, standing between two palm trees under a gray
autumn sky.
It
was 2003. U.S. troops had entered Baghdad that April, and although Saddam
Hussein was no longer in power, the Americans had not yet delivered upon grand
promises to rebuild the nation. Most in O’Leary’s frame had no electricity at
home. Looters roamed their streets. Many had not been to a party in years —
they hadn’t had the means to entertain while Iraq’s economy was smothered by a
trade embargo.
But
as the shutter clicked, they smiled. Some thought back to their carefree
childhoods, before years of war and suffocating sanctions. Others allowed their
minds to wander ahead. The day’s gaiety seemed a harbinger of more joyous
times.
After
the photo session, the youngsters resumed playing table tennis and bouncing
balloons into the air. “They are so lucky,” one of the drivers declared. “They
will get to grow up in an Iraq free of war.”
- “Get the Data: The Pakistan government’s secret document”, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, July 2013.
The
Bureau is publishing in full a leaked internal document – titled Details of
Attacks by NATO Forces/Predators in FATA - which contains the Pakistan
government’s own estimates of how many people have died in specific CIA drone
strikes.
The
summary report – obtained from three independent sources – covers the period
January 13 2006 to October 24 2009.
Drawn
from field reports by local officials in Pakistan’s Federally Administered
Tribal Areas, the document lists over 70 drone strikes between 2006 and late
2009, alongside a small number of other incidents such as alleged Nato attacks
and strikes by unspecified forces.
Of
746 people listed as killed in the drone strikes, at least 147 of the dead are
clearly stated by the leaked report to be civilian victims. Some 94 of these
are said to be children.
Some
CIA strikes are missing from the document. None of the five reported strikes
for 2007 are listed, for example. Also missing are any biographical details of
those killed, although the genders of many victims are reported and – where
known – whether any children died.
The
document also fails to mention details of a number of senior militant
commanders known to have died in the attacks.
The
Bureau believes there is a strong public interest value in publishing the
report in full. A number of small distinguishing marks have been removed –
otherwise the document is presented as-is.
- “How to Save the War in Afghanistan,” Real Clear World, July 2013.
The
U.S. is slowly and steadily losing the war in Afghanistan. It is not losing the
war at the military level - although such defeat is possible in coming years if
the U.S. does not provide the necessary funds, advisors, and partners. The U.S.
is losing the war at the political level by failing to win (and merit) the
support of the Congress, the American people, its allies, and the Afghans.
At
one level, the U.S. is losing the war through a failure to provide credible
leadership. It is losing the war through a combination of a lack of strategic
realism, meaningful judgments about the cost-benefits of continuing the war,
and a failure to develop credible plans. At another level, the U.S. is losing
the war through delays, neglect, and a failure to lead at the top levels of the
Obama Administration.
The
Obama Administration does, however, face critical problems in providing
effective leadership. It inherited a massive and unnecessary mess from the Bush
Administration. It also inherited a major recession, and a crisis in federal
spending that now forces major cuts in U.S. military capability and hard
choices in terms of strategic priorities. The Congress has contributed to its
own failures on a bipartisan basis. Rather than demand effective plans,
accountability, and measures of effectiveness, it has simply accepted most
funding requests in an effort to show it has supported the troops and the war.
- “Pakistan: A History of Violence”, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, July 2013.
The
Pakistan Religious Violence Project, an undertaking of the U.S. Commission on
International Religious Freedom, tracked over the past 18 months
publicly-reported attacks against religious communities in Pakistan. The
findings are sobering: 203 incidents of sectarian violence resulting in more
than 1,800 casualties, including over 700 deaths. The Shi’a community bore the
brunt of attacks from militants and terrorist organizations, with some of the
deadliest attacks occurring during holy months and pilgrimages.
While
Shi’a are more at risk of becoming victims of suicide bombings and targeted
shootings, the already poor religious freedom environment for Christians,
Ahmadis, and Hindus continued to deteriorate, with a number violent incidents
occurring against members of these communities.
The
information the Project gathered is based on reports and news articles
available in the public domain. The Project seeks to be inclusive, tracking all
reported incidents involving physical attacks targeting a member of a religious
community or a major religious gathering place (church, shrine, or mosque).
However, it is not exhaustive and some acts of violence are certain to have
been overlooked. While each incident has not been independently verified, the
accompanying Factsheet provides a hyperlink to the supporting documents.
The
Project’s findings paint a grim and challenging picture for the new government
of Prime Minister Newaz Sharif…
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress” Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, July 2013.
- “Report
on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan [‘1230
Report’]”,
U.S. Department of Defense, July 2013.
- “How to Read Afghanistan”, The New York Times, August 2013.
On
a sunny, crisp November day in 2008, three American civilians joined a platoon
of United States soldiers on a foot patrol in Maiwand District, a flat, yellow
patch of earth crowned by black-rock mountains in southern Afghanistan. The
civilians were part of the Human Terrain System, an ambitious, troubled Army
program that sends social scientists into conflict zones to help soldiers
understand local culture, politics and economics.
That
day, the team planned to interview shoppers coming and going from a nearby
bazaar. Afghans had complained about the high price of flour, so the Human
Terrain Team members were creating a consumer price index. They also wanted to
find out whether Afghan officials were asking shopkeepers for bribes, and how
merchants protected themselves and their goods in a place where insurgents and
local security forces threatened civilians in equal measure.
The
team’s social scientist that day was Paula Loyd, a 36-year-old Wellesley
graduate and Army veteran with degrees in anthropology and diplomacy and years
of experience as a development worker in Afghanistan. Through her interpreter,
she struck up a conversation with an Afghan man who was carrying a jug of fuel,
asking how much he had paid for it. They talked genially until her interpreter
was called away. Suddenly, the man doused Ms. Loyd with gas from his jug and
lit her on fire.
- “Status of Developing Afghan Governance and Lessons for Future Endeavors”, International Journal of Security and Development, May 2013.
Building
the capacity of and reforming Afghan governance is widely viewed as the key to
success in Afghanistan. Assessing progress, however, is hampered by limited
data outside the Afghan security ministries – the Ministries of Defense and
Interior – and by the lack of a common definition of governance. Available
reporting suggests building governance capacity is far from complete. Varying
definitions of governance, coupled with the use of the term by numerous organizations
without defining it, results in addressing too broad a range of issues. It
would be more useful to concentrate on the core of governance – providing the
services the Afghan government has committed to provide to its citizens. This,
in turn, requires that Afghan ministries have the functional capacity to carry
out their responsibilities, including financial management, budget formulation
and execution, policy and strategic planning, and service delivery. However,
time is growing short. The Afghan experience provides some important lessons
that could guide future endeavors for the international community. First, this
paper discusses progress in building ministerial capacity. Second, it discusses
recent efforts to link continued financial assistance to Afghanistan with
improved governance. Third, it describes how the lack of a commonly accepted
definition of governance complicates assessing progress. Finally, it offers
conclusions and observations about the failure to establish an autonomous Afghan
governance capacity.
For
more than a decade, improving governance has been recognized as the most
difficult and critical challenge involving Afghan reconstruction. The Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reports that U.S. policymakers
have consistently identified building the capacity of and reforming Afghan
governance as the key to success in Afghanistan (SIGAR 2012, 22).
10. The
Middle East, explained in one (sort of terrifying) chart”, Washington Post, August
2013.
11. “Iraq: Politics, Governance, and Human Rights”,
Congressional Research Service, August
2013.
12.
“A Death in the Family,” Foreign Policy, September 2013.
On
Aug. 15, the U.S. Agency for International Development announced that one of
its employees had died suddenly. The agency didn't mention that Michael C.
Dempsey, a senior field program officer assigned as the leader of a civilian
assistance team in eastern Afghanistan, killed himself four days earlier while
home on extended medical leave. However, the medical examiner in Kent County,
Michigan, confirmed to Foreign Policy that Dempsey had committed suicide by
hanging himself in a hotel-room shower. His death is USAID's first known
suicide in a decade of work in the war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq. And what
makes the suicide particularly striking is that it came a year and three days
after Dempsey's close friend and colleague was killed in an
improvised-explosive-device attack in Afghanistan.
After
a decade of development and reconstruction work in two of the world's hottest
war zones, USAID now has hundreds of Foreign Service officers who are
potentially at risk for post-traumatic mental-health issues. While an enormous
amount of resources and attention has been paid to military suicides,
comparatively little focus has been given to civilians' struggles. And it's a
sign that it's not only members of the armed services who shoulder the
emotional burdens of war.
13.
“War in Afghanistan: Campaign Progress, Political Strategy, and Issues for
Congress”, U.S. Congressional Research Service, August 2013.
This
is a critical time for U.S. efforts in the war in Afghanistan. In his 2013
State of the Union address, President Obama announced that the U.S. troop
presence in Afghanistan would draw down by an additional 34,000 troops, to
about 33,000, by February 2014, and that by the end of 2014 “our war in
Afghanistan will be over.” Further decision-making regarding the U.S. force presence
in Afghanistan, including after the end of NATO’s International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) mission at the end of 2014, is expected later this year. Yet while
troop levels tend to steal the headlines, far more fundamentally at stake is
what it would take to ensure the long-term protection of U.S. interests in
Afghanistan and the region.
Arguably,
the United States may have a number of different interests at stake in the
region: countering al Qaeda and other violent extremists; preventing nuclear
proliferation; preventing nuclear confrontation between nuclear-armed states;
standing up for American values, including basic human rights and the
protection of women; and preserving the United States’ ability to exercise
leadership on the world stage. At issue is the relative priority of these
interests, what it would take in practice to ensure that they are protected,
and their relative importance compared to other compelling security concerns
around the globe.
14.
The Bravest Girls in the World: The Afghan Women's Writing Project, October
2013.
15.
“Watching the Middle East Implode”, Hoover Institution, September 2013.
Only
when we recognize the fundamental role Islam plays in the region can we begin
to craft sensible policies that put U.S. interests first.
The
revolutions against dictators in the Middle East dubbed the Arab Spring have
degenerated into a complex, bloody mélange of coups and counter-coups, as have
happened in Egypt; vicious civil wars, like the current conflict in Syria; a
resurgence of jihadists gaining footholds in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the
Sinai; and a shifting and fracturing of alliances and enmities of the sort
throwing Lebanon and Jordan into turmoil. Meanwhile, American foreign policy
has been confused, incompetent, and feckless in insuring that the security and
interests of the United States and its allies are protected.
A
major reason for our foreign policy failures in the region is our inability to
take into account the intricate diversity of ideological, political, and
especially theological motives driving events. Just within the Islamist
outfits, Sunni and Shia groups are at odds—and this isn’t to mention the many
bitter divisions within Sunni and Shia groups. Add the other players in the
Middle East––military dictators, secular democrats, leftover communists, and
nationalists of various stripes––and the whole region seems embroiled in
endlessly complex divisions.
16.
“The
United States’ disservice to Afghan translators”, The Washington Post,
September 2013.
Four
years ago, a bleeding Afghan interpreter, Fazel, staggered out of an ambush in
Ganjigal Valley in eastern Afghanistan. Trapped inside the valley were four
Americans. Asked to help rescue them, he said, “I have a wife and baby. But I
will go back.” Fazel returned to the battle, killed several Taliban fighters
and carried out the bodies of the fallen Americans.
Since
that fight, the Taliban has been determined to kill Fazel, who has served with
U.S. units for five years and has received 15 certificates and letters of
commendation attesting to his work record. Shortly after the ambush, Fazel
applied for a visa to the United States.
Since
he applied, the State Department has issued almost 2 million visas to
immigrants. The visa section at State was repeatedly informed that the Taliban
was hunting Fazel. But for four years, there was no movement. Last month, Fox
News reported the neglect, and Gen. Joseph Dunford, the senior commander in Afghanistan,
insisted that Fazel receive a visa “as soon as possible.” A few days ago, an
overjoyed Fazel got his visa.
On
the one hand, this is a happy ending to a nearly five-year odyssey. But it is
depressing that a four-star general had to personally intervene to resolve the
case of someone clearly loyal to the United States. Fazel risked the lives of
his family because, in his mind, he was an American, fighting alongside his
fellow grunts. Ask any company commander returning from Afghanistan, and he can
tell you about another Fazel, equally deserving of a visa.
17. “Has America Abandoned an Afghan
Interpreter?”, The New Yorker, September 2013.
18. “Analysis: Land disputes add to
Afghanistan’s security woes”, IRIN, September 2013.
KUNDUZ, 10 September 2013 (IRIN) - Fifty
years ago, Dost Mohammad's grandfather had 1,000 sheep grazing on the family's
plot of land on the outskirts of Kunduz City, Afghanistan. The family's
livestock numbers have since decreased significantly, but then, so has the size
of their land.
“We keep getting pushed further and
further back,” said Mohammad. “We're also having problems bringing our sheep to
Badakshan. We will be killed today if we bring our sheep there.”
Over the past 10 years, land disputes
across the country have become increasingly common, reflecting long-term
trends, like environmental degradation, increasing competition over land in
both rural and urban areas, a high population growth rate, and the 4.6 million
former refugees who have returned from neighbouring countries in the past
decade. Presidential elections, to be held in 2014, are also worsening
tensions.
There has been little success in resolving the
issues or improving the land system. Analysts warn the number of disputes is
likely to grow.
19. “You don’t need to love us’: Civil-Military
Relations in Afghanistan, 2002–13”, ReliefWeb, August 2013.
The belief that development and reconstruction
activities are central to stability and security is by no means novel. The need
for ‘integrated’ approaches or ‘coherence’ in post-conflict environments had
been largely acknowledged by humanitarian and military actors alike,
particularly in the aftermath of Rwanda and other humanitarian crises of the
1990s (Collinson and Elhawary 2012). However, ‘stabilisation’ in foreign
policy, military strategy, and development aid assumed significantly greater
prominence after the events of 9/11. Such approaches were highly contentious,
perhaps nowhere more so than in Afghanistan where troop contributing nations
(TCNs) to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) sought to utilise
development and reconstruction activities to undermine the Taliban and enhance
the legitimacy of the Afghan government. The stabilisation approaches employed
by international forces and their governments in Afghanistan have become a
model for many Western countries and for NATO, yet aid agencies’ experiences in
dialogue with these forces and in the context of stabilisation have often been
deeply negative, affecting the way they operate and interact with military
forces globally.
