- “Pakistani Disapproval of U.S. Leadership Soars In 2012”, Gallup, February 2013.
WASHINGTON,
D.C. -- With President Barack Obama's first term characterized by strained
relations between Pakistan and the U.S., more than nine in 10 Pakistanis (92%)
disapprove of U.S. leadership and 4% approve, the lowest approval rating
Pakistanis have ever given.
Pakistanis'
approval of the leadership of their ostensible ally, the United States, has
historically been quite low. However, perceptions began to change, albeit modestly,
through much of Obama's first term. As recently as May 2011, 27% of Pakistanis
approved of U.S. leadership, the apex of support. Noticeably, approval declined
after the May 2011 killing of Osama bin Laden, carried out by the U.S. military
without the assistance of the Pakistani military -- an event that many
Pakistanis viewed as a blatant disregard for Pakistani sovereignty.
These findings are based on a survey conducted
from Sept. 30-Oct. 16, 2012, in Pakistan. The survey directly followed massive
demonstrations against the release of an anti-Muslim film made in the U.S.
- “Over $8B of the Money You Spent Rebuilding Iraq Was Wasted Outright,” Wired, March 2013.
The
legacy of all the money the U.S. wasted in Iraq might be summed up with a
single quote. “$55 billion could have brought great change in Iraq,” Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki recently told the U.S.’s Iraq auditor. In fact, the
U.S. spent $60 billion in its botched and often fraudulent efforts to rebuild
the country it invaded, occupied and recast in its image.
With
the 10-year anniversary of the Iraq invasion looming, Stuart Bowen, the Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, considers $8 billion of that money
wasted outright. And that’s a “conservative” estimate, Bowen tells Danger Room.
- “Learning From Iraq A Final Report From the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction,” SIGIR, March 2013.
A
final report from the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
culminates SIGIR's nine-year mission overseeing Iraq's reconstruction. It
serves as a follow-up to our previous comprehensive review of the rebuilding
effort, Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience.
This
study provides much more than a recapitulation of what the reconstruction
program accomplished and what my office found in the interstices. While
examining both of these issues and many more, Learning From Iraq importantly
captures the effects of the rebuilding program as derived from 44 interviews
with the recipients (the Iraqi leadership), the executors (U.S. senior
leaders), and the providers (congressional members). These interviews piece
together an instructive picture of what was the largest stabilization and
reconstruction operation ever undertaken by the United States (until recently overtaken
by Afghanistan).
The
body of this report reveals countless details about the use of more than $60
billion in taxpayer dollars to support programs and projects in Iraq. It
articulates numerous lessons derived from SIGIR's 220 audits and 170 inspections,
and it lists the varying consequences meted out from the 82 convictions
achieved through our investigations. It urges and substantiates necessary
reforms that could improve stabilization and reconstruction operations, and it
highlights the financial benefits accomplished by SIGIR's work: more than $1.61
billion from audits and over $191 million from investigations.
- “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, March 2013.
The
United States and its partner countries are reducing military involvement in
Afghanistan in preparation to end the current international security mission by
the end of 2014. As agreed by President Obama and Afghan President Karzai, and
announced January 11, 2013, Afghan forces will assume the security lead
nationwide in the spring of 2013 and U.S. forces will move to a support role.
The number of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, which peaked at about 100,000 in June
2011, has been reduced to a “pre-surge” level of 66,000 as of September 20,
2012. President Obama announced that 34,000 of the contingent will leave by
February 2014. The size of the U.S. force that will remain in Afghanistan after
2014 is under discussion between the United States, its allies,
and the Afghan government, and reportedly center on about 8,000-12,000 U.S.
forces, plus about 4,000 partner forces. U.S. troops that remain after 2014
would do so under a U.S.-Afghanistan security agreement that is under
negotiation pursuant to a May 1, 2012, U.S.-Afghan Strategic Partnership
Agreement. The forces would reportedly engage in counter-terrorism missions as
well as train the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). Still, fearing
instability after 2014, some key ethnic and political faction leaders are
preparing to revive their militia forces should the international drawdown lead
to a major Taliban push to retake power.
- “Breaking Up Is Not Hard to Do - Why the U.S.-Pakistani Alliance Isn't Worth the Trouble,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2013.
Instead
of continuing their endless battling, the United States and Pakistan should
acknowledge that their interests simply do not converge enough to make them
strong partners. Giving up the fiction of an alliance would free up Washington
to explore new ways of achieving its goals in South Asia. And it would allow
Islamabad to finally pursue its regional ambitions -- which would either
succeed once and for all or, more likely, teach Pakistani officials the
limitations of their country's power.
- Joint Subcommittee Hearing: After the Withdrawal: The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Part I) http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/joint-subcommittee-hearing-after-withdrawal-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan-part-i
- “U.S. Builds Afghan Air Base, but Where Are the Planes?,” Wall Street Journal, March 2013.
The Afghans won't get the planes on time. The
Air Force initially awarded a contract to a U.S. company to supply
Brazilian-designed planes. But it canceled the contract after a Kansas-based
plane maker filed suit to block it, and the Air Force decided the contract had
insufficient documentation. The Kansas congressional delegation also lobbied
hard against the Brazilian plane. The Air Force has started the bidding process
again, and a new contract likely won't be awarded until next year.
The Afghans won't get
the planes on time. The Air Force initially awarded a contract to a U.S.
company to supply Brazilian-designed planes. But it canceled the contract after
a Kansas-based plane maker filed suit to block it, and the Air Force decided
the contract had insufficient documentation. The Kansas congressional
delegation also lobbied hard against the Brazilian plane. The Air Force has
started the bidding process again, and a new contract likely won't be awarded
until next year.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303292204577517010230335018.html#articleTabs%3Darticle
- “U.S. Military Neglects Huge Data Trove of Iraq War: The Iraqis Themselves,” Wired, March 2013.
More
than the U.S. military ever knew, the Sunni tribes in Iraq prevented America’s
long, searing occupation from descending into an even bigger fiasco than it
was. That’s just one lesson the U.S. is missing by not taking advantage of the
biggest data trove of the war: the accounts of Iraqis who lived through it.
In
the popular American conception of the Iraq war, the tribes didn’t play a
significant role in the war until around 2006, when they abruptly defected from
the Sunni insurgency to stand with U.S. forces during the surge. The brutality
of al-Qaida in Iraq — who would punish the ostensible sin of cigarette smoking
by chopping off the fingers of the Sunnis they claimed to protect — compelled
one of the most momentous strategic shifts of the war.
That
is nowhere near the complete truth, according to Najim Abed al-Jabouri. Jabouri
was a two-star general in Saddam Hussein’s army who became one of America’s
most prominent and heralded partners against the extremist forces in Iraq that
killed nearly 4,500 U.S. troops. Jabouri was the key Iraqi partner for U.S.
Army then-Col. H.R. McMaster in Tall Afar, a city that became a proving ground
for the counterinsurgency strategy that Gen. David Petraeus would later
implement and make famous.
- “The Untold Story of Afghan Progress,” Wall Street Journal, March 2013.
The
conventional wisdom about Afghanistan runs something like this: The country is
a lost cause. Almost nothing has changed. The people remain backward and
thankless, and there is little benefit for the international community to stay
engaged in the country's future.
This
is far from the truth. Despite many years of conflict, Afghanistan has
exhibited dramatic signs of economic, social and cultural revival. The country
has undergone such extraordinary change since 9/11 that a return to the dark
period of the Taliban is unfathomable.
One
source of the misconception about my country is the Afghan government's combative
relationship with the international community. But the government doesn't
reflect the views of the public. Most people in Afghanistan remain strongly
supportive of international engagement and widely approve of the presence of
troops from other countries.
- The Iraq War in pictures, The Atlantic, March 2013.
- The invasion of Iraq in pictures, The Atlantic, March 2013.
- “Taliban Talks: Past, Present and Prospects for the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan”, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS), March 2013.
This
report takes stock of the burgeoning efforts to achieve some level of reconciliation
with the Taliban after more than 11 years of war. It deals with the recent
history of initiatives to engage with the Taliban, outlines the challenges to
these initiatives and derives some recommendations for how to move forward with
the peace processes.
The
first part written by Mona Kanwal Sheikh gives a brief background to, and status
overview of the different initiatives that the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan have
taken in order to initiate a peace process with the Taliban. Quoting extracts from
recent interviews with experts from Afghanistan and Pakistan who have followed
the different initiatives on peace and reconciliation closely, the second part
identifies the challenges to the present situation and initiatives. The final
part, written
by Afghanistan analyst Tim Foxley, puts forward some thought-provoking recommendations
on how to create a communication environment that can serve as
a foundation for a viable peace process.
- “The World Bank Group in Afghanistan: Country Update”, World Bank, March 2013.
- “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014”, World Bank, February 2013.
- “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress”, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, January 2013.
- Joint Subcommittee Hearing: After the Withdrawal: The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Part I), U.S. House of Representatives, March 2013.
- “Perceptions of Politically Engaged, Influential Afghans on the Way Forward,” United States Institute of Peace, March 2013.
Summary
•
Most influential Afghans surveyed for this report are positive about the
international engagement
in their country since 2001.
•
Most consider that security has deteriorated and are skeptical about the 2014
end date of international
combat operations.
•
Most are in favor of a small contingent of international forces to be deployed
after 2014.
•
Mistrust of neighbors seen as interfering is widespread, as is the belief that
regional dynamics have a major impact on Afghan stability.
•
The majority are equally critical of Afghan foreign policy but do not think
that Afghanistan is a threat to others.
•
Border demarcation issues, most believe, should be addressed through a
consultative process, as should water rights through international mediation,
to help de-escalate regional tensions and act as confidence-building measures.
•
Terrorism is deemed as sourced outside the country, and the Taliban’s strength
is seen as tied to external factors.
•
A negotiated political end to the conflict is considered ideal, as is a U.S.
role in that process.
•
Most do not believe that the Taliban would agree to the current political order
or constitution, but some are willing to negotiate elements of democratic
values and gender rights.
•
Afghans do favor free, fair, and transparent elections for 2014 but ask for
more consultation and transparency.
•
The majority do not believe that the current political system was imposed and
consider democratic
values essential for social and political stability.
•
Approximately half of the respondents demand a more decentralized regime
through a constitutional
review and reform process but do not believe the country is ready for political
parties.
•
Corruption, weak governance, militant attacks, foreign meddling, narco-business,
and criminality
are agreed to be among major challenges facing the country.
•
Most of those surveyed pin their hopes on concepts of peace, tolerance,
democratic rule, education,
rule of law, employment, and international support. They do not see an
alternative to democratic governance.
- Support Process Over Personalities in Pakistan, Council on Foreign Relations, February 2013.
Pakistan’s
leadership transitions over the course of 2013 will complicate, perhaps even
disrupt, the already tenuous U.S.-Pakistan relationship. As in the past,
Washington may be tempted to lend support to Pakistani leaders with
“pro-American” leanings. U.S. officials should resist these temptations. The
United States should cast its weight behind Pakistan’s
constitutional, rule-based process of leadership transition.
By
actively encouraging Pakistan’s leaders to stick to their own rules (while
otherwise standing above the political fray), the United States would improve
prospects for an orderly transfer of power that would contribute to Pakistan’s
overall stability. Pakistani leaders who emerge from such a process may not be
especially friendly to Washington, but they will at least be open to
businesslike cooperation on matters of greatest U.S. concern.
- “Hidden enemies: Afghanistan combats landmines”, Deutsche Welle, March 2013
There
are landmines hidden in nearly all of Afghanistan's provinces. Playing children
are especially at risk of detonating the devices, which have already cost
thousands of lives in the country.
The
13-year-old Firoz Ali Alizada was in the wrong place at the wrong time when he
decided to take a short cut on the way to school with a few friends. He stepped
on a landmine that instantly went off and had to be rushed to hospital. Doctors
said they would have to amputate his legs if there was any chance for him to
survive. But before doctors would even see him, his parents had to bribe them
with a handsome sum of money. In the end, the operation was carried out and
young Firoz lost his legs.
He
was one of very few who survive such blasts. "I was lucky. It is a miracle
that I survived despite losing my legs and nearly all of my blood."
Each
month, between 30 and 60 Afghans have an encounter with landmines. They are
either killed or badly injured. "Compared to the 1990s, that number has
gone down, but it is still the highest rate in the world," Alizada
explains.
- “The Iraq Invasion Ten Years Later: A Wrong War”, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2013.
Ten years after the U.S. invasion, the war in Iraq
represents "a poor choice poorly implemented," says CFR President
Richard N. Haass, who was then a senior State Department official. Haass says
the cost--in terms of U.S. blood and treasure and a shaky Iraq--was clearly not
worth it. The Iraq campaign, along with the current war in Afghanistan and the
Vietnam War, he says, "show the folly of overlooking local realities, be
they political, cultural, or historic, and trying to impose our views on these
societies and trying to remake these societies using large amounts of American
military might."
- Joint
Subcommittee Hearing: “Islamist Militant Threats to Eurasia”, Subcommittee
on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation,
and Trade, U.S. House of Representatives, February 2013. http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/hearing/joint-subcommittee-hearing-islamist-militant-threats-eurasia
- “China's Central Asia Problem”, International Crisis Group, February 2013.
Since
the collapse of the Soviet Union, China and its Central Asian neighbours have developed
a close relationship, initially economic but increasingly also political and security.
Energy, precious metals, and other natural resources flow into China from the
region. Investment flows the other way, as China builds pipelines, power lines and
transport networks linking Central Asia to its north-western province, the
Xinjiang Uighur
Autonomous Region. Cheap consumer goods from the province have flooded
Central Asian markets. Regional elites and governments receive generous funding
from Beijing, discreet diplomatic support if Russia becomes too demanding and
warm expressions of solidarity at a time when much of the international
community questions
the region’s long-term stability. China’s influence and visibility is growing
rapidly. It is already the dominant economic force in the region and within
the next few years could well become the pre-eminent external power there, overshadowing
the U.S. and Russia.
- “Invisible Ink: Looking for the Lost Trade Between China, Russia, and Central Asia”, Institute for Security and Development Policy, March 2013.
China,
Russia, and the Central Asian States have consistently engaged in economic
relations. However, the bilateral trade statistics that are publicly available
show a history of inconsistent and unreliable reporting to an extent that makes
usage of the statistics as any benchmark problematic. This Policy Brief
examines the issues of unreliable bilateral trade statistics and explores ways
to improve this area in the future.
- “Addressing Pakistan's Atomisation”, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, March 2013.
Recent
milestones in Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal expansion coincide with a growing
governance crisis in its domestic politics. New efforts from Pakistan’s elected
government to robustly anchor the social base of the state could create
resources for strengthening civilian governance and the underlying social
fabric. This could in turn provide a strong foundation for eventual domestic
decisions to restrain Pakistan’s military nuclear ambitions. Nuclear force
development is at present an attractive means for Pakistan to attract
international political and financial assistance, while salving the paranoias
of its security establishment. Improvement in the state-society relationship
could reduce the domestic appeal of endless nuclear expansion as other, more
sustainable, resources become available to the state for building economic
growth and security. In the wake of national elections this spring, Pakistani
politicians should be considering ways to advance this objective when in office.
- “Pakistan and the Narratives of Extremism”, United States Institute of Peace, March 2013.
Summary
•
People process events around narratives that resonate on an emotional level.
Effective strategic
communications efforts understand this and ground messages within existing, accepted
narratives.
•
Violent extremist Islamist organizations in Pakistan have effectively drawn on
powerful existing
narratives in presenting and promoting their particular worldview.
•
Specifically, the circumstances and arguments surrounding Pakistan’s birth gave
rise to narratives that violent extremist organizations, including al-Qaeda,
have exploited to promote themselves and to gain sympathy.
•
For example, extremist strategic communications efforts build on Pakistan’s
existing narratives to portray events related to Pakistan as proof that there
is an ongoing war against Islam.
•
As a result, narratives promoted by extremists are making strong headway among
the Pakistani
people, who are increasingly seeing extremist narratives as an attractive way
of explaining
the world around them.
•
Unlike extremist communications efforts, strategic communications efforts to
counter extremism
in Pakistan typically do not deploy messages built on Pakistan’s narratives.
•
An effective counterextremism communications strategy needs to engage
Pakistan’s narratives and work with those elements of society who are - through
their cultural output - challenging extremist visualizations of the world.
•
Any strategy toward counterextremism communications in Pakistan should draw on
Pakistan’s existing narratives and its sense of itself. Indeed, these
narratives provide significant opportunities for counterextremists to attack
the vision and worldview of groups like al-Qaeda.
•
Strategic communications efforts against extremism need to move away from
crafting the “right” message from the practitioners’ point of view and move
toward focusing on emotionally engaging the audience.
•
All such efforts should be long-term and Pakistani-led, with the capacity to
involve state and
private entities.
- “The problem with Pakistan's democracy”, Foreign Policy, April 2013.
On
Sunday, former military dictator Pervez Musharraf was at last given permission
to run in the parliamentary elections scheduled for May 11, but only in the
northern district of Chitral. Two other districts rejected his nomination
papers, and his application in Islamabad is still pending. Elections officials
in Pakistan, acting under directives of the country's Supreme Court, have
excluded several candidates -- among them Musharraf -- from running in the
elections. This pre-selection of candidates is based on controversial Articles
62 and 63 of the Constitution, decreed by military ruler General Zia ul-Haq in
1985 as part of his Islamization agenda. These articles forbid anyone who does
not meet the test of being a good Muslim or patriotic Pakistani from becoming
members of Pakistan's parliament. Until now, the highly subjective criteria of
these provisions have never been implemented in practice. http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/04/08/the_problem_with_pakistans_democracy
- “Iraq: A Decade of Abuses”, Amnesty International, March 2013.
Ten
years after the US-led invasion that toppled the brutal dictatorship of Saddam
Hussein, Iraq remains mired in human rights abuses. Thousands of Iraqis are
detained without trial or serving prison sentences imposed after unfair trials,
torture remains rife and continues to be committed with impunity, and the new
Iraq is one of the world's leading executioners. The government hanged 129
prisoners in 2012, while hundreds more languished on death row. Yet, when he
launched the campaign of “shock and awe” in March 2003, that swept away Saddam
Hussein's regime within just four weeks, then US President George W Bush
justified the military intervention partly on human rights grounds, pointing to
the many grave crimes committed under the Iraqi leader. The decade since,
however, as this report shows, has brought only limited change although tens of
thousands of Iraqis' lives have been lost, mostly during the political and
sectarian violence that succeeded the armed conflict and continues to this day.
As the record shows, in the years when they held sway, the US-dominated
coalition of occupying forces created their own legacies of human rights abuse,
for which there is yet to be full accountability, and failed to implement new
standards that fundamentally challenged the mould of repression set under
Saddam Hussein. Today, assuredly, many Iraqis enjoy greater rights and freedom
than existed under the ousted dictator but the margin of improvement is far
less than it should be, and the country remains wracked by political, religious
and other divisions and serious abuses of human rights.
- “Afghanistan Index”, Brookings Institution, March 2013.
- “Justifying the Means: Afghan Perceptions of Electoral Processes”, United States Institute of Peace, March 2013.
This
report focuses on local perceptions of the 2014 presidential elections in
Afghanistan. It situates the elections within growing concerns about the
political uncertainty of the upcoming transition. The author details the
findings from over fifty interviews conducted with respondents from three
different regions of the country, both male and female, and representing all of
the major ethnic groups. The findings suggest that Afghan voters spoke of
earlier rounds of voting as having had a cumulatively negative effect.
Nevertheless, the ideals associated with elections were described in a positive
way.
- “Major U.S. Arms Sales and Grants to Pakistan Since 2001”, Congressional Research Service, March 2013.
Major
U.S. arms sales and grants to Pakistan since 2001 have included items useful
for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations, along with a number of “big
ticket” platforms more suited to conventional warfare. In dollar value terms,
the bulk of purchases have been made with Pakistani national funds, although
U.S. grants have eclipsed these in recent years. The Pentagon reports total
Foreign Military Sales agreements with Pakistan worth about $5.2 billion for
FY2002-FY2011 (in-process sales of F-16 combat aircraft and related equipment account
for about half of this). The U.S. Congress has appropriated more than $3
billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) for Pakistan since 2001, more than
two-thirds of which has been disbursed. These funds are used to purchase U.S.
military equipment for longer-term modernization efforts. Pakistan has also
been granted U.S. defense supplies as Excess Defense Articles (EDA). Discord in
the U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship beginning mid-FY2011 has slowed the
pace of transfers considerably.
