- Risky business: U.S. diplomats abroad, Dante Paradiso, October 2012.
In
June 2003, U.S. Ambassador John Blaney had a choice to make. Two rebel groups
assaulted the Liberian capital to overthrow Charles Taylor. Taylor was wanted
by an international criminal court and he controlled Liberia with commandos and
unruly militia. There was a real risk that his forces would attack the U.S.
Embassy. The city was swollen with thousands of internally displaced people,
and there was no food, potable water or electricity.
The
U.S. Embassy was the last Western diplomatic presence and there was no way out
of the country, as the port was under attack, no airlines were flying, and
roads were impassable. At the low point, the embassy had only a handful of
Marines and a skeletal staff. Ambassador Blaney had every reason to take down
the flag and go home. What would you have done?
- Lara Logan 2012 BGA Annual Luncheon Keynote Speech, October 2012. http://www.bettergov.org/about_us/2012_bga_annual_luncheon_2.aspx
- Institute for War & Peace Reporting – Afghanistan http://iwpr.net/programme/afghanistan
- Kabul Politics Block Bank Probe, Panel Finds, Wall Street Journal, November 2012.
KABUL—Political
interference has impeded an investigation into the collapse of Afghanistan's
largest private lender, with some investors, including President Hamid Karzai's
brother Mahmood, escaping scrutiny, a joint Afghan-international watchdog said
in a report released Wednesday.
The
Afghan Attorney General's investigation into Kabul Bank's 2010 collapse has led
to the prosecution of several bank executives, who have been on trial in the
Afghan capital for about a month.
But
the investigation is sparing shareholders with strong political connections,
according to the report by the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and
Evaluation Committee, which comprises three Afghan anticorruption experts named
by Mr. Karzai and three international representatives. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323330604578145323831172956.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
- Report of the Public Inquiry into the Kabul Bank Crisis, Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee, Kabul, Afghanistan. November 2012 http://mec.af/files/knpir-final.pdf
- “Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: A Risk Assessment Report”, Carlton University, October 2012.
The
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan has a long history of power struggles and regime
changes. A landlocked country in a volatile region, Afghanistan is home to many
ethnic and religious minorities. It has struggled with corruption, civil
unrest, and outside influences since its independence in 1919. It transitioned
from a constitutional monarchy in 1964, to a declared republic after a
political coup in 1973. Shortly after leader Mohammed Daoud was overthrown by
the leftist People’s Democratic Party in 1978, Afghanistan was invaded by USSR
troops trying to end an Islamist insurgency. Soviet control lasted until 1989, when
religious guerrilla Mujahadeen successfully in ousted their presence. In 1996,
the Taliban (a militant movement of Pashtun extremists), took control of the
government and established a repressive regime, enforcing Sharia Law, and
remaining unacknowledged by the majority of the international community. Following
the 9/11 attacks, the United States invaded Afghanistan, put an end to the
Taliban regime, and Hamid Karzai took over as President of Afghanistan. Since
2001, Afghanistan has been dependent on international aid in helping to stabilize
infrastructure and development and has been faced with serious challenges. With
a promise of NATO troop withdrawal by 2014, Afghanistan continues to face
political and civil unrest. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1415.pdf
- “Afghanistan: Development progress and prospects after 2014”, House of Commons International Development Committee, United Kingdom, 25 October 2012.
The
future of Afghanistan is uncertain. There will be changes in its leadership,
the withdrawal
of international forces and a reduction in total overseas aid. It is not known what
attitude neighbouring countries, particularly Pakistan, will take. The Taliban
is stronger
in many parts of Afghanistan than it was when our predecessor Committee visited
the country in 2007. Despite these uncertainties we believe the UK should have
a major aid budget in the country. We have an obligation to the millions of
Afghans who have resisted the Taliban and the British soldiers who have died in
the country.
Nevertheless,
because of the uncertainties in the country, DFID will need to be flexible. For
example, there might come a point at which DFID would need to stop funding the
Afghan Government through the ARTF; in which case, it should ensure it has
other channels open to it such as NGOs to which funding can then flow to
prevent Afghan communities from suddenly being cut off from aid.
The
UK Government’s overarching strategy for its engagement in Afghanistan has
given DFID
the lead in creating a viable state. DFID has had some successes, for example
in increasing
tax revenue, but these gains will be difficult to sustain and further progress
will not be made unless the Afghan Government is determined to achieve a
similar outcome. We recommend the UK Government reconsider DFID’s focus on
creating a ‘viable state’, giving greater emphasis to the provision of services
and alleviating poverty.
- “Economic Assistance in Conflict Zones. Lessons from Afghanistan”, Centre for Global Development, October 2012.
The
upcoming departure of NATO forces from Afghanistan highlights the question of whether
that country will find lasting peace and prosperity without a significant
foreign military
presence. Has the international community been able to lay the foundations for
a stable Afghanistan? Is the Afghan government now capable of formulating and
implementing economic and security policies widely perceived as welfare-
enhancing? Or will the country collapse into anarchy as Taliban and
anti-Taliban forces
struggle for power in the wake of the coming security vacuum?
This
paper examines these questions through the lens of foreign-assistance policy.
We argue that donors face a fundamental tension between the short-rundemands of
financing a war effort and the long-run demands of sustainable economic
development. In short, this paper explores the question of whether or not
foreign aid has helped to build state strength and legitimacy in Afghanistan,
and not just bolster state capacity to fight a war.
- “Afghanistan: The Long, Hard Road to the 2014 Transition”, International Crisis Group, October 2012.
Plagued
by factionalism and corruption, Afghanistan is far from ready to assume
responsibility for security when U.S. and NATO forces withdraw in 2014. That
makes the po-litical challenge of organising a credible presidential election
and transfer of power from President Karzai to a successor that year all the
more daunting. A repeat of previous elec-tions’ chaos and chicanery would
trigger a constitutional crisis, lessening chances the present political
dispensation can survive the transition. In the current environment, pro-spects
for clean elections and a smooth transition are slim. The electoral process is
mired in bureaucratic confusion, institutional duplication and political
machinations. Elec-toral officials indicate that security and financial
concerns will force the 2013 provincial council polls to 2014. There are
alarming signs Karzai hopes to stack the deck for a favoured proxy.
Demonstrating at least will to ensure clean elections could forge a degree of national
consensus and boost popular confidence, but steps toward a stable transi-tion
must begin now to prevent a precipitous slide toward state collapse. Time is
running out.
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/236-afghanistan-the-long-hard-road-to-the-2014-transition.pdf
- Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, October 2012.
- NATO Must Refocus on Afghanistan, Heritage Foundation, October 2012.
On
October 9–11, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s 28 defense ministers
will meet in Brussels. The top priority for the United States at this
ministerial meeting should be ensuring that NATO demonstrates resolve and commitment
to Afghanistan—especially in light of the recent “green on blue” attacks. The
Alliance needs to realize that reforms such as Smart Defense will be
meaningless and the credibility of the Alliance will be in doubt if it is not
successful in its current operations.
- Contracting the Commanders: Transition and the Political Economy of Afghanistan’s Private Security Industry, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, October 2012.
As
Afghanistan approaches the 2014 deadline for assuming responsibility for its
own security, and the international community becomes preoccupied with the
challenge of reducing
its vast entanglement with the country’s politics, economy, and society, the
critical question is whether NATO’s transition will succeed in stabilizing
Afghanistan - or
whether it will result in further destabilization, as seen following the Soviet
withdrawal in 1989, which eventually led to the collapse of the central
government, large-scale civil
war, and the country’s development into a haven for international terrorism.
Under
the liberal state-building paradigm that has informed the international
intervention, this challenge is largely seen in terms of institution and
capacity building, as measured by the strength of the ANSF, the effectiveness
of the civil service and bureaucracy, fiscal and
macroeconomic stability, as well as, to a lesser degree, qualitative metrics
for rule of law, gender equality, and human rights. The emphasis on such
metrics is evident in
the preoccupation with ANSF troop levels and funding commitments at
international conferences such as the NATO summit in Chicago this past May.
Without
denying the importance of these factors, this policy brief argues that the
country’s near- and medium-term stability is less contingent on
institution-building than it is on the political settlement between
Afghanistan’s diverse and fragmented political networks and powerbrokers…
- Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, October 2012.
- Drone Politics in Pakistan, Council on Foreign Relations, October 2012.
Imran
Khan, a former cricket star-turned-politician, led a two-day march last weekend
that focused new attention on U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan. For Joshua Foust,
a fellow at the American Security Project, the march demonstrates how Khan, who
is running for prime minister as head of the party Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf
(PTI), is exploiting public anger over U.S. drone strikes. Foust questions
Khan's silence on the subject of the Pakistani Taliban, especially in light of
Tuesday's shooting of teen activist Malala Yousufzai. "It's important to
remember that the Taliban were rampaging in Pakistan before there were
drones," he says. As far as U.S.-Pakistan relations on terrorism, he says
the relationship needs to be renegotiated to "shift to a more
collaborative system, where the U.S. actively engages in target selection and
ultimately target neutralization with the Pakistani government."
- A Wake-Up Call for Pakistan, Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, October 2012.
Pakistani
women are being targeted by Islamic terrorists who fear that women’s
emancipation would ultimately reduce their influence over a society that has
become increasingly conservative. It appears that the possible rise of women
will not go unchallenged, particularly in the country’s more conservative areas
such as the tribal belt on the border with Afghanistan.
Just
when women in Pakistan have begun to use education to improve their economic
and social conditions, they have run into another obstacle: the obstinate
resistance offered by Islamic extremists.
- The Long and Rocky Road to India-Pakistan Rapprochement, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, October 2012.
The
India-Pakistan peace process, has gained momentum since minister-level talks
were restarted in early 2011. Recent months have brought considerable progress
in improving bilateral ties. This includes a new visa accord, an energy
agreement, and Pakistan’s decision to grant most-favoured nation status to
India.
However,
the relationship remains hampered by territorial disputes; the Kashmir problem
is nowhere close to being resolved. Bilateral ties are also undermined by
hostile public opinion. Recent polling finds significant majorities in each
country harbouring unfavourable views of the other, hardline narratives remain
entrenched and criticism of each with a greater emphasis on regional
reconciliation. And over the last year both countries
have responded with restraint during periods of crisis. At the same time, country’s
policies continues to prevail. Nonetheless, there is cause for hope. with a
greater emphasis on regional reconciliation. And over the last year both
countries have responded with restraint during periods of crisis. http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/9180f96a5cc844447344620d87bd216d.pdf
- Political Islam's Adaptive Radiation, The National Interest, November 2012.
The
cascading riots that spread across the Middle East and North Africa took many
experts and policymakers by surprise. The riots in Libya would probably have
faded into history, but the recent election cycle put them under a microscope.
Much of the attention to date has focused on the decisions about security
resources in the days leading up the attack and the subsequent White House
response. These are important issues, but we must move beyond the retrospective
assessment and consider implications for Middle East policy going forward.
The
events of the Arab Spring that began in late 2010 captured global attention as
thousands of Muslims across the Middle East and North Africa took to the
streets at great personal risk to condemn corrupt dictators and poor
governance. The early days were exciting and hopeful. A rising generation of
Muslims armed with courage and vision, aided by technology, brought major
changes in countries like Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen.
Eighteen
months later, the United States stood in disbelief as mobs stormed embassies
and burned flags…
- “Afghanistan Order of Battle”, Institute for the Study of War, November 2012.
This
document describes the composition and placement of U.S. and other Western
combat forces in Afghanistan down to battalion level. It includes the following
categories of units: maneuver (i.e. infantry, armor, and cavalry) units, which
in most cases are responsible for particular districts or provinces; artillery
units, including both those acting as provisional maneuver units and those in
traditional artillery roles; aviation units, both rotary and fixed-wing; military
police units; most types of engineer and explosive ordnance disposal units; and
“white” special operations forces, described in general terms. It does not
include “black” special operations units or other units such as logistical,
transportation, medical, and intelligence units or Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
- “Afghanistan: Transition needs investment, involvement to replace troops in 2014,” CBS News. November 2012.
KABUL - The date "2014" looms over this country like an
unblinking neon sign, a coming attraction no one wants to see. The more people
here talk and fret about the pending departure of Western troops, the more it
becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy -- it becomes a year in which things will
change, and insecurity could return.
Already, people are leaving, and they aren't part of the
official drawdown. The director of one conservation group told me he discovers
every week that another NGO friend has left the country -- Afghans and
foreigners alike. They pretend to fly out for a conference, and they just never
come back.
Afghan Americans who had returned to their country to
build businesses are slowly squirreling money out of it, unsure if the banks
will survive in a few years' time. They are still desperately rooting for their
country to succeed, but they're not quite willing to bet on it.
The false economy borne of the last decade is starting to
fray at the edges. http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57551655/afghanistan-transition-needs-investment-involvement-to-replace-troops-in-2014/
- “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan: Down but not out,” ForeignPolicy.com, November 2012.
The
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a militant group based in Pakistan's
tribal agencies, has suffered a series of major battlefield setbacks over the
past year. But despite the loss of several senior leaders and a key media
operative since 2011, the group remains one of the most militarily capable and
media savvy militant outfits operating in the region. It maintains working relationships with a
number of other Sunni militant groups active in the region including al-Qaeda
Central, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and the Afghan Taliban. The IMU has particularly close ties to the
TTP, with whom it has launched joint military operations against Pakistani
military targets inside Pakistan, as well ISAF and Afghan government targets in
Afghanistan. In April, an estimated 150
IMU and TTP fighters launched a successful attack on Bannu Prison in
northwestern Pakistan, freeing nearly 400 prisoners, including Adnan Rashid,
who was convicted in 2008 of involvement in an assassination plot against
then-Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf. Rashid was subsequently featured in
videos released by the IMU and TTP. http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/11/20/the_islamic_movement_of_uzbekistan_down_but_not_out
- “Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the Afghan People,” The Asia Foundation, November 2012.
The
Asia Foundation has released findings from Afghanistan in 2012: A Survey of the
Afghan People, the broadest public opinion poll in the country. In June 2012,
742 Afghan pollsters—both men and women—fanned out across all 34 provinces to
gather first-hand opinions from nearly 6,300 Afghan citizens on a wide range of
topics critical to the future of Afghanistan. This marks the eighth in the
Foundation's series of surveys in Afghanistan.
- “Afghanistan
Index,” The Brookings Institution, November 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/about/programs/foreign-policy/afghanistan-index
