1. Civilian
contractor deaths -- "Best kept secret of the wars". OregonLive.com, July 2012.
Debi
Klecker of Bend, Oregon was advising Iraqi police in 2005 when she was killed
by a roadside bomb. In that capacity, she worked with -- but wasn't part of --
the U.S. military. She was, instead, employed by DynCorp International. According to the
www.americancontractorsiniraq.org web site, at least 108 civilian contractors
were killed in the first six months of the current year. The website declares:
"Scandal in mistreatment of Silent Service members. We are the best-kept
secret of the wars." http://blog.oregonlive.com/oregonatwar/2012/07/civilian_contractor_deaths_--.html
2. “Blind
in Baghdad,” Michael Knights, ForeignPolicy.com, July 2012.
Something
is stirring in Iraq. On July 3, car bombs ripped through mainly Shiite
neighborhoods across the country, killing 36 people. It was the latest tragedy
in a bloody month -- a prolonged political crisis has weakened the government
in Baghdad, giving insurgent groups an opening to expand their operations. The
consequent surge in violence has led some to fear that the country could once
again be descending into civil war.
But
just as Iraqi politics heats up, the United States is rapidly losing its
ability to decipher events in the country. "Half of our situational
awareness is gone," an unnamed U.S. official told the Wall Street Journal
in June. "More than half," a serving U.S. military officer told me
when I asked about the accuracy of that statement. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/05/blind_in_baghdad?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full
3. “Afghanistan’s
Buried Riches,” Sarah Simpson, Scientific American, October 2011.
The
scene at first resembles many that play out daily in the war-torn Red Zone of
southern Afghanistan: a pair of Black Hawk helicopters descend on a hillside
near the country’s southern border with Pakistan. As the choppers land, U.S.
marines leap out, assault rifles ready. But then geologists sporting helmets
and heavy ceramic vests jump out, too. The researchers are virtually indistinguishable
from the soldiers except that they carry rock hammers instead of guns. A human
chain of soldiers encircles the scientists as they step forward on the dusty
ground.
“The
minute you get off, you go into geologist mode,” says Jack H. Medlin, director
of the U.S. Geological Survey’s activities in Afghanistan. “You forget,
basically, that these guys are around—unless you try to get out of the circle.”
4. “Welcome
to Afghanistan’s Future,” Jeffrey Goldberg, TheAtlantic.com, July 2012.
It
used to be commonplace in Afghanistan that women living under Taliban rule
feared execution following accusations of adultery, and it will one day be
common again, now that the West has decided that it is too difficult to keep
the promises it made to Afghanistan's women. In fact, it's already
happening: At the outset of the fuzzy
video, which runs nearly four minutes and appears to have been taken by a
Taliban member with a cellphone, Najiba is a peripheral figure, seen kneeling
in the background. Her body is turned away from the camera, her head is
shrouded by a gray scarf.
One of the Taliban says the Koran prohibits adultery. Killing the woman is "God's order and decree," he says. "If the issue was avenging deaths, we would beg for her amnesty. But in this case, God says, 'You should finish her.'" He concludes by saying, "It's the order of God, and now it is her husband's work to punish her."
Then someone else says, "Give him a Kalashnikov." http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/welcome-to-afghanistans-future/259550/
One of the Taliban says the Koran prohibits adultery. Killing the woman is "God's order and decree," he says. "If the issue was avenging deaths, we would beg for her amnesty. But in this case, God says, 'You should finish her.'" He concludes by saying, "It's the order of God, and now it is her husband's work to punish her."
Then someone else says, "Give him a Kalashnikov." http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/07/welcome-to-afghanistans-future/259550/
5. “Final
Forensic Audit Report of Iraq Reconstruction Funds,” Special Inspector General
for Iraq Reconstruction, July 2012.
SIGIR
audits, inspections, and investigations have found serious weaknesses in the
government’s controls over Iraq reconstruction funds that put billions of
American taxpayer dollars at risk of waste and misappropriation. The precise
amount lost to fraud and waste can never be known, but SIGIR believes it is
significant. As of June 30, 2012, SIGIR audit reports had questioned $635.8
million in costs, and SIGIR Investigations, working with other agencies, had
resulted in $176.84 million in fines, forfeitures, and other monetary results.
SIGIR
audit reports identified internal control weaknesses such as inadequate reviews
of contractors’ invoices, insufficient numbers of, or inadequately trained
oversight staff, poor inventory controls, high staff turnover, poor
recordkeeping, insufficient price competition by subcontractors, and weak
oversight of cash disbursements. For example, SIGIR’s audit of a DoS contract
for Iraqi police training program support found that more than $2.5 billion in
U.S. funds was vulnerable to fraud and waste as a result of poor DoS oversight.
Another SIGIR audit of a DoD contract for warehousing and distribution services
found that the contractor’s business systems had not been adequately reviewed. http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-017.pdf#view=fit
6. “As NATO Draws Down, Afghans Fear A Brain Drain,” NPR.org,
June 2012.
As
NATO troops leave Afghanistan, there will also be a decline in aid money that
has flooded the country over the past decade and created hundreds of thousands
of jobs funded by donor money. That
means fewer jobs for Afghans, and skilled Afghans may be tempted to leave the
country as part of a brain drain that could further weaken a fragile state.
Many
Afghans, particularly those with an education and means, fled the country
during wars dating back more than three decades. Some have come back in recent
years. But another mass exodus would deprive Afghanistan of a critical building
block. Sitting
in the basement of a large house-turned-office isn't where Rohullah Zarif wants
to be. He spent 15 years with the development organization CARE Afghanistan.
Now, he's a technical adviser for an international construction and support
services firm. "Here,
I am working for one person. He's the owner of the company," Zarif says.
"When I worked for CARE, it means my [efforts] reached to the poor
communities that are in need."
7.
“Fiscal
Year 2011 Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund Projects Are behind Schedule and Lack
Adequate Sustainment Plans”, Special Inspects General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction, July 2012. http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/2012-07-30audit-12-12Revised.pdf
8. “Preparing
Advisers for Capacity-Building Missions”, United States Institute of Peace,
August 2012.
As
part of their efforts to support the rebuilding and reform of post-conflict and
transitional states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United
Nations, and other members of the international community are sending
international advisers to work alongside high-level officials in national
institutions.
Advisers
are recruited for their strong professional expertise in fields such as
logistics and human resources. However, they have had little preparation in
transferring that knowledge to others, especially in a transitional or post-conflict
environment.
If
they are to contribute to sustainable reforms, advisers need to be taught how
to transfer knowledge in a complex and alien environment, how to operate
without formal authority, and how to cultivate local ownership.
9. “Afghanistan
Monthly Progress Report: June 2012,” Department of International Development,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence, July 2012. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/afghan-progress-jun12.pdf
10.
“The Global Afghan Opium Trade”. Vienna:
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, October 2011.
Opiates originating in
Afghanistan threaten the health and well-being of people in many regions of the
world. Their illicit trade also adversely impacts governance, security,
stability and development—in Afghanistan, in its neighbours, in the broader
region and beyond.
“The Global Afghan
Opium Trade,”, the second such report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
research project on the topic, covers worldwide flows of Afghan opiates, as
well as trafficking in precursor chemicals used to turn opium into heroin. By
providing a better understanding of the global impact of Afghan opiates, this
report can help the international community identify vulnerabilities and
possible countermeasures.
Heroin is the most
dangerous drug…
11.
“Religious Movements, Militancy and Conflict
in South Asia: Cases from India, Pakistan and Afghanistan”, Centre for
Strategic and International Studies, July 2012.
The top headlines of
the past year have made increasingly clear to U.S. government officials the central—but
complicated—roles that religion plays in many of the most strategically
important engagements of the United States.
Since early 2011, the
uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have brought about significant
changes to long-standing political regimes. Concerns in the West over the types
of regimes that will replace Muammar Qaddafi, Hosni Mubarak, and potentially
others have been fueled in part by uncertainty over the role religion will play
in national and regional politics. In some cases, these movements initially
forged a degree of solidarity among protesters from different religious
communities. But subsequently there has
been an increase in sectarian, religious, and ethnic animosities among the
challengers in some of those countries. For example, in the wake of Hosni
Mubarak’s departure from Egypt, the country saw a surge in violent clashes
between the Sunni Muslim majority and the Coptic Christian minority.
12.
“Afghanistan Annual Report 2011”, United
Nations Development Programme, June 2012.
Despite being
confronted with major security challenges and a fragile political environment
in Afghanistan, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) remains committed to
improving the lives of Afghans, many still suffering following decades of war,
recurrent natural disasters and a continuing cycle of violence.
The country’s fragile
security situation have posed serious hurdles in the delivery of vital
assistance in many areas, yet UNDP forges ahead – even in the most remote,
rugged parts of the country – working tirelessly to improve the lives of
Afghans across the country. With more than 800 staff on the ground and equipped
with nearly 50 years of experience working in the country, UNDP has established
its role as a provider, supporter and resource of development assistance in
Afghanistan.
During the past 10
years, UNDP has been at the forefront of international and Afghan efforts to
build democratic institutions, promote human rights, and rebuild the country’s
economy. In 2011 alone, UNDP delivered more than US$700 million in development
assistance to Afghanistan, much of it focused on crisis prevention and recovery
activities, in order to support the government’s efforts in conflict prevention
and peace-building.
13. “Snapshots
of an Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of Afghanistan’s Decade of Assistance
(2001–11)” Afghanistan Analysts Network, August 2012.
The
decade of state-building, reconstruction and development assistance in
Afghanistan has left many people confused. There have been undeniable changes:
Afghanistan now has an election-based, market-driven political system and many
socio-economic indicators are far better than they used to be under Taleban
rule or during the civil war (although that is, admittedly, not a very high
bar). There have been great, albeit unequal, opportunities in terms of
education, employment and enrichment. But there is also a strong sense of
missed and mismanaged opportunities, which many – Afghans and internationals
alike – find difficult to understand: how could so many resources have achieved
what feels like so little and so fleeting?
This
edited volume explores the question by taking a closer look at a variety of key
programmes and projects that were designed and implemented over the last
decade, or more. It consists of a collection of 25 articles by analysts and
practitioners with long histories in the country, who were closely involved in
the programmes they describe. The contributions present a rare and detailed
insight into the complexity of the intervention in Afghanistan – including the
often complicated relations between donors and representatives of the Afghan
government (with projects tending to be nominally Afghan-led, but clearly
donor-driven), the difficulties in achieving greater coherence and leverage
and, in many cases, the widely shared failure to learn the necessary lessons
and to adapt to realities as they were encountered. http://aan-afghanistan.com/uploads/2012_AAN_E-book_Snapshots_of_an_Intervention.pdf
14. “The Current Status of Al-Qaida.” Oxford
Research Group, June 2012.
During
May, there were three events that aid an understanding of the current status
and future prospects for the al-Qaida movement. These were the interception of
an improvised explosive device designed to be employed in destroying a
passenger aircraft; the killing of a key operative, Fahd al Quso, by a drone
attack in Yemen; and the exploding of two very large car bombs in Damascus, as
well as a third car bomb targeting a military complex in an eastern Syrian
city. The issue of who are the perpetrators of the increasing terrorist
violence in Syria is hotly contested, but it is likely to prove a severe
complication in any attempt to seek an end to the conflict. This makes
diplomatic efforts to end the conflict in Syria even more critical.
There
are widely differing views as to the potency of the al-Qaida movement and this
briefing seeks to present a helpful interpretation. http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/sites/default/files/MayEn12_0.pdf
15. “Haqqani
Network Financing: The Evolution Of An Industry.” Combating
Terrorism Center, July 2012.
The
CTC’s latest report leverages captured battlefield material and the insights of
local community members in Afghanistan and Pakistan to outline the financial
architecture that sustains the Haqqani faction of the Afghan insurgency. The Haqqani network is widely recognized as a
semi-autonomous component of the Taliban and as the deadliest and most globally
focused faction of that latter group.
What receives far less attention is the fact that the Haqqani network
also appears to be the most sophisticated and diversified from a financial
standpoint. In addition to raising funds
from ideologically like-minded donors, an activity the Haqqanis have engaged in
since the 1980s, information collected for this report indicates that over the
past three decades they have penetrated key business sectors, including
import-export, transport, real estate and construction in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, the Arab Gulf and beyond. The
Haqqani network also appears to operate its own front companies, many of which
seem to be directed at laundering illicit proceeds. By examining these issues this report
demonstrates how the Haqqanis’ involvement in criminal and profit-making
activities has diversified over time in pragmatic response to shifting funding
conditions and economic opportunities, and how members of the group have a
financial incentive to remain the dealmakers and the enforcers in their area of
operations, a dynamic which is likely to complicate future U.S. and Afghan
efforts to deal with the group.
16. “Taliban
Recruiting and Fundraising in Karachi.” Combating
Terrorism Center, July 2012.
Karachi
is Pakistan’s commercial hub as well as its largest city. Taking advantage of
Karachi’s ongoing ethnic and sectarian violence, militants from several Taliban
factions and al-Qa`ida have moved to the city to escape U.S. drone strikes and
Pakistani military operations in Pakistan’s northwest tribal regions.
Karachi’s
role as a shelter for al-Qa`ida and Taliban militants is well known. This
article, however, provides clarity on how al-Qa`ida and Taliban militants are
using Karachi to recruit university-educated youth as well as finance their
operations against Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan.
17. Foundation
for Afghanistan
18. “Afghan
National Security Forces: Afghan Corruption and the Development of an Effective
Fighting Force.” Hearing before the House Armed Services Committee,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, August 2012.
19. “Afghan
National Security Forces and Security Lead Transition: The Assessment Process,
Metrics, and Efforts to Build Capability.”
Hearing before the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations, July 2012.
20. “Dawood
National Military Hospital, Afghanistan: What Happened and What Went Wrong?” Hearing before the House Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform, July 2012.
21. “Withdrawal
from Afghanistan: Historical Lessons.” Hearing
before the House Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, July 2012. http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/hearings-display?ContentRecord_id=46f2231a-02a8-4db4-bfad-3d19f486f9a7
22. “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress.” Office
of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, July
2012.
23. “Fiscal
Year 2011 Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund Projects Are behind Schedule and Lack
Adequate Sustainment Plans.” Office of the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction, July 2012.
24. “Selected
Public Diplomacy Awards Mostly Achieved Objectives, but Embassy Can Take Steps
to Enhance Grant Management and Oversight.” Office of the Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, July 2012.
25. “Washington's
Civilian Shortcomings in Pakistan.” Milan Vaishnav. Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, July 2012.
Nearly
three years ago, the Obama administration and Congress signaled their intention
to forge a civilian partnership with the new, democratically elected government
of Pakistan. Motivating this reset was a sincere desire, in Washington and
Islamabad, to avoid a confusion that has defined the U.S.-Pakistan relationship
for decades: the conflation of security and nonsecurity objectives in the
distribution of U.S. aid to Pakistan. The centerpiece of this new approach was
the 2009 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, commonly referred to as the
Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill, which authorized $7.5 billion in U.S. economic
assistance to Pakistan over five years. Yet if the United States hopes to
achieve the goals it laid out in 2009, it must change its approach now.
26. “Stabilizing
Pakistan Through Police Reform.” Hassan Abbas, ed. Asia Society, July 2012.
In
the coming years, Pakistan will continue to face a range of challenges stemming
from both internal and external factors. In addition to the transnational and
regional threats of terrorism, Pakistan is also experiencing domestic security
challenges posed by rising religious extremism and militancy, kidnappings, organized
crime, insurgencies, and political assassinations. Increasingly fragile
internal security and law enforcement systems will likely pose grave
difficulties for the country. In light of the trends of increasing insecurity
and instability, how the police and other law enforcement bodies are structured
and how they coordinate
efforts to combat security threats deserve greater attention.
Despite
frequent internal crises in Pakistan since the country was established in
1947—ranging from ethnic and sectarian conflicts to chronic political
instability and underdevelopment—policy makers have neglected to prioritize
police reform. High crime rates throughout the country, relatively low
conviction rates of prisoners on trial, and heightened concerns about
instability spilling over from Afghanistan indicate that there is an urgent and
critical need to invest in and reform Pakistan’s law enforcement infrastructure.
27. “More
Money, More Problems: A 2012 Assessment of the US Approach to Development in
Pakistan.” Nancy Birdsall, Milan Vaishnav, and Daniel Cutherell. Center for
Global Development, July 2012.
In
March 2009, the Obama administration announced a new strategy for Afghanistan
and Pakistan. A central component of this new strategy was a significant
increase in the deployment of resources—human and financial—through civilian
(nonsecurity) channels in both countries. In so doing, the administration
sought to demonstrate a new commitment to civilian-led government in Pakistan.
Underlying this new strategic framework was a realization within the
administration that Pakistan’s ability to grow economically, to meet its
citizens’ basic needs, and to reduce domestic conflict, insecurity, and
instability depended on the establishment of a more capable and effective
democratic state. The administration was also moved by the fact that Pakistan
represents a genuine security threat to the region, to the United States, and
to the world. By now, the myriad concerns are well known: extremist violence,
cross-border and domestic terrorism, the possibility of “loose nukes,” and the
potential failure of the Pakistani state. On the basis of these significant
development and security challenges, the Obama administration determined that
it was in the long-term of interests of the US government and the American
people to build a new partnership with the government of Pakistan to help
counter these pressing challenges.
28. “Religion
and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan: A Literature Review.” Mariam Mufti.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 2012. http://csis.org/files/publication/120709_Mufti_ReligionMilitancy_Web.pdf
29. “U.S.
Engagement in Central Asia.” Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, July 2012.
