- H.R. McMaster: The Warrior's-Eye View of Afghanistan. Wall Street Journal.
The
two-star general wrote the book on Vietnam and showed the way for the surge in
Iraq. Now he's back from 20 months in Afghanistan—and says the war can be won.
- SIGAR Quarterly Report, April 2012.
From
the covering letter:
“The
APPF, a state-owned enterprise established by the Afghan government to replace
private security companies, began assuming responsibility for providing
security for development projects during this reporting period. On March 29, I
testified before the Congress about SIGAR’s ongoing audit work, which has
identified a number of concerns about the transition to the APPF, including the
potential for rising costs and the possible disruption or termination of
reconstruction projects if the APPF cannot provide the required security.
“In
addition to these developments, corruption remains a major threat to the
reconstruction effort. During my visit to Kabul this quarter, I met with U.S.
and Afghan officials to discuss and assess their anti-corruption efforts. I
also shared with them SIGAR’s work to combat corruption: nearly 30% of our
investigations involve public corruption and bribery. This quarter, our
investigators partnered with other federal and Afghan law enforcement agents to
recover $446,000 in stolen fuel and $175,000 in cash in cases involving Afghan
attempts to bribe U.S. officials. In addition, three individuals who had been
convicted of bribery were sentenced to prison terms and ordered to pay fines
and restitutions totaling $269,000. The three had been arrested and charged in
cases in which SIGAR participated.
“Also
this quarter, SIGAR investigations resulted in the termination for default or
voiding of five contracts, protecting $131 million in unspent funds. In
addition, SIGAR issued seven referrals for the suspension or debarment of
individuals and companies for illegal activities or poor performance.”
- “When America Leaves: Asia after the Afghan War.” The American Interest.
Afghanistan
is passing inexorably into a post-American phase that will have far-reaching
consequences for the interconnected space encompassing the Indian and Pakistani
portions of Kashmir, Pakistan proper, Afghanistan, the five Central Asian
“Stans”, eastern Iran, China’s western province of Xinjiang, and the seven
republics of Russia’s South Caucasus region. In this zone, Greater Central
Asia, multiple sources of conflict already exist even as new patterns of trade
and investment are emerging, not least in energy. Increasing competition
between long preponderant powers and challengers whose presence has heretofore
been minimal are changing the calculus of risks and opportunities. Note as well
that Greater Central Asia provides a bridge for competition and conflict to
migrate and shape the larger interactions among China, India, Russia and the
United States.
- “The Looming Catastrophe in Afghanistan.” Registan.com
This
past weekend, I attended the NATO Summit in Chicago. There I heard from many
heads of state, foreign ministers, defense ministers, secretary-generals,
officials, and analysts about what NATO is doing and how it’s evolving into an
enlightened global actor for peace.
The
challenge with what I heard is that a lot of is little more than gussied up
magical thinking. While NATO’s broader issues merit discussion (I did some of
that for U.S. News here), the way it is approaching Afghanistan leaves much to
be desired.
- “Has War in Afghanistan Ruined Central Asia?” Registan.com
While
Central Asia’s international political profile has risen considerably since
2001, it has primarily been seen in the West through the prism of Afghanistan.
The policies of Western governments towards Central Asia as a whole and as
individual states have widely fluctuated, but in almost every case, been
heavily shaped by policies toward Afghanistan. U.S. and ISAF Afghanistan policy
has been short-sighted and messy enough, making policy toward Central Asia even
more so.
In
recent years, Central Asia’s governments have backslid, becoming more
authoritarian and less able to provide services to all of society. This
contributes to greater risks for instability in the future.
- “Look Before You Leap.” The American Interest.
It
used to be, I think, that the vast majority of strategists and statesmen played
chess, or in non-Western cultures some comparably complex game that required
players to anticipate what their opponents might do in an extended sequence of
moves. This was good training for the real world. If you read in the history of
diplomacy, you can find many excellent examples of careful statecraft
resembling what we may call sequence assessment. (A masterful and also quite
brief description of the phenomenon, as seen by a social scientist, may be
found in Erving Goffman’s little-known 1969 book Strategic Interaction.) One
can also find examples of hotheads going off half-cocked, usually to their and
everyone else’s regret. Big mistakes make big news historically. But my sense
is that responsible individuals, who made up the vast majority a century and
two ago, generally understood the difficulty of their task, and worked at it in
a fairly disciplined fashion.
Now
consider some recent events in that light…
- “Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014”, The World Bank, May 2012.
- “Opiate Flows Through Northern Afghanistan and Central Asia: A Threat Assessment”, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, May 2012.
In
2010 an estimated 25 per cent of the 380 tons of heroin manufactured in
Afghanistan
-some
90 tons- was trafficked northwards through Central Asia via the Northern route
and
onward to the Russian Federation. The 90-ton total includes heroin consumed
within
Central Asia and the Russian Federation, as well as heroin seized by law
enforcement
or trafficked onward. More than three quarters of this amount are destined
for
the Russian market, with a small portion (approximately 3-4 tons) continuing to
eastern
and northern Europe. Furthermore, in 2010 between 35 and 40 tons of raw
opium
were trafficked through northern Afghanistan towards Central Asian markets. The
entire
2010 opiate demand of the Northern route is required to transit or be produced
in
northern
Afghanistan.
- “Measures of ‘Progress’ in Afghanistan in the Spring of 2012: The Need for Strategic Focus, Transparency and Credibility”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 09 May 2012, by Anthony H. Cordesman. http://csis.org/publication/measures-progress-afghanistan-spring-2012
- “Afghanistan Trip Report V: The Afghan Local Police: ‘It’s Local, So It Must Be Good’- Or Is It?” The Brookings Institution, 09 May 2012, by Vanda Felbab-Brown.
Among
the most controversial aspects of the transition strategy in Afghanistan are
various efforts to stand up self-defense forces around the country. These
Afghan ―militias‖ are supposed to increase security in areas where Afghan
National Army (ANA), Afghan National Police (ANP), and ISAF presence are highly
limited. With ISAF denying that the various programs amount to a militia effort
(calling the units everything else but militias and insisting that they are
based on Afghan traditions, such as arbakai), the most visible version of these
efforts right now is the Afghan Local Police (ALP). The ALP currently numbers
around 13,000 members and is slated to increase to at least 30,000 by the end
of 2014.
The
purpose of the ALP is to extend at least a modicum of security to communities
where Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are unlikely to be deployed for a
long time. In those communities, the ALP is relied on to weaken the Taliban,
Hezb-i-Islami, and the Haqqanis by either hiring their soldiers away for the
ALP or having the ALP fight them, and to generate intelligence for ISAF.
U.S.
military officials claim to be thrilled with the program. In conversations with
me (during my recent research in Afghanistan in April 2012 and previous
research trips), they describe the program in glowing terms and portray it as
tremendous success. They report that the ALP is enthusiastically embraced by
local communities and effective in fighting the Taliban—often characterizing it
as a ―game changer. As a U.S. Special
Operations Forces officer explained to me: ―All politics is local. The ALP’s local,
so it must be good. After all, that’s what counterinsurgency theory teaches us.
http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/7084~v~The_Afghan_Local_Police___It_s_Local_So_It_Must_Be_Good__-_Or_is_it_.pdf
- “Afghan civilian protection during security transition: briefing ahead of NATO summit 20-21 May 2012.” Consortium of NGOs, May 2012.
As
heads of state prepare to gather for the NATO summit in Chicago, the
undersigned NGOs call on NATO member states and the Afghan Government to
prioritize improving the accountability of the Afghan National Security Forces
as well as measures to enhance their capability to protect civilians more
broadly.
Over
the last decade, millions of Afghan women and men have experienced significant
progress in areas such as equal constitutional rights, political participation,
and access to health and education. However, these impressive but fragile gains
will be at serious risk should the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) prove
incapable of taking on full security responsibilities as transition progresses.
Despite
welcome efforts by NATO member states, their allies and the Afghan government
to improve the quality of the ANSF, serious concerns remain about their conduct
and the lack of adequate accountability mechanisms. Reliance on irregular forces
such as the Afghan Local Police (ALP) in some areas has been problematic, with
reported abuses linked to inadequate vetting and training, and command and control
issues. In addition, transition is taking place in a context of rising violence
against civilians; growing internal displacement and increasing protection
concerns – raising the stakes for security forces that are effective,
responsive and accountable.
- “Chicago Summit Declaration on Afghanistan.” Heads of State and Government of Afghanistan and Nations contributing to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), May 2012.
We,
the nations contributing to ISAF, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan, met today in Chicago to renew our firm commitment to a sovereign,
secure and democratic Afghanistan. In line with the strategy which we agreed at
the Lisbon Summit, ISAF’s mission will be concluded by the end of 2014. But
thereafter Afghanistan will not stand alone: we reaffirm that our close
partnership will continue beyond the end of the transition period.
In
the ten years of our partnership the lives of Afghan men, women and children,
have improved significantly in terms of security, education, health care,
economic opportunity and the assurance of rights and freedoms. There is more to
be done, but we are resolved to work together to preserve the substantial
progress we have made during the past decade. The nations contributing to ISAF
will therefore continue to support Afghanistan on its path towards
self-reliance in security, improved governance, and economic and social
development. This will prevent Afghanistan from ever again becoming a safe
haven for terrorists that threaten Afghanistan, the region, and the world. A
secure and stable Afghanistan will make an important contribution to its
region, in which security, stability and development are interlinked.
ISAF
nations and Afghanistan join in honouring all those – civilian or military,
Afghan or foreign – who have lost their lives or been injured in the fight for
our common security and a prosperous, peaceful and stable Afghanistan. We pay
particular tribute to the courage of the armed forces of Afghanistan and ISAF
countries who live, train and fight next to each other every day. We are
determined that all our sacrifices will be justified by our strong long-term
partnership, which will contribute to a better future for the people of
Afghanistan.
- “Drugs in Afghanistan: A Forgotten Issue?” United States Institute of Peace, May 2012, by William Byrd and David Mansfield.
Opium
will continue to be an important part of the Afghan landscape—with political
and security as well as economic ramifications.
The
ongoing security transition (2011-2014) will be accompanied by greater risks to
Afghanistan's polity, security and economy from the illicit drug
industry—including through likely further increases in opium production.
The
priority attached to drug issues by the international community appears to be
declining; it would be perilous, however, to neglect the drugs issue.
- “Afghanistan Monthly Progress Report, April 2012.” UK Department for International Development, May 2012.
At
the NATO Joint Foreign and Defence Ministers Meeting on 18 April, the UK
announced a contribution of £70 million per annum to help fund the Afghan
National Security Force (ANSF) for a period after our forces withdraw from
their combat role at the end of 2014. Developing strong and capable Afghan
security forces that will help foster enduring stability in the country is
critical to our long-term strategy in Afghanistan. Their continued viability is
in our national interest and that of our partners. We must ensure that Afghanistan
can never again be used as a safe haven for terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda,
to plan and launch attacks against the UK and our allies. This of contribution
is aligned with international objectives for the Chicago Summit and underlines
our enduring commitment to a stable and secure Afghanistan after 2014.
- In May 2012,
a tribal court in Khyber Agency sentenced Dr. Shakil Afridi to 30 years in
prison under the colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR), a set of
laws adhered to in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The text of the FCR is at http://fatapakistan.blogspot.com/2011/11/full-text-of-frontier-crimes-regulation.html
- Women's World in Qajar Iran: Explore the lives of women during the Qajar era (1796-1925) through a wide array of materials from private family holdings and participating institutions. The site features bilingual access to thousands of personal papers, manuscripts, photographs, publications, everyday objects, works of art and audio materials. http://www.qajarwomen.org/en/index.html
- “The US Cost of the Afghan War: FY2002-FY2013.” CSIS.
It
is surprisingly difficult to get a meaningful estimate of the total cost of the
Afghan conflict, total spending on Afghan forces and total spending on various
forms of aid. More data are available on US efforts – which have dominated
military and aid spending, but even these data present serious problems in
reliability, consistency, and definition. Moreover, it is only since FY2012
that the US provided an integrated request for funding for the war as part of
its annual budget request. ...
It
addresses the fiscal cost to the US of the Afghan War from FY2000-FY2013. It
provides estimates of total cost, cost to the Department of Defense, and
estimates concerning aid costs to State, USAID, and other federal agencies. It
also reports on the total cost of international aid when this takes the form of
integrated aid to Afghan development and Afghan forces – a fraction of total
aid spending.
- “U.S.-Turkey Relations: A New Partnership.” Council on Foreign Relations.
Turkey
is a rising regional and global power facing, as is the United States, the
challenges of political transitions in the Middle East, bloodshed in Syria, and
Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons. As a result, it is incumbent upon the
leaders of the United States and Turkey to define a new partnership "in
order to make a strategic relationship a reality," says a new Council on
Foreign Relations (CFR)–sponsored Independent Task Force.
The
bipartisan Task Force is chaired by former secretary of state Madeleine K.
Albright and former national security adviser Stephen J. Hadley, and is
directed by Steven A. Cook, CFR's Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle
Eastern studies. The Task Force includes twenty-three prominent experts who
represent a variety of perspectives and backgrounds.
- “Borders Hardening Throughout Central Asia in Anticipation of NATO Pullout.” Myles G. Smith. Jamestown Foundation. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=borders%20hardening&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=39398&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=d0c68fbcb0833af3b11e4df0ecc7c4cf
- “Democracy in Central Asia: Sowing in Unfertile Fields.” Jos Boonstra. EUCAM: EU-Central Asia Monitoring - Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior and the Centre for European Policy Studies.
Central
Asia is one of the most repressive regions in the world. Compared with the two
other former-Soviet regions of Eastern Europe (Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine)
and the South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia), Central Asia shows
the least inclination towards democratisation. Although the five Central Asian
republics are very different from each other none can be labeled a democracy or
even claim to have
made substantial progress towards democratic practices.
- U.S. State Department Country
Reports for Human Rights Practices - 2011
- Kazakhstan http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160465.pdf
- Kyrgyz Republic http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160059.pdf
- Tajikistan http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160062.pdf
- Turkmenistan http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160480.pdf
- Uzbekistan http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160482.pdf
- Afghanistan http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186669.pdf
- Pakistan http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186685.pdf
- “Security and Development Approaches to Central Asia: The EU Compared to China and Russia”, Sébastien Peyrouse, Jos Boonstra, Marlène Laruelle. EUCAM: EU-Central Asia Monitoring - Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior and the Centre for European Policy Studies.
The increased involvement of external actors in Central Asia is
often characterised as a new great game. If there is a geopolitical game
between Russia and China and to a lesser extent the U.S., EU, Turkey, Iran,
India and Pakistan over influence in Central Asia it seems to be centered on
energy ‒ primarily gas from Turkmenistan. But there are other factors at play
that counter this perception of the region as solely a geopolitical struggle
between major powers. First, the Central Asian regimes are not merely
subordinates of external actors but have emerged as ‘players’ themselves,
choosing who to cooperate with and playing countries against each other.
Second, there is more at stake in Central Asia then just energy. There is a
long list of security threats ranging from internal threats to stability to
regional ethnic tensions and from bad interregional relations to negative
spill-over effects from Afghanistan. http://www.eucentralasia.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/Working_Papers/WP11.pdf
- “Drugs: A war lost in Afghanistan.” Foreign Policy.
The
May 20 NATO summit in Chicago was dominated by the issue of Afghanistan. Amidst
all the talk about withdrawing international combat troops by 2014, funding the
Afghan National Security Forces beyond 2014, and a doubtful political
settlement with the Taliban, one subject was absent from the formal agenda:
drugs.
Yet
in few other countries is the drugs trade so entrenched as it is in
Afghanistan. Accounting for between one-quarter and one-third of the national
economy, it is an integral part of the insecurity blighting Afghan life for the
past 30 years.
Debate
may continue for years as to whether the Western intervention in Afghanistan
has made the world safer or more insecure in the post-9/11 era. But it has not
only done nothing to reduce global supplies of illicit opium; rather, it has
made the problem worse.
- “US-Pakistan Relations: Common and Clashing Interests.” Shehzad Qazi, World Affairs Journal.
The
last calendar year was by far the most tumultuous in a decade of tense and
mistrustful relations between Pakistan and the United States. It began with CIA
contractor Raymond Davis shooting and killing two Pakistanis in broad daylight
in Lahore, then only worsened in May when Osama bin Laden was found and killed
in a US raid at a compound near the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad (an
episode that severely angered Pakistanis and embarrassed the Army, which was
domestically seen as unable to secure the homeland against foreign intrusion
and internationally suspected of providing refuge to America’s worst enemy).
Tensions escalated further as the US began pressuring Pakistan to attack the
Haqqani Network (HN), a Taliban group with safe havens in North Waziristan.
Pakistan refused, and crisis hit when the HN launched a twenty-two hour assault
on the US Embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul. An infuriated Admiral Mike
Mullen, outgoing chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lashed out against
Pakistan, saying the HN was a “veritable arm” of Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) agency. Weeks of diplomatic efforts finally thawed
relations, but just as the situation stabilized, a NATO attack on a Pakistani
checkpoint in Salala in late November threw the relationship into a tailspin.
Twenty-four Pakistani soldiers died in the two-hour assault. Pakistan was
furious, immediately suspending NATO supply lines and boycotting the Bonn
conference on Afghanistan held in early December.
- “Failure in Chicago: No U.S.-Pakistan Deal on NATO Supply Lines.” Reza Jan., American Enterprise Institute.
As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Chicago
concluded, the much hoped-for deal between the United States and Pakistan to
reopen NATO supply routes through Pakistan did not materialize. In fact,
hardened stances on display in Chicago on both sides chipped away at optimism
that a deal may be in the offing anytime soon.
The elusive deal to open the Pakistani Ground Lines of
Communication (GLOCs) appears in the end to have stumbled on a pricing issue,
but it was likely a misreading by both parties of the other’s negotiating red
lines and competing external and internal pressures that led to the showdown
becoming the spectacle that took center stage in Chicago. Both sides will
likely now re-gauge and approach the negotiating table afresh. Securing an
agreement on the GLOCs is important enough to both Pakistan and the U.S. that
the setback is unlikely to kill negotiating efforts altogether. It is possible that negotiations can now be
conducted in a more level-headed manner free of the artificial deadline and
inflated international expectations that the Chicago summit imposed on them.
The advantages to both sides of reopening the GLOCs are so great that a deal is
likely at some point. The experience of
the closure and the negotiations, however, has laid bare the changed
relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan. The idea that the two states are
real partners in a common struggle has been replaced by a naked process of
horse-trading. The shift to an openly transactional relationship between
Islamabad and Washington may be the most important outcome of this process.
- “Pakistan Missed Opportunity to Repair Ties with U.S.” Lisa Curtis, Heritage Foundation.
Pakistan
missed a valuable opportunity to create goodwill with the U.S. and other NATO
members when it failed to announce a reopening of NATO supply routes to Afghanistan
at the summit held Sunday and Monday in Chicago. Not only has Pakistan’s
closure of the supply routes over the past six months made the war effort more
expensive for NATO members, but its failure to crack down on Taliban and
Haqqani network sanctuaries on its soil has prolonged the war and undermined
the overall NATO mission in Afghanistan.
Unless Pakistan demonstrates that it is willing to make greater
efforts to help bring peace and stability to Afghanistan, the U.S. and NATO
should shift their diplomatic focus to working more closely with other
countries in the region, including the Central Asian states and India.
- “U.S.-Pakistan Reset: Still Need to Deal with Terrorist Sanctuaries.” Lisa Curtis, Heritage Foundation.
A
Pakistan parliamentary committee has released its recommendations for
“resetting” the parameters of U.S.–Pakistan relations. U.S.–Pakistan ties have
been severely strained since the November 26, 2011, NATO attack that killed 24
Pakistani soldiers along the border with Afghanistan. Since then, there have
been no high-level U.S. visits to Pakistan, and NATO supply routes running
through Pakistani territory have been shut down. The Pakistani parliament’s
efforts to reframe the relationship could be helpful in restoring ties, as long
as the U.S. brings its own terms to the table.
- “Getting Back to a Functional Relationship with Pakistan: The United States Needs to Stay Engaged.” Brian Katulis, Center for American Progress.
As the United States focuses on transitioning out of Afghanistan,
rebalancing its national security strategy, and pivoting toward East Asia, it
needs to remain engaged with Pakistan and encourage it to play a leadership
role in its region. Even after a downturn in relations over the past year,
disengaging and isolating Pakistan is not a practical option due to its size
and impact on broader security. The news that Pakistan will participate in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s summit in Chicago next week is a small
sign that efforts to get Pakistan to play a more constructive role in
Afghanistan and the region are working. But much more needs to be done.
- “Fixing Pakistan's Civil-Military Imbalance: A Dangerous Temptation.” Moeed Yusuf, United States Institute of Peace.
As the mistrust in
the U.S.-Pakistan relationship deepens, Washington’s frustration with Islamabad
has also grown. Over the past few months, influential voices have begun to
recommend that the U.S. take a more aggressive approach to Pakistan by playing
up Pakistan’s civil-military divide: prop up civilians while dealing harshly
with the military and its spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Specifically, views range from moving to a more hostile “containment” approach
that would box in the Pakistan military; to seeing “progressive” civilians as
partners and declaring the military as an adversary; to labeling specific
members of the military and ISI found to be involved in supporting militants as
“terrorists.”
The premise for this view is that the Pakistani military and
intelligence apparatus is undermining U.S. interests in Afghanistan and that it
has held civilian governments—who otherwise would be amenable to reversing
Pakistan’s traditional strategic paradigm—hostage to its own agenda. Underlying
this is the implicit belief that if the strength of the military is undercut
and if the civilians are able to take charge in letter and spirit, resulting
revisions in Pakistani threat perceptions and national priorities would overlap
more neatly with U.S. interests.
