1. Buried Treasure.  Archaeologists are racing to save Afghanistan's cultural heritage before the Chinese start digging on one of the world's most valuable new copper mines.   http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204542404577157281392227936.html#ixzz1lKc8KjrD

2. Afghan First Initiative Has Placed Work with Afghan Companies, but Is Affected by Inconsistent Contract Solicitation and Vetting, and Employment Data Is Limited, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR%20Audit-12-6.pdf  

3. Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/Jan2012/Lores%20PDF/2012JanBook.pdf  

4. DOD Improved its Accountability for Vehicles Provided to the Afghan National Security Forces, but Should Follow Up on End-Use Monitoring Findings, Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction http://www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/SIGAR%20Audit-12-4.pdf  

5. Thirty Years of Conflict: Drivers of Anti-Government Mobilisation in Afghanistan, 1978-2011,
   Antonio Giustozzi and Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.  The literature concerning the last 30 years of war in Afghanistan has over the last few years reached such a critical mass that it is now possible to identify structural factors in Afghan history that contributed to the various conflicts and have been its signal feature from 1978 onward. The state-building model borrowed from the neighbouring British and Tsarist empires in the late 19th century contained the seeds of later trouble, chiefly in the form of rural-urban friction that gained substantial force with the spread of modernity to rural Afghanistan starting in the 1950s. Following the Khalqi regime’s all-out assault on rural conservatism in 1978-79, this friction ignited into large-scale collective action by a variety of localised opposition groups, including political organisations, clerical networks, and Pakistani military intelligence, as well as the intelligence services of several other countries.  http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1203E-Drivers%20of%20Conflict%20IP%202012.pdf  

6. Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between Aid and Security in Afghanistan, Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder. Feinstein International Center.  Political and security objectives have always influenced U.S. foreign assistance policies and priorities. Since 9/11, however, development aid for countries like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan has increasingly and explicitly been militarized and subsumed into the national security agenda. In the U.S. as well as in other western nations, the re-structuring of aid programs to reflect the prevailing foreign policy agenda of confronting global terrorism has had a major impact on development strategies, priorities, and structures. The widely held assumption in military and foreign policy circles that development assistance is an important “soft power” tool to win consent for the presence of foreign troops in potentially hostile areas, and to promote stabilization and security objectives, assumes a relationship between poverty and insecurity that is shared by many in the development and humanitarian community.  http://sites.tufts.edu/feinstein/files/2012/01/WinningHearts-Final.pdf  

7. Healing the Legacies of Conflict in Afghanistan: Community Voices on Justice, Peace and Reconciliation, Emily Winterbotham, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit.  Ten years after the overthrow of the Taliban, Afghanistan is an environment of escalating conflict and prevailing impunity. In this context, the narrative of the Afghan government and its international partners has increasingly focused on ending the violence through negotiating with insurgent leaders and reintegrating their fighters into Afghan society. In their attempt to secure peace, policymakers have largely failed to include justice as a component of reconciliation and reintegration processes. This has continued the predominant approach since 2001 (and before) with the need for immediate stability outweighing the need for wartime accountability. The fact that the Afghan government and its international partners have failed to implement a comprehensive programme to provide justice or compensation for past and present wartime crimes has inhibited people’s ability to deal with the legacies of conflict. Subsequently, the majority of people participating in AREU’s research said they were struggling to cope emotionally, psychologically and practically, and the desire for some form of “closure” remains strong.  http://www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/1201E-Healing%20the%20Legacies%20of%20Conflict%20in%20Afghanistan%20SP%202011.pdf  

8. Pakistan's Perspective on Investigation Report Conducted by BG Stephen Clark into 26th November 2011 US Led ISAF/NATO Forces Attack on Pakistani Volcano and Boulder Posts in Mohmand Agency, Inter Services Public Relations, Government of Pakistan http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/press/pakistan.pdf  

9.      The Limits of the Pakistan-China Alliance, Lisa Curtis and Derek Scissors. Heritage Foundation.  After the U.S. raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan in May 2011, Pakistani political leaders played up their country’s relations with China, touting Beijing as an alternative partner to Washington. But China’s concerns over Pakistan’s future stability will likely limit the extent to which it will help Pakistan out of its economic difficulties. While China has an interest in maintaining strong security ties with Pakistan, the eco­nomic relationship is not very extensive and the notion that Chinese ties could serve as a replacement for U.S. ties is far-fetched. Instead of wringing its hands over Chinese influence on Pakistan, the U.S. should seek cooperation from Beijing in encouraging a more stable and prosperous Pakistan—which will benefit all parties involved.  http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2012/pdf/B2641.pdf  

10.  Report of the Commission of Inquiry Concerning the Gruesome Incident of the Abduction and Murder of Syed Saleem Shahzad, Submitted to the Government of Pakistan http://www.pid.gov.pk/REPORT.pdf  

11.  Security Sector Governance in Pakistan: Progress, But Many Challenges Persist, C. Christine Fair. Centre for International Governance Innovation.  The utility of the Pakistani army’s domination over nearly all aspects of the state in Pakistan was brought into question following the US Navy SEAL raid on Osama bin Laden’s hideout on May 2, 2011. Pakistanis wondered how these events could have occurred right under the military’s nose. This issue paper examines the prospects for security sector governance in Pakistan and identifies the reforms that are necessary for Pakistan’s government to make meaningful strides in this area. It begins by explaining the hegemonic role of the armed forces in the history of the state of Pakistan and the unique challenges of its contemporary security terrain before surveying security sector governance in several key areas: the security of Pakistan’s growing nuclear arsenal; the all powerful intelligence agencies; disaster management; law enforcement; the criminal justice system and support to jihadist groups. While the report elucidates persistent shortcomings of security governance in all areas, it also highlights key areas of recent improvement, including disaster management and control of nuclear arms.  http://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/SSR_Issue_no5.pdf  

12. Counter-IED Strategic Plan 2012-2016, Joint IED Defeat Organization https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/content/docs/20120106_JIEDDOC-IEDStrategicPlan_MEDprint.pdf

13.  An Afghanistan Without Institutions, A World Without Rest by Kip Whittington, Small Wars Journal.  Let’s not kid ourselves; Afghanistan will still be at war post-2014. Given that the coalition intends to end combat operations in 2014 while security problems linger on, the Afghans will certainly be left to manage the daily activities of a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign well into the “Transformation Decade” (2015-2024), discussed in-depth at the recent Bonn Conference. If the world doesn’t want to see Afghanistan plunge into chaos once again, there must be a serious focus on strengthening the institutions that will protect and run the country as a whole.  http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/an-afghanistan-without-institutions

14. Quarterly Report and Semiannual Report to the United States Congress, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/quarterlyreports/January2012/Report_-_January_2012.pdf#view=fit       

15. Few Contracts Terminated by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Resulted in Wasted Funds in Iraq, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-011.pdf#view=fit      

16. The Department of State's Process to Provide Information on Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-009.pdf#view=fit       

17. Development Fund for Iraq: Department of Defense Cannot Fully Account for the Funds it Used after the Coalition Provisional Authority Dissolved, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-008.pdf#view=fit       

18. Status of Recommendations Made by the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction to the Department of Defense, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-010.pdf#view=fit       

19. Iraq after America: 2012 Promises to be a Stormy Year for the Beleaguered Country, LTC Joel Rayburn, USA. Defining Ideas, Hoover Institution http://www.hoover.org/publications/defining-ideas/article/106226      

20. Development Funds for Iraq Returned to the Central Bank of Iraq, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction http://www.sigir.mil/files/audits/12-012-F.pdf#view=fit